Independent Submission S. Smyshlyaev, Ed.
Request for Comments: 9367 E. Alekseev
Category: Informational E. Griboedova
ISSN: 2070-1721 A. Babueva
L. Nikiforova
CryptoPro
February 2023
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GOST Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
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Version 1.3
Abstract
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The purpose of this document is to make the Russian cryptographic standards available to the Internet community for their implementation in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3.
This document defines the cipher suites, signature schemes, and key exchange mechanisms for using Russian cryptographic standards, called GOST algorithms, with TLS Version 1.3. Additionally, this document specifies a profile of TLS 1.3 with GOST algorithms to facilitate interoperable implementations. The IETF has not endorsed the cipher suites, signature schemes, or key exchange mechanisms described in this document.
Status of This Memo
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This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at its discretion and makes no statement about its value for implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by the RFC Editor are not candidates for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9367.
Copyright Notice
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Copyright © 2023 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document.
Table of Contents
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1. Introduction 2. Conventions Used in This Document 3. Basic Terms and Definitions 4. Cipher Suite Definition 4.1. Record Protection Algorithm 4.1.1. AEAD Algorithm 4.1.2. TLSTREE 4.1.3. SNMAX Parameter 4.2. Hash Algorithm 5. Signature Scheme Definition 5.1. Signature Algorithm 5.2. Elliptic Curve 5.3. SIGN Function 6. Key Exchange and Authentication 6.1. Key Exchange 6.1.1. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation 6.1.1.1. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation on the Client Side 6.1.1.2. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation on Server Side 6.1.1.3. Public Ephemeral Key Representation 6.1.2. Values for the TLS Supported Groups Registry 6.2. Authentication 6.3. Handshake Messages 6.3.1. Hello Messages 6.3.2. CertificateRequest 6.3.3. Certificate 6.3.4. CertificateVerify 7. IANA Considerations 8. Historical Considerations 9. Security Considerations 10. References 10.1. Normative References 10.2. Informative References Appendix A. Test Examples A.1. Example 1 A.1.1. Test Case A.1.2. Test Examples A.2. Example 2 A.2.1. Test Case A.2.2. Test Examples Contributors Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
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This document defines four new cipher suites (the TLS13_GOST cipher suites) and seven new signature schemes (the TLS13_GOST signature schemes) for the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3 that are based on Russian cryptographic standards GOST R 34.12-2015 [RFC7801], GOST R 34.11-2012 [RFC6986], and GOST R 34.10-2012 [RFC7091].
The TLS13_GOST cipher suites (see Section 4) have the following values:
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TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L = {0xC1, 0x03}
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L = {0xC1, 0x04}
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S = {0xC1, 0x05}
TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S = {0xC1, 0x06}
Each TLS13_GOST cipher suite specifies a pair (record protection algorithm, hash algorithm) such that:
- The record protection algorithm is the Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) algorithm (see Section 4.1.1) based on the GOST R 34.12-2015 block cipher [RFC7801] in the Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM) [RFC9058] and the external re-keying approach (see [RFC8645]) intended for increasing the lifetime of symmetric keys used to protect records.
- The hash algorithm is the GOST R 34.11-2012 algorithm [RFC6986].
Note: The TLS13_GOST cipher suites are divided into two types: the "_S" (strong) cipher suites and the "_L" (light) cipher suites (depending on the key lifetime limitations, see Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3).
The TLS13_GOST signature schemes have the following values:
gostr34102012_256a = 0x0709 gostr34102012_256b = 0x070A gostr34102012_256c = 0x070B gostr34102012_256d = 0x070C gostr34102012_512a = 0x070D gostr34102012_512b = 0x070E gostr34102012_512c = 0x070FEach TLS13_GOST signature scheme specifies a pair (signature algorithm, elliptic curve) such that:
- The signature algorithm is the GOST R 34.10-2012 algorithm [RFC7091].
- The elliptic curve is one of the curves defined in Section 5.2.
This document also specifies the key exchange mechanism with GOST algorithms for the TLS 1.3 protocol (see Section 6.1).
Additionally, this document specifies a TLS13_GOST profile of the TLS 1.3 protocol with GOST algorithms so that implementers can produce interoperable implementations. It uses TLS13_GOST cipher suites, TLS13_GOST signature schemes, and key exchange mechanisms that are defined in this document.
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2. Conventions Used in This Document
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
3. Basic Terms and Definitions
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This document follows the terminology from [RFC8446BIS] for "main secret".
This document uses the following terms and definitions for the sets and operations on the elements of these sets:
B_t The set of byte strings of length t, t >= 0; for t = 0, the B_t set consists of a single empty string of zero length. If A is an element in B_t, then A = (a_1, a_2, ... , a_t), where a_1, a_2, ... , a_t are in {0, ... , 255}. B* The set of all byte strings of a finite length (hereinafter referred to as strings) including the empty string. A[i..j] The string A[i..j] = (a_i, a_{i+1}, ... , a_j) in B_{j-i+1}, where A = (a_1, a_2, ... , a_t) in B_t and 1<=i<=j<=t. A[i] The integer a_i in {0, ... , 255}, where A = (a_1, a_2, ... , a_t) in B_t and 1<=i<=t. |A| The length of the byte string A in bytes. A | C The concatenation of strings A and C both belonging to B*; i.e., a string in B_{|A|+|C|}, where the left substring in B_|A| is equal to A and the right substring in B_|C| is equal to C. i & j Bitwise AND of integers i and j. STR_t The transformation that maps an integer i = 256^(t-1) * i_1 + ... + 256 * i_{t-1} + i_t into the byte string STR_t(i) = (i_1, ... , i_t) in B_t (the interpretation of the integer as a byte string in big-endian format). str_t The transformation that maps an integer i = 256^(t-1) * i_t + ... + 256 * i_2 + i_1 into the byte string str_t(i) = (i_1, ... , i_t) in B_t (the interpretation of the integer as a byte string in little-endian format). k The length of the block cipher key in bytes. n The length of the block cipher block in bytes. IVlen The length of the initialization vector in bytes. S The length of the authentication tag in bytes. E_i The elliptic curve indicated by the client in "supported_groups" extension. O_i The zero point of the elliptic curve E_i. m_i The order of the group of points belonging to the elliptic curve E_i. q_i The order of the cyclic subgroup of the group of points belonging to the elliptic curve E_i. h_i The cofactor of the cyclic subgroup that is equal to m_i / q_i. Q_sign The public key stored in the endpoint's certificate. d_sign The private key that corresponds to the Q_sign key. P_i The point of the elliptic curve E_i of the order q_i.(d_C^i, Q_C^i) The client's ephemeral key pair that consists of the
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private key and the public key corresponding to the elliptic curve E_i.
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(d_S^i, Q_S^i) The server's ephemeral key pair that consists of the
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private key and the public key corresponding to the elliptic curve E_i.
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4. Cipher Suite Definition
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This section defines the following four TLS13_GOST cipher suites:
- CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L = {0xC1, 0x03};
* CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L = {0xC1, 0x04};- CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S = {0xC1, 0x05};
- CipherSuite TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S = {0xC1, 0x06}.
Each cipher suite specifies a pair consisting of a record protection algorithm (see Section 4.1) and a hash algorithm (Section 4.2).
4.1. Record Protection Algorithm
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In accordance with Section 5.2 of [RFC8446], the record protection algorithm translates a TLSPlaintext structure into a TLSCiphertext structure. If the TLS13_GOST cipher suite is negotiated, the encrypted_record field of the TLSCiphertext structure MUST be set to the AEADEncrypted value computed as follows:
AEADEncrypted = AEAD-Encrypt(sender_record_write_key, nonce, additional_data, plaintext), where * the AEAD-Encrypt function is defined in Section 4.1.1;- the sender_record_write_key is a key derived from sender_write_key (see Section 7.3 of [RFC8446]) using the TLSTREE function defined in Section 4.1.2 and sequence number seqnum as follows:
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sender_record_write_key = TLSTREE(sender_write_key, seqnum);
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- the nonce is a value derived from sequence number seqnum and sender_write_iv (see Section 7.3 of [RFC8446]) in accordance with Section 5.3 of [RFC8446];
- the additional_data value is a record header that is generated in accordance with Section 5.2 of [RFC8446];
- the plaintext value is the TLSInnerPlaintext structure encoded in accordance with Section 5.2 of [RFC8446].
Note 1: The AEAD-Encrypt function is exactly the same as the AEAD- Encrypt function defined in [RFC8446], such that the key (the first argument) is calculated from sender_write_key and sequence number seqnum for each message separately to support the external re-keying approach according to [RFC8645].
Note 2: Sequence number is a value in the range 0-SNMAX, where the SNMAX value is defined in Section 4.1.3. The SNMAX parameter is specified by a particular TLS13_GOST cipher suite to limit an amount of data that can be encrypted under the same traffic key material (sender_write_key, sender_write_iv).
The record deprotection algorithm reverses the process of the record protection. In order to decrypt and verify a protected record with sequence number seqnum, the algorithm takes sender_record_write_key as an input, which is derived from sender_write_key, nonce, additional_data, and the AEADEncrypted value. The algorithm outputs the res value that is either plaintext or an error indicating that the decryption failed. If a TLS13_GOST cipher suite is negotiated, the res value MUST be computed as follows:
res = AEAD-Decrypt(sender_record_write_key, nonce, additional_data, AEADEncrypted),where the AEAD-Decrypt function is as defined in Section 4.1.1.
Note: The AEAD-Decrypt function is exactly the same as the AEAD- Decrypt function defined in [RFC8446], such that the key (the first argument) is calculated from sender_write_key and sequence number seqnum for each message separately to support the external re-keying approach according to [RFC8645].
4.1.1. AEAD Algorithm
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The AEAD-Encrypt and AEAD-Decrypt functions are defined as follows:
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AEAD-Encrypt(K, nonce, A, P) | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Input: | | - encryption key K in B_k, | | - unique vector nonce in B_IVlen, | | - additional authenticated data A in B_r, r >= 0, | | - plaintext P in B_t, t >= 0. | | Output: | | - ciphertext C in B_{|P|}, | | - authentication tag T in B_S. | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1. MGMnonce = STR_1(nonce[1] & 0x7f) | nonce[2..IVlen]; | | 2. (MGMnonce, A, C, T) = MGM-Encrypt(K, MGMnonce, A, P); | | 3. Return C | T. | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ | AEAD-Decrypt(K, nonce, A, C | T) | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | Input: | | - encryption key K in B_k, | | - unique vector nonce in B_IVlen, | | - additional authenticated data A in B_r, r >= 0, | | - ciphertext C in B_t, t >= 0, | | - authentication tag T in B_S. | | Output: | | - plaintext P in B_{|C|} or FAIL. | |-------------------------------------------------------------------| | 1. MGMnonce = STR_1(nonce[1] & 0x7f) | nonce[2..IVlen]; | | 2. res' = MGM-Decrypt(K, MGMnonce, A, C, T); | | 3. IF res' = FAIL then return FAIL; | | 4. IF res' = (A, P) then return P. | +-------------------------------------------------------------------+ where- the MGM-Encrypt and MGM-Decrypt functions are defined in [RFC9058];
- the length of authentication tag T is equal to n bytes (S = n);
- the length of the nonce parameter is equal to n bytes (IVlen = n).
Cipher suites TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L and TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S MUST use Kuznyechik [RFC7801] as a base block cipher for the AEAD algorithm. The block length n is 16 bytes (n = 16) and the key length k is 32 bytes (k = 32).
Cipher suites TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L and TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S MUST use Magma [RFC8891] as a base block cipher for the AEAD algorithm. The block length n is 8 bytes (n = 8) and the key length k is 32 bytes (k = 32).
4.1.2. TLSTREE
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The TLS13_GOST cipher suites use the TLSTREE function to support the external re-keying approach (see [RFC8645]). The TLSTREE function is defined as follows:
TLSTREE(K_root, i) = KDF_3(KDF_2(KDF_1(K_root, STR_8(i & C_1)), STR_8(i & C_2)), STR_8(i & C_3)), where- K_root in B_32;
* i in {0, 1, ... , 2^64 - 1}; * KDF_j(K, D), j = 1, 2, 3, is the key derivation function defined as follows: - KDF_1(K, D) = KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256(K, "level1", D), - KDF_2(K, D) = KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256(K, "level2", D), - KDF_3(K, D) = KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256(K, "level3", D),-
where the KDF_GOSTR3411_2012_256 function is defined in [RFC7836], K in B_32, D in B_8;
- C_1, C_2, C_3 are the constants defined by each cipher suite as follows:
+===========================================+======================+ | CipherSuites |C_1, C_2, C_3 | +===========================================+======================+ | TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L |C_1=0xf800000000000000| | | | | |C_2=0xfffffff000000000| | | | | |C_3=0xffffffffffffe000| +-------------------------------------------+----------------------+ | TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L |C_1=0xffe0000000000000| | | | | |C_2=0xffffffffc0000000| | | | | |C_3=0xffffffffffffff80| +-------------------------------------------+----------------------+ | TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S |C_1=0xffffffffe0000000| | | | | |C_2=0xffffffffffff0000| | | | | |C_3=0xfffffffffffffff8| +-------------------------------------------+----------------------+ | TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S |C_1=0xfffffffffc000000| | | | | |C_2=0xffffffffffffe000| | | | | |C_3=0xffffffffffffffff| +-------------------------------------------+----------------------+
Table 1
4.1.3. SNMAX Parameter
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The SNMAX parameter is the maximum number of records encrypted under the same traffic key material (sender_write_key and sender_write_iv) and is defined by each cipher suite as follows:
+===========================================+==================+ | CipherSuites | SNMAX | +===========================================+==================+ | TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L | SNMAX = 2^64 - 1 | +-------------------------------------------+------------------+ | TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L | SNMAX = 2^64 - 1 | +-------------------------------------------+------------------+ | TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S | SNMAX = 2^42 - 1 | +-------------------------------------------+------------------+ | TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S | SNMAX = 2^39 - 1 | +-------------------------------------------+------------------+
Table 2
4.2. Hash Algorithm
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The Hash algorithm is used for the key derivation process (see Section 7.1 of [RFC8446]), Finished message calculation (see Section 4.4.4 of [RFC8446]), Transcript-Hash function computation (see Section 4.4.1 of [RFC8446]), Pre-Shared Key (PSK) binder value calculation (see Section 4.2.11.2 of [RFC8446]), external re-keying approach (see Section 4.1.2), and other purposes.
If a TLS13_GOST cipher suite is negotiated, the Hash algorithm MUST be the GOST R 34.11-2012 hash algorithm [RFC6986] with a 32-byte (256-bit) hash value.
5. Signature Scheme Definition
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This section defines the following seven TLS13_GOST signature schemes:
enum { gostr34102012_256a(0x0709), gostr34102012_256b(0x070A), gostr34102012_256c(0x070B), gostr34102012_256d(0x070C), gostr34102012_512a(0x070D), gostr34102012_512b(0x070E), gostr34102012_512c(0x070F) } SignatureScheme;One of the TLS13_GOST signature schemes listed above SHOULD be used with the TLS13_GOST profile.
Each signature scheme specifies a pair consisting of the signature algorithm (see Section 5.1) and the elliptic curve (see Section 5.2). The procedure to calculate the signature value using TLS13_GOST signature schemes is defined in Section 5.3.
5.1. Signature Algorithm
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Signature algorithms corresponding to the TLS13_GOST signature schemes are defined as follows:
+=======================+=====================+============+ | SignatureScheme Value | Signature Algorithm | References | +=======================+=====================+============+ | gostr34102012_256a | GOST R 34.10-2012, | RFC 7091 | | | 32-byte key length | | +-----------------------+---------------------+------------+ | gostr34102012_256b | GOST R 34.10-2012, | RFC 7091 | | | 32-byte key length | | +-----------------------+---------------------+------------+ | gostr34102012_256c | GOST R 34.10-2012, | RFC 7091 | | | 32-byte key length | | +-----------------------+---------------------+------------+ | gostr34102012_256d | GOST R 34.10-2012, | RFC 7091 | | | 32-byte key length | | +-----------------------+---------------------+------------+ | gostr34102012_512a | GOST R 34.10-2012, | RFC 7091 | | | 64-byte key length | | +-----------------------+---------------------+------------+ | gostr34102012_512b | GOST R 34.10-2012, | RFC 7091 | | | 64-byte key length | | +-----------------------+---------------------+------------+ | gostr34102012_512c | GOST R 34.10-2012, | RFC 7091 | | | 64-byte key length | | +-----------------------+---------------------+------------+
Table 3
5.2. Elliptic Curve
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Elliptic curves corresponding to the TLS13_GOST signature schemes are defined as follows:
+=======================+=========================+============+ | SignatureScheme Value | Curve Identifier Value | References | +=======================+=========================+============+ | gostr34102012_256a | id-tc26-gost- | RFC 7836 | | | 3410-2012-256-paramSetA | | +-----------------------+-------------------------+------------+ | gostr34102012_256b | id-GostR3410-2001- | RFC 4357 | | | CryptoPro-A-ParamSet | | +-----------------------+-------------------------+------------+ | gostr34102012_256c | id-GostR3410-2001- | RFC 4357 | | | CryptoPro-B-ParamSet | | +-----------------------+-------------------------+------------+ | gostr34102012_256d | id-GostR3410-2001- | RFC 4357 | | | CryptoPro-C-ParamSet | | +-----------------------+-------------------------+------------+ | gostr34102012_512a | id-tc26-gost- | RFC 7836 | | | 3410-12-512-paramSetA | | +-----------------------+-------------------------+------------+ | gostr34102012_512b | id-tc26-gost- | RFC 7836 | | | 3410-12-512-paramSetB | | +-----------------------+-------------------------+------------+ | gostr34102012_512c | id-tc26-gost- | RFC 7836 | | | 3410-2012-512-paramSetC | | +-----------------------+-------------------------+------------+
Table 4
5.3. SIGN Function
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If the TLS13_GOST signature scheme is used, the signature value in the CertificateVerify message (see Section 6.3.4) MUST be calculated using the SIGN function defined as follows:
+-----------------------------------------------------+ | SIGN(d_sign, M) | |-----------------------------------------------------| | Input: | | - the sign key d_sign: 0 < d_sign < q; | | - the byte string M in B*. | | Output: | | - signature value sgn in B_{2*l}. | |-----------------------------------------------------| | 1. (r, s) = SIGNGOST(d_sign, M) | | 2. Return str_l(r) | str_l(s). | |-----------------------------------------------------+ where- q is the subgroup order of the group of points of the elliptic curve;
- l is defined as follows:
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- l = 32 for the gostr34102012_256a, gostr34102012_256b, gostr34102012_256c, and gostr34102012_256d signature schemes;
- l = 64 for the gostr34102012_512a, gostr34102012_512b, and gostr34102012_512c signature schemes;
- SIGNGOST is an algorithm that takes a private key d_sign and a message M as an input and returns a pair of integers (r, s) that is calculated during the signature generation process in accordance with the GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm (see Section 6.1 of [RFC7091]).
Note: The signature value sgn is the concatenation of two strings that are byte representations of r and s values in the little-endian format.
6. Key Exchange and Authentication
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The key exchange and authentication process for using the TLS13_GOST profile is defined in Sections 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3.
6.1. Key Exchange
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The TLS13_GOST profile supports three basic key exchange modes that are defined in [RFC8446]: Ephemeral Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDHE), PSK-only, and PSK with ECDHE.
Note: In accordance with [RFC8446], TLS 1.3 also supports key exchange modes based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol over finite fields. However, the TLS13_GOST profile MUST use modes based on the Diffie-Hellman protocol over elliptic curves.
In accordance with [RFC8446], PSKs can be divided into two types:
- internal PSKs that can be established during the previous connection;
- external PSKs that can be established out of band.
If the TLS13_GOST profile is used, PSK-only key exchange mode SHOULD be established via the internal PSKs, and external PSKs SHOULD be used only in PSK with ECDHE mode (see more in Section 9).
If the TLS13_GOST profile is used and ECDHE or PSK with ECDHE key exchange mode is used, the ECDHE shared secret SHOULD be calculated in accordance with Section 6.1.1 on the basis of one of the elliptic curves defined in Section 6.1.2.
6.1.1. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation
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If the TLS13_GOST profile is used, the ECDHE shared secret SHOULD be calculated in accordance with Sections 6.1.1.1 and 6.1.1.2. The public ephemeral keys used to obtain the ECDHE shared secret SHOULD be represented in the format described in Section 6.1.1.3.
6.1.1.1. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation on the Client Side
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The client calculates the ECDHE shared secret in accordance with the following steps:
Step 1. The client chooses from all supported curves E_1, ..., E_R the set of curves E_{i_1}, ..., E_{i_r}, 1 <= i_1 <= i_r <= R, where-
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- r >= 1 in the case of the first ClientHello message;
- r = 1 in the case of responding to the HelloRetryRequest message; E_{i_1} corresponds to the curve indicated in the "key_share" extension in the HelloRetryRequest message.
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Step 2. The client generates ephemeral key pairs (d_C^{i_1},
Q_C^{i_1}), ..., (d_C^{i_r}, Q_C^{i_r}) corresponding to the curves E_{i_1}, ..., E_{i_r}, where for each i in {i_1, ..., i_r}: -
* d_C^i is chosen from {1, ..., q_i - 1} at random;
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- Q_C^i = d_C^i * P_i.
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Step 3. The client sends the ClientHello message specified in
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accordance with Section 4.1.2 of [RFC8446] and Section 6.3.1 that contains:
- "key_share" extension with public ephemeral keys Q_C^{i_1}, ..., Q_C^{i_r} built in accordance with Section 4.2.8 of [RFC8446];
- "supported_groups" extension with supported curves E_1, ..., E_R built in accordance with Section 4.2.7 of [RFC8446].
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Note: The client MAY send an empty "key_share" extension in the first ClientHello message to request a group selection from the server in the HelloRetryRequest message and to generate an ephemeral key for the selected group only. The ECDHE shared secret may be calculated without sending HelloRetryRequest message if the "key_share" extension in the first ClientHello message contains the value corresponding to the curve that is selected by the server.
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Step 4. If the HelloRetryRequest message is received, the client
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MUST return to Step 1 and choose correct parameters in accordance with Section 4.1.2 of [RFC8446]. If the ServerHello message is received, the client proceeds to the next step. In other cases, the client MUST terminate the connection with the "unexpected_message" alert.
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Step 5. The client extracts curve E_res and ephemeral key Q_S^res,
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res in {1, ..., R}, from the ServerHello message and checks whether Q_S^res belongs to E_res. If this check fails, the client MUST terminate the connection with "handshake_failure" alert.
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Step 6. The client generates Q^ECDHE:
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Q^ECDHE = (X^ECDHE, Y^ECDHE) = (h_res * d_C^res) * Q_S^res.
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Step 7. The client MUST check whether the calculated shared secret
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Q^ECDHE is not equal to the zero point O_res. If this check fails, the client MUST terminate the connection with "handshake_failure" alert.
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Step 8. The ECDHE shared secret is the byte representation of the
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coordinate X^ECDHE of the point Q^ECDHE in the little-endian format:
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ECDHE = str_{coordinate_length}(X^ECDHE),
where the coordinate_length value is defined by the
particular elliptic curve (see Section 6.1.2).
6.1.1.2. ECDHE Shared Secret Calculation on Server Side
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Upon receiving the ClientHello message, the server calculates the ECDHE shared secret in accordance with the following steps:
Step 1. The server chooses the curve E_res, res in {1, ..., R}, from the list of the curves E_1, ..., E_R indicated in the "supported_groups" extension in the ClientHello message and the corresponding public ephemeral key Q_C^res from the list Q_C^{i_1}, ..., Q_C^{i_r}, 1 <= i_1 <= i_r <= R, indicated in the "key_share" extension. If the corresponding public ephemeral key is not found (res in {1, ..., R}\{i_1, ..., i_r}), the server MUST send the HelloRetryRequest message with the "key_share" extension indicating the selected elliptic curve E_res and wait for the new ClientHello message.Step 2. The server checks whether Q_C^res belongs to E_res. If this
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check fails, the server MUST terminate the connection with "handshake_failure" alert.
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Step 3. The server generates ephemeral key pair (d_S^res, Q_S^res)
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corresponding to E_res:
-
* d_S^res is chosen from {1, ..., q_res - 1} at random;-
-
- Q_S^res = d_S^res * P_res.
-
Step 4. The server sends the ServerHello message generated in
accordance with Section 4.1.3 of [RFC8446] and Section 6.3.1
with the "key_share" extension that contains public
ephemeral key Q_S^res corresponding to E_res.
-
Step 5. The server generates Q^ECDHE:
-
-
-
Q^ECDHE = (X^ECDHE, Y^ECDHE) = (h_res * d_S^res) * Q_C^res.
-
-
Step 6. The server MUST check whether the calculated shared secret
-
-
Q^ECDHE is not equal to the zero point O_res. If this check fails, the server MUST abort the handshake with "handshake_failure" alert.
-
Step 7. The ECDHE shared secret is the byte representation of the
-
-
coordinate X^ECDHE of the point Q^ECDHE in the little-endian format:
-
-
ECDHE = str_{coordinate_length}(X^ECDHE),
where the coordinate_length value is defined by the
particular elliptic curve (see Section 6.1.2).
6.1.1.3. Public Ephemeral Key Representation
-
This section defines the representation format of the public ephemeral keys generated during the ECDHE shared secret calculation (see Sections 6.1.1.1 and 6.1.1.2).
If the TLS13_GOST profile is used and ECDHE or PSK with ECDHE key exchange mode is used, the public ephemeral key Q indicated in the KeyShareEntry.key_exchange field MUST contain the data defined by the following structure:
struct { opaque X[coordinate_length]; opaque Y[coordinate_length]; } PlainPointRepresentation;where X and Y, respectively, contain the byte representations of x and y values of the point Q (Q = (x, y)) in the little-endian format and are specified as follows:
* X = str_{coordinate_length}(x);- Y = str_{coordinate_length}(y).
The coordinate_length value is defined by the particular elliptic curve (see Section 6.1.2).
6.1.2. Values for the TLS Supported Groups Registry
-
The "supported_groups" extension is used to indicate the set of the elliptic curves supported by an endpoint and is defined in Section 4.2.7 of [RFC8446]. This extension is always contained in the ClientHello message and optionally in the EncryptedExtensions message.
This section defines the following seven elliptic curves:
enum { GC256A(0x22), GC256B(0x23), GC256C(0x24), GC256D(0x25), GC512A(0x26), GC512B(0x27), GC512C(0x28) } NamedGroup;If the TLS13_GOST profile is used and ECDHE or PSK with ECDHE key exchange mode is used, one of the elliptic curves listed above SHOULD be used.
Each curve corresponds to the particular identifier and specifies the value of coordinate_length parameter (see "cl" column) as follows:
+===========+========================================+==+=========+ |Description| Curve Identifier Value |cl|Reference| +===========+========================================+==+=========+ |GC256A | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA |32|RFC 7836 | +-----------+----------------------------------------+--+---------+ |GC256B | id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet |32|RFC 4357 | +-----------+----------------------------------------+--+---------+ |GC256C | id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet |32|RFC 4357 | +-----------+----------------------------------------+--+---------+ |GC256D | id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet |32|RFC 4357 | +-----------+----------------------------------------+--+---------+ |GC512A | id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetA |64|RFC 7836 | +-----------+----------------------------------------+--+---------+ |GC512B | id-tc26-gost-3410-12-512-paramSetB |64|RFC 7836 | +-----------+----------------------------------------+--+---------+ |GC512C | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC |64|RFC 7836 | +-----------+----------------------------------------+--+---------+
Table 5
-
Note: The identifier values and the corresponding elliptic curves are the same as in [RFC9189].
6.2. Authentication
-
In accordance with [RFC8446], authentication can be performed via a signature with a certificate or via a symmetric PSK. The server side is always authenticated; the client side is optionally authenticated.
PSK-based authentication is performed as a side effect of key exchange. If the TLS13_GOST profile is used, external PSKs SHOULD be combined only with mutual authentication (see Section 9).
Certificate-based authentication is performed via Authentication messages and an optional CertificateRequest message (sent if client authentication is required). If the TLS13_GOST profile is used, the signature schemes used for certificate-based authentication are defined in Section 5 and Authentication messages are specified in Sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4. The CertificateRequest message is specified in Section 6.3.2.
6.3. Handshake Messages
-
The TLS13_GOST profile specifies the ClientHello, ServerHello, CertificateRequest, Certificate and CertificateVerify handshake messages that are described in further detail below.
6.3.1. Hello Messages
-
The ClientHello message is sent when the client first connects to the server or responds to the HelloRetryRequest message and is specified in accordance with Section 4.1.2 of [RFC8446].
If the TLS13_GOST profile is used, the ClientHello message MUST meet the following requirements:
- The ClientHello.cipher_suites field MUST contain the values defined in Section 4.
- If server authentication via a certificate is required, the extension_data field of the "signature_algorithms" extension MUST contain the values defined in Section 5 that correspond to the GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm.
- If server authentication via a certificate is required and the client uses optional "signature_algorithms_cert" extension, the extension_data field of this extension SHOULD contain the values defined in Section 5 that correspond to the GOST R 34.10-2012 signature algorithm.
- If the client wants to establish a TLS 1.3 connection using the ECDHE shared secret, the extension_data field of the "supported_groups" extension MUST contain the elliptic curve identifiers defined in Section 6.1.2.
The ServerHello message is sent by the server in response to the ClientHello message to negotiate an acceptable set of handshake parameters based on the ClientHello message and is specified in accordance with Section 4.1.3 of [RFC8446].
If the TLS13_GOST profile is used, the ServerHello message MUST meet the following requirements:
- The ServerHello.cipher_suite field MUST contain one of the values defined in Section 4.
- If the server decides to establish a TLS 1.3 connection using the ECDHE shared secret, the extension_data field of the "key_share" extension MUST contain the elliptic curve identifier and the public ephemeral key that satisfy the following conditions:
-
- The elliptic curve identifier corresponds to the value that was indicated in the "supported_groups" and the "key_share" extensions in the ClientHello message.
- The elliptic curve identifier is one of the values defined in Section 6.1.2.
- The public ephemeral key corresponds to the elliptic curve specified by the KeyShareEntry.group identifier.
6.3.2. CertificateRequest
-
This message is sent when the server requests client authentication via a certificate and is specified in accordance with Section 4.3.2 of [RFC8446].
If the TLS13_GOST profile is used, the CertificateRequest message MUST meet the following requirements:
- The extension_data field of the "signature_algorithms" extension MUST contain only the values defined in Section 5.
- If the server uses optional "signature_algorithms_cert" extension, the extension_data field of this extension SHOULD contain only the values defined in Section 5.
6.3.3. Certificate
-
This message is sent to convey the endpoint's certificate chain to the peer and is specified in accordance with Section 4.4.2 of [RFC8446].
If the TLS13_GOST profile is used, the Certificate message MUST meet the following requirements.
- Each endpoint's certificate provided to the peer MUST be signed using the algorithm that corresponds to a signature scheme indicated by the peer in its "signature_algorithms_cert" extension, if present (or in the "signature_algorithms" extension, otherwise).
- The signature algorithm used for signing certificates SHOULD correspond to one of the signature schemes defined in Section 5.
6.3.4. CertificateVerify
-
This message is sent to provide explicit proof that the endpoint has the private key corresponding to the public key indicated in its certificate and is specified in accordance with Section 4.4.3 of [RFC8446].
If the TLS13_GOST profile is used, the CertificateVerify message MUST meet the following requirements:
- The CertificateVerify.algorithm field MUST contain the signature scheme identifier that corresponds to the value indicated in the peer's "signature_algorithms" extension and is one of the values defined in Section 5.
- The CertificateVerify.signature field contains the sgn value that is computed as follows:
-
-
sgn = SIGN(d_sign, M),
-
where
-
- the SIGN function is defined in Section 5.3;
- d_sign is the sender's long-term private key that corresponds to the sender's long-term public key Q_sign from the sender's certificate;
- the message M is defined in accordance with Section 4.4.3 of [RFC8446].
7. IANA Considerations
-
IANA has added the following values to the "TLS Cipher Suites" registry with a reference to this RFC:
+=====+=========================================+=======+===========+ |Value|Description |DTLS-OK|Recommended| +=====+=========================================+=======+===========+ |0xC1,|TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_L|N |N | |0x03 | | | | +-----+-----------------------------------------+-------+-----------+ |0xC1,|TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L |N |N | |0x04 | | | | +-----+-----------------------------------------+-------+-----------+ |0xC1,|TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S|N |N | |0x05 | | | | +-----+-----------------------------------------+-------+-----------+ |0xC1,|TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_S |N |N | |0x06 | | | | +-----+-----------------------------------------+-------+-----------+
Table 6
-
IANA has added the following values to the "TLS SignatureScheme" registry with a reference to this RFC:
+========+====================+=============+ | Value | Description | Recommended | +========+====================+=============+ | 0x0709 | gostr34102012_256a | N | +--------+--------------------+-------------+ | 0x070A | gostr34102012_256b | N | +--------+--------------------+-------------+ | 0x070B | gostr34102012_256c | N | +--------+--------------------+-------------+ | 0x070C | gostr34102012_256d | N | +--------+--------------------+-------------+ | 0x070D | gostr34102012_512a | N | +--------+--------------------+-------------+ | 0x070E | gostr34102012_512b | N | +--------+--------------------+-------------+ | 0x070F | gostr34102012_512c | N | +--------+--------------------+-------------+
Table 7
8. Historical Considerations
-
In addition to the curve identifier values listed in Table 5, there are some additional identifier values that correspond to the signature schemes for historical reasons. They are as follows:
+====================+============================================+ | Description | Curve Identifier Value | +====================+============================================+ | gostr34102012_256b | id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet, | | | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetB | +--------------------+--------------------------------------------+ | gostr34102012_256c | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetC | +--------------------+--------------------------------------------+ | gostr34102012_256d | id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet, | | | id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetD | +--------------------+--------------------------------------------+
Table 8
-
The client should be prepared to handle any of them correctly if the corresponding signature scheme is included in the "signature_algorithms" or "signature_algorithms_cert" extensions.
9. Security Considerations
-
In order to create an efficient and side-channel resistant implementation while using the TLSTREE algorithm, the functions KDF_j, j = 1, 2, 3, SHOULD be called only when necessary (when the record sequence number seqnum reaches such a value that seqnum & C_j != (seqnum - 1) & C_j). Otherwise, the previous value should be used.
10. References
10.1. Normative References
-
[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC6986] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.11-2012: Hash Function", RFC 6986, DOI 10.17487/RFC6986, August 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6986>. [RFC7091] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and A. Degtyarev, "GOST R 34.10-2012: Digital Signature Algorithm", RFC 7091, DOI 10.17487/RFC7091, December 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7091>. [RFC7801] Dolmatov, V., Ed., "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher "Kuznyechik"", RFC 7801, DOI 10.17487/RFC7801, March 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7801>. [RFC7836] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Alekseev, E., Oshkin, I., Popov, V., Leontiev, S., Podobaev, V., and D. Belyavsky, "Guidelines on the Cryptographic Algorithms to Accompany the Usage of Standards GOST R 34.10-2012 and GOST R 34.11-2012", RFC 7836, DOI 10.17487/RFC7836, March 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7836>. [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. [RFC8446] Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>. [RFC8645] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., "Re-keying Mechanisms for Symmetric Keys", RFC 8645, DOI 10.17487/RFC8645, August 2019, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8645>. [RFC8891] Dolmatov, V., Ed. and D. Baryshkov, "GOST R 34.12-2015: Block Cipher "Magma"", RFC 8891, DOI 10.17487/RFC8891, September 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8891>. [RFC9058] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Nozdrunov, V., Shishkin, V., and E. Griboedova, "Multilinear Galois Mode (MGM)", RFC 9058, DOI 10.17487/RFC9058, June 2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9058>. [RFC9189] Smyshlyaev, S., Ed., Belyavsky, D., and E. Alekseev, "GOST Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 9189, DOI 10.17487/RFC9189, March 2022, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9189>.
10.2. Informative References
-
[RFC8446BIS]
Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft- ietf-tls-rfc8446bis-05, 24 October 2022, <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls- rfc8446bis-05>.
Appendix A. Test Examples
A.1. Example 1
A.1.1. Test Case
-
Test examples are given for the following instance of the TLS13_GOST profile:
- Full TLS Handshake is used.
- ECDHE key exchange mode is used. The elliptic curve GC512C is used for ECDHE shared secret calculation.
- Authentication is only used on the server side. The signature scheme gost34102012_256b is used.
- TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_KUZNYECHIK_MGM_S cipher suite is negotiated.
- Application Data is sent by the server prior to receiving the Finished message from the client.
- NewSessionTicket is sent after establishing a secure connection.
- Nine Application Data records are sent during the operation of the Record protocol. The sequence numbers are selected to demonstrate the operation of the TLSTREE function.
- Alert protocol is used for closure of the connection.
A.1.2. Test Examples
-
---------------------------Client--------------------------- ClientHello message: msg_type: 01 length: 0000DE body: legacy_version: 0303 random: 03030303030303030303030303030303 03030303030303030303030303030303 legacy_session_id: length: 00 vector: -- cipher_suites: length: 0002 vector: CipherSuite: C105 compression_methods: length: 01 vector: CompressionMethod: 00 extensions: length: 00B3 vector: Extension: /* supported_groups */ extension_type: 000A extension_data: length: 0004 vector: named_group_list: length: 0002 vector: /* GC512C */ 0028 Extension: /* signature_algorithms */ extension_type: 000D extension_data: length: 0010 vector: supported_signature_algorithms: length: 000E vector: /* gost34102012256a */ 0709 /* gost34102012256b */ 070A /* gost34102012256c */ 070B /* gost34102012256d */ 070C /* gost34102012512a */ 070D /* gost34102012512b */ 070E /* gost34102012512c */ 070F Extension: /* supported_versions */ extension_type: 002B extension_data: length: 0003 vector: versions: length: 02 vector: 0304 Extension: /* psk_key_exchange_modes */ extension_type: 002D extension_data: length: 0002 vector: ke_modes: length: 01 vector: /* psk_ke */ 00 Extension: /* key_share */ extension_type: 0033 extension_data: length: 0086 vector: length: 0084 vector: group: 0028 key_exchange: length: 0080 vector: 05EEBDF3DDC1D2F5F3822433241284E7 7641487938EA88721F26203E9792B5CB 97EB70EF02E8F72B7491D4F2CFDC332A DF7F1778E854A88DDC2113FEC527A151 71A04CB0C573793A7AEF9BBCA486B6B0 46B2149B46F4332903E5B7C438ADD05E 185EFBF45557475A8CCBF6ACED1A2EB4 16F916729D7CEF9CBD8334989304AFAE 0000: 01 00 00 DE 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 0010: 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 0020: 03 03 03 03 03 03 00 00 02 C1 05 01 00 00 B3 00 0030: 0A 00 04 00 02 00 28 00 0D 00 10 00 0E 07 09 07 0040: 0A 07 0B 07 0C 07 0D 07 0E 07 0F 00 2B 00 03 02 0050: 03 04 00 2D 00 02 01 00 00 33 00 86 00 84 00 28 0060: 00 80 05 EE BD F3 DD C1 D2 F5 F3 82 24 33 24 12 0070: 84 E7 76 41 48 79 38 EA 88 72 1F 26 20 3E 97 92 0080: B5 CB 97 EB 70 EF 02 E8 F7 2B 74 91 D4 F2 CF DC 0090: 33 2A DF 7F 17 78 E8 54 A8 8D DC 21 13 FE C5 27 00A0: A1 51 71 A0 4C B0 C5 73 79 3A 7A EF 9B BC A4 86 00B0: B6 B0 46 B2 14 9B 46 F4 33 29 03 E5 B7 C4 38 AD 00C0: D0 5E 18 5E FB F4 55 57 47 5A 8C CB F6 AC ED 1A 00D0: 2E B4 16 F9 16 72 9D 7C EF 9C BD 83 34 98 93 04 00E0: AF AE Record layer message: type: 16 legacy_record_version: 0301 length: 00E2 fragment: 010000DE030303030303030303030303 03030303030303030303030303030303 030303030303000002C105010000B300 0A000400020028000D0010000E070907 0A070B070C070D070E070F002B000302 0304002D000201000033008600840028 008005EEBDF3DDC1D2F5F38224332412 84E77641487938EA88721F26203E9792 B5CB97EB70EF02E8F72B7491D4F2CFDC 332ADF7F1778E854A88DDC2113FEC527 A15171A04CB0C573793A7AEF9BBCA486 B6B046B2149B46F4332903E5B7C438AD D05E185EFBF45557475A8CCBF6ACED1A 2EB416F916729D7CEF9CBD8334989304 AFAE 00000: 16 03 01 00 E2 01 00 00 DE 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 00010: 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 00020: 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 03 00 00 02 C1 05 00030: 01 00 00 B3 00 0A 00 04 00 02 00 28 00 0D 00 10 00040: 00 0E 07 09 07 0A 07 0B 07 0C 07 0D 07 0E 07 0F 00050: 00 2B 00 03 02 03 04 00 2D 00 02 01 00 00 33 00 00060: 86 00 84 00 28 00 80 05 EE BD F3 DD C1 D2 F5 F3 00070: 82 24 33 24 12 84 E7 76 41 48 79 38 EA 88 72 1F 00080: 26 20 3E 97 92 B5 CB 97 EB 70 EF 02 E8 F7 2B 74 00090: 91 D4 F2 CF DC 33 2A DF 7F 17 78 E8 54 A8 8D DC 000A0: 21 13 FE C5 27 A1 51 71 A0 4C B0 C5 73 79 3A 7A 000B0: EF 9B BC A4 86 B6 B0 46 B2 14 9B 46 F4 33 29 03 000D0: E5 B7 C4 38 AD D0 5E 18 5E FB F4 55 57 47 5A 8C 000E0: CB F6 AC ED 1A 2E B4 16 F9 16 72 9D 7C EF 9C BD 000F0: 83 34 98 93 04 AF AE ---------------------------Server--------------------------- ServerHello message: msg_type: 02 length: 0000B6 body: legacy_version: 0303 random: 83838383838383838383838383838383 83838383838383838383838383838383 legacy_session_id: length: 00 vector: -- cipher_suite: CipherSuite: C105 compression_method: CompressionMethod: 00 extensions: length: 008E vector: Extension: /* supported_versions */ extension_type: 002B extension_data: length: 0002 vector: selected_version: 0304 Extension: /* key_share */ extension_type: 0033 extension_data: length: 0084 vector: group: 0028 key_exchange: length: 0080 vector: 2F3C663FE74735A1C421160DF0F43266 185FD30B6E5D6E88FC4061FAEACAB338 B10A1BD20CB0B4EE757E74A0027D409F E937F01633A1E3F9A5518DEFD0F89F9D 3D9F6CC651413DEC2C74366D83C47EE1 DE4E421F65CD1163E94EA0C2E19ED45D 35558B937D9BFDC5ECC2B2A21B4EC3D5 3B29579A8FD5E074811028FBCF17994F 00000: 02 00 00 B6 03 03 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 00010: 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 00020: 83 83 83 83 83 83 00 C1 05 00 00 8E 00 2B 00 02 00030: 03 04 00 33 00 84 00 28 00 80 2F 3C 66 3F E7 47 00040: 35 A1 C4 21 16 0D F0 F4 32 66 18 5F D3 0B 6E 5D 00050: 6E 88 FC 40 61 FA EA CA B3 38 B1 0A 1B D2 0C B0 00060: B4 EE 75 7E 74 A0 02 7D 40 9F E9 37 F0 16 33 A1 00070: E3 F9 A5 51 8D EF D0 F8 9F 9D 3D 9F 6C C6 51 41 00080: 3D EC 2C 74 36 6D 83 C4 7E E1 DE 4E 42 1F 65 CD 00090: 11 63 E9 4E A0 C2 E1 9E D4 5D 35 55 8B 93 7D 9B 000A0: FD C5 EC C2 B2 A2 1B 4E C3 D5 3B 29 57 9A 8F D5 000B0: E0 74 81 10 28 FB CF 17 99 4F Record layer message: type: 16 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 00BA fragment: 020000B6030383838383838383838383 83838383838383838383838383838383 83838383838300C10500008E002B0002 030400330084002800802F3C663FE747 35A1C421160DF0F43266185FD30B6E5D 6E88FC4061FAEACAB338B10A1BD20CB0 B4EE757E74A0027D409FE937F01633A1 E3F9A5518DEFD0F89F9D3D9F6CC65141 3DEC2C74366D83C47EE1DE4E421F65CD 1163E94EA0C2E19ED45D35558B937D9B FDC5ECC2B2A21B4EC3D53B29579A8FD5 E074811028FBCF17994F 00000: 16 03 03 00 BA 02 00 00 B6 03 03 83 83 83 83 83 00010: 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 00020: 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 00 C1 05 00 00 00030: 8E 00 2B 00 02 03 04 00 33 00 84 00 28 00 80 2F 00040: 3C 66 3F E7 47 35 A1 C4 21 16 0D F0 F4 32 66 18 00050: 5F D3 0B 6E 5D 6E 88 FC 40 61 FA EA CA B3 38 B1 00060: 0A 1B D2 0C B0 B4 EE 75 7E 74 A0 02 7D 40 9F E9 00070: 37 F0 16 33 A1 E3 F9 A5 51 8D EF D0 F8 9F 9D 3D 00080: 9F 6C C6 51 41 3D EC 2C 74 36 6D 83 C4 7E E1 DE 00090: 4E 42 1F 65 CD 11 63 E9 4E A0 C2 E1 9E D4 5D 35 000A0: 55 8B 93 7D 9B FD C5 EC C2 B2 A2 1B 4E C3 D5 3B 000B0: 29 57 9A 8F D5 E0 74 81 10 28 FB CF 17 99 4F ---------------------------Client--------------------------- d_C^res: 00000: 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 00010: 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 00020: 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 00030: 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 04 Q_S^res: 00000: 2F 3C 66 3F E7 47 35 A1 C4 21 16 0D F0 F4 32 66 00010: 18 5F D3 0B 6E 5D 6E 88 FC 40 61 FA EA CA B3 38 00020: B1 0A 1B D2 0C B0 B4 EE 75 7E 74 A0 02 7D 40 9F 00030: E9 37 F0 16 33 A1 E3 F9 A5 51 8D EF D0 F8 9F 9D 00040: 3D 9F 6C C6 51 41 3D EC 2C 74 36 6D 83 C4 7E E1 00050: DE 4E 42 1F 65 CD 11 63 E9 4E A0 C2 E1 9E D4 5D 00060: 35 55 8B 93 7D 9B FD C5 EC C2 B2 A2 1B 4E C3 D5 00070: 3B 29 57 9A 8F D5 E0 74 81 10 28 FB CF 17 99 4F ECDHE: 00000: 4D E6 0D 21 EA 8F B9 22 0D 14 64 23 B4 90 DA 40 00010: CC EB C4 3B C5 89 DB 79 B8 31 A4 7D 6B 06 30 07 00020: DD 03 40 5A 1B 79 76 B6 23 DC AA 69 B0 11 AE 10 00030: 6E 7E 41 74 38 5F 86 26 E1 21 B5 99 43 63 C9 9F ---------------------------Server--------------------------- d_S^res: 00000: AA 3C A4 F4 A5 0A C0 5B 37 42 B1 35 B5 30 A9 F2 00010: 2A E4 F5 E1 85 30 1D EC 83 2E 77 BA 3B CD 6A F1 00020: 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 00030: 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 04 Q_C^res: 00000: 05 EE BD F3 DD C1 D2 F5 F3 82 24 33 24 12 84 E7 00010: 76 41 48 79 38 EA 88 72 1F 26 20 3E 97 92 B5 CB 00020: 97 EB 70 EF 02 E8 F7 2B 74 91 D4 F2 CF DC 33 2A 00030: DF 7F 17 78 E8 54 A8 8D DC 21 13 FE C5 27 A1 51 00040: 71 A0 4C B0 C5 73 79 3A 7A EF 9B BC A4 86 B6 B0 00050: 46 B2 14 9B 46 F4 33 29 03 E5 B7 C4 38 AD D0 5E 00060: 18 5E FB F4 55 57 47 5A 8C CB F6 AC ED 1A 2E B4 00070: 16 F9 16 72 9D 7C EF 9C BD 83 34 98 93 04 AF AE ECDHE: 00000: 4D E6 0D 21 EA 8F B9 22 0D 14 64 23 B4 90 DA 40 00010: CC EB C4 3B C5 89 DB 79 B8 31 A4 7D 6B 06 30 07 00020: DD 03 40 5A 1B 79 76 B6 23 DC AA 69 B0 11 AE 10 00030: 6E 7E 41 74 38 5F 86 26 E1 21 B5 99 43 63 C9 9F ---------------------------Server--------------------------- EncryptedExtensions message: msg_type: 08 length: 000002 body: extensions: length: 0000 vector: -- 00000: 08 00 00 02 00 00Record payload protection:
EarlySecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: 0^256, IKM: 0^256): 00000: FB DE FB E5 27 FE EA 66 5A AB 92 77 A2 16 3B 83 00010: 43 08 4F D1 91 C4 60 66 26 0F AC 6F D1 43 6C 72 Derived #0 = Derive-Secret(EarlySecret, "derived", "") = HKDF-Expand-Label(EarlySecret, "derived", "", 32): 00000: DB C3 C8 26 D8 77 A3 B7 D2 D2 45 3D BF DC 6C FB 00010: FB 11 51 B3 E8 4F 0C 8F 26 01 1D 8D 5B F3 ED F7 HandshakeSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #0, IKM: ECDHE): 00000: 44 24 5E 2C 43 32 D1 F7 8B 0F 8D 16 F4 03 EB 69 00010: ED 2A 40 53 84 7C DC 39 FA 8B 3D 29 74 F7 45 E7-
HM1 = (ClientHello, ServerHello)
TH1 = Transcript-Hash(HM1): 00000: 99 3B A7 22 12 4A F3 CB FD 47 71 E7 FA E3 2A C1 00010: D0 E9 27 8C F7 84 3F CB C6 20 E1 A0 08 5A 87 A1-
server_handshake_traffic_secret (SHTS):
SHTS = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "s hs traffic", HM1) = HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "s hs traffic", TH1, 32): 00000: 70 A5 F2 46 3D F6 0D BA A2 36 8B 67 FD 45 AE FF 00010: 7C 1A 0B A4 2D 8A BD 72 41 5E CD 1D 94 E9 EF 54 server_write_key_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(SHTS, "key", "", 32): 00000: E1 37 64 B5 4B 9E 1B 47 D4 33 98 D6 D2 16 DF 24 00010: C2 89 A3 96 AB 6C 5B 52 4B BB 9C 06 F3 9F EF 01 server_write_iv_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(SHTS, "iv", "", 16): 00000: 69 69 FF AA A4 52 52 81 EE BB EB 4C BD 0B 64 0E server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_hs, 0): 00000: 56 EE 18 13 72 72 49 C9 DC DF 35 13 78 7E DB 93 00010: DF 62 C6 1E E7 B1 26 C5 0F 26 C0 AA AF AE 00 E1 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 nonce: 00000: 69 69 FF AA A4 52 52 81 EE BB EB 4C BD 0B 64 0E additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 00 17 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000: 08 00 00 02 00 00 16 TLSCiphertext: 00000: 17 03 03 00 17 94 0E 5D 2C 75 3A E5 FE BD 20 01 00010: 2C C9 E3 EB 24 A3 79 84 1E 02 AB BE Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 0017 encrypted_record: 940E5D2C753AE5FEBD20012CC9E3EB24 A379841E02ABBE 00000: 17 03 03 00 17 94 0E 5D 2C 75 3A E5 FE BD 20 01 00010: 2C C9 E3 EB 24 A3 79 84 1E 02 AB BE ---------------------------Server--------------------------- Certificate message: msg_type: 0B length: 000151 body: certificate_request_context: length: 00 vector: -- certificate_list: length: 00014D vector: ASN.1Cert: length: 000148 vector: 308201443081F2A00302010202023039 300A06082A85030701010302301B3119 301706035504031310676F73742E6578 616D706C652E636F6D301E170D323030 3232383131303833375A170D33303032 32353131303833375A301B3119301706 035504031310676F73742E6578616D70 6C652E636F6D305E301706082A850307 01010101300B06092A85030701020101 020343000440F383CEE83048B4EB14C7 1A7F6DE44A37CE11A6AC1750F1CFB8DA D8A38CCDD8FD06656F7CFC075F4083C3 716221478F1EE24C6B1B70CCE3C72AFD 2ACE65C775BCA321301F301D0603551D 0E04160414F330FA7166DF095AF3A073 BC3B8EA356D7DFAC71300A06082A8503 0701010302034100AB2EDA23F49B4862 3B0CFF5906B7DD3C23B473570B296A08 71DD15EF9A33201B97904A5CFA6C931C 5473DC0C5A5F2FBB2E50CF587AE27C4D 8E52EB80189DD08B extensions: length: 0000 vector: -- 00000: 0B 00 01 51 00 00 01 4D 00 01 48 30 82 01 44 30 00010: 81 F2 A0 03 02 01 02 02 02 30 39 30 0A 06 08 2A 00020: 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 30 1B 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 00030: 04 03 13 10 67 6F 73 74 2E 65 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 00040: 2E 63 6F 6D 30 1E 17 0D 32 30 30 32 32 38 31 31 00050: 30 38 33 37 5A 17 0D 33 30 30 32 32 35 31 31 30 00060: 38 33 37 5A 30 1B 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 03 13 00070: 10 67 6F 73 74 2E 65 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 2E 63 6F 00080: 6D 30 5E 30 17 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 01 30 00090: 0B 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 01 02 03 43 00 04 000A0: 40 F3 83 CE E8 30 48 B4 EB 14 C7 1A 7F 6D E4 4A 000B0: 37 CE 11 A6 AC 17 50 F1 CF B8 DA D8 A3 8C CD D8 000C0: FD 06 65 6F 7C FC 07 5F 40 83 C3 71 62 21 47 8F 000D0: 1E E2 4C 6B 1B 70 CC E3 C7 2A FD 2A CE 65 C7 75 000E0: BC A3 21 30 1F 30 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 000F0: F3 30 FA 71 66 DF 09 5A F3 A0 73 BC 3B 8E A3 56 00100: D7 DF AC 71 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 00110: 03 41 00 AB 2E DA 23 F4 9B 48 62 3B 0C FF 59 06 00120: B7 DD 3C 23 B4 73 57 0B 29 6A 08 71 DD 15 EF 9A 00130: 33 20 1B 97 90 4A 5C FA 6C 93 1C 54 73 DC 0C 5A 00140: 5F 2F BB 2E 50 CF 58 7A E2 7C 4D 8E 52 EB 80 18 00150: 9D D0 8B 00 00Record payload protection:
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_hs, 1): 00000: 56 EE 18 13 72 72 49 C9 DC DF 35 13 78 7E DB 93 00010: DF 62 C6 1E E7 B1 26 C5 0F 26 C0 AA AF AE 00 E1 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 nonce: 00000: 69 69 FF AA A4 52 52 81 EE BB EB 4C BD 0B 64 0F additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 01 66 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000: 0B 00 01 51 00 00 01 4D 00 01 48 30 82 01 44 30 00010: 81 F2 A0 03 02 01 02 02 02 30 39 30 0A 06 08 2A 00020: 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 30 1B 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 00030: 04 03 13 10 67 6F 73 74 2E 65 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 00040: 2E 63 6F 6D 30 1E 17 0D 32 30 30 32 32 38 31 31 00050: 30 38 33 37 5A 17 0D 33 30 30 32 32 35 31 31 30 00060: 38 33 37 5A 30 1B 31 19 30 17 06 03 55 04 03 13 00070: 10 67 6F 73 74 2E 65 78 61 6D 70 6C 65 2E 63 6F 00080: 6D 30 5E 30 17 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 01 01 30 00090: 0B 06 09 2A 85 03 07 01 02 01 01 02 03 43 00 04 000A0: 40 F3 83 CE E8 30 48 B4 EB 14 C7 1A 7F 6D E4 4A 000B0: 37 CE 11 A6 AC 17 50 F1 CF B8 DA D8 A3 8C CD D8 000C0: FD 06 65 6F 7C FC 07 5F 40 83 C3 71 62 21 47 8F 000D0: 1E E2 4C 6B 1B 70 CC E3 C7 2A FD 2A CE 65 C7 75 000E0: BC A3 21 30 1F 30 1D 06 03 55 1D 0E 04 16 04 14 000F0: F3 30 FA 71 66 DF 09 5A F3 A0 73 BC 3B 8E A3 56 00100: D7 DF AC 71 30 0A 06 08 2A 85 03 07 01 01 03 02 00110: 03 41 00 AB 2E DA 23 F4 9B 48 62 3B 0C FF 59 06 00120: B7 DD 3C 23 B4 73 57 0B 29 6A 08 71 DD 15 EF 9A 00130: 33 20 1B 97 90 4A 5C FA 6C 93 1C 54 73 DC 0C 5A 00140: 5F 2F BB 2E 50 CF 58 7A E2 7C 4D 8E 52 EB 80 18 00150: 9D D0 8B 00 00 16 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 0166 encrypted_record: F57944FE9A599A76E7FE9C26E3FCE5BB AC4DDCF68EF2E77624E33E80B6743E39 10502EE419A219B3BB6A1712D15458BB 897D3DAC7A48769945C89237DFB86620 CC31C456B4374B075905E42AB5333742 3463819982DC6D76A067C4FD83BD3E47 9CD9B7FD2926A5A63B1E88B1525DB976 C7F409190F955AE9F0AC5F976A471F23 675DEB9B24E162D24F494ECDC483A070 7129F3BD17D0FAC4944F2B3BF140D616 D654709297495B23898893B211505856 EEC1A96BC4DCF78A016798E5500D662C 54A74BDF6A7F300AC9B72299B4F15F6F 449F396CE1D0C9243CBC1C86BECD5CAB BFDF50197B7AFF4BE903D7E3311B729B C32D09D2D0DCE06622985AE037DC2F87 CB0C492F2D5106B259CC86E227CC8338 C1DF6C63576B17DB9655FD255F156E1F 4F767FAFB74471731E4225256818DE94 64218263D7CF7B87EB5222E76DE6C951 E462CCCCC53E06387BB4FEDEFD34B9C1 3AB4EE3D49057CD2672F852A5F692408 29B92341CDC9TLSCiphertext:
00000: 17 03 03 01 66 F5 79 44 FE 9A 59 9A 76 E7 FE 9C 00010: 26 E3 FC E5 BB AC 4D DC F6 8E F2 E7 76 24 E3 3E 00020: 80 B6 74 3E 39 10 50 2E E4 19 A2 19 B3 BB 6A 17 00030: 12 D1 54 58 BB 89 7D 3D AC 7A 48 76 99 45 C8 92 00040: 37 DF B8 66 20 CC 31 C4 56 B4 37 4B 07 59 05 E4 00050: 2A B5 33 37 42 34 63 81 99 82 DC 6D 76 A0 67 C4 00060: FD 83 BD 3E 47 9C D9 B7 FD 29 26 A5 A6 3B 1E 88 00070: B1 52 5D B9 76 C7 F4 09 19 0F 95 5A E9 F0 AC 5F 00080: 97 6A 47 1F 23 67 5D EB 9B 24 E1 62 D2 4F 49 4E 00090: CD C4 83 A0 70 71 29 F3 BD 17 D0 FA C4 94 4F 2B 000A0: 3B F1 40 D6 16 D6 54 70 92 97 49 5B 23 89 88 93 000B0: B2 11 50 58 56 EE C1 A9 6B C4 DC F7 8A 01 67 98 000C0: E5 50 0D 66 2C 54 A7 4B DF 6A 7F 30 0A C9 B7 22 000D0: 99 B4 F1 5F 6F 44 9F 39 6C E1 D0 C9 24 3C BC 1C 000E0: 86 BE CD 5C AB BF DF 50 19 7B 7A FF 4B E9 03 D7 000F0: E3 31 1B 72 9B C3 2D 09 D2 D0 DC E0 66 22 98 5A 00100: E0 37 DC 2F 87 CB 0C 49 2F 2D 51 06 B2 59 CC 86 00110: E2 27 CC 83 38 C1 DF 6C 63 57 6B 17 DB 96 55 FD 00120: 25 5F 15 6E 1F 4F 76 7F AF B7 44 71 73 1E 42 25 00130: 25 68 18 DE 94 64 21 82 63 D7 CF 7B 87 EB 52 22 00140: E7 6D E6 C9 51 E4 62 CC CC C5 3E 06 38 7B B4 FE 00150: DE FD 34 B9 C1 3A B4 EE 3D 49 05 7C D2 67 2F 85 00160: 2A 5F 69 24 08 29 B9 23 41 CD C9 ---------------------------Server---------------------------HMCertificateVerify = (ClientHello, ServerHello,
EncryptedExtensions, Certificate)
Transcript-Hash(HMCertificateVerify):
00000: E0 CC 4B C1 4B EC 5D 13 19 2C DC 66 22 B4 FD A9 00010: 67 6A 1B 50 E4 56 83 0B B5 F0 7E 01 21 22 73 06k (random for signature algorithm):
00000: 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 00010: 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85sgn:
00000: A0 AA 13 91 5C 5B 80 C6 02 E2 FD 85 80 4F 99 2C 00010: 77 15 97 AD 37 85 7A D6 BC 2A 9D 7B C5 FE BE C3 00020: 7C 72 94 BA A2 3C F6 9D 03 E4 71 0B D7 08 13 FD 00030: AC 59 6B C1 58 E7 56 BD 37 1C 44 2E 95 22 DE 87 CertificateVerify message: msg_type: 0F length: 000044 body: algorithm: 070A signature: length: 0040 vector: A0AA13915C5B80C602E2FD85804F992C 771597AD37857AD6BC2A9D7BC5FEBEC3 7C7294BAA23CF69D03E4710BD70813FD AC596BC158E756BD371C442E9522DE87 00000: 0F 00 00 44 07 0A 00 40 A0 AA 13 91 5C 5B 80 C6 00010: 02 E2 FD 85 80 4F 99 2C 77 15 97 AD 37 85 7A D6 00020: BC 2A 9D 7B C5 FE BE C3 7C 72 94 BA A2 3C F6 9D 00030: 03 E4 71 0B D7 08 13 FD AC 59 6B C1 58 E7 56 BD 00040: 37 1C 44 2E 95 22 DE 87Record payload protection:
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_hs, 2): 00000: 56 EE 18 13 72 72 49 C9 DC DF 35 13 78 7E DB 93 00010: DF 62 C6 1E E7 B1 26 C5 0F 26 C0 AA AF AE 00 E1 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 nonce: 00000: 69 69 FF AA A4 52 52 81 EE BB EB 4C BD 0B 64 0C additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 00 59 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000: 0F 00 00 44 07 0A 00 40 A0 AA 13 91 5C 5B 80 C6 00010: 02 E2 FD 85 80 4F 99 2C 77 15 97 AD 37 85 7A D6 00020: BC 2A 9D 7B C5 FE BE C3 7C 72 94 BA A2 3C F6 9D 00030: 03 E4 71 0B D7 08 13 FD AC 59 6B C1 58 E7 56 BD 00040: 37 1C 44 2E 95 22 DE 87 16 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 0059 encrypted_record: 52631D5BFDF48254BDFB5F9E02A6A527 0163BCE1E0D818E8D74176535C6CDD25 2DE065AE77984A65ADBA036D59CF45B9 A0047BABCCD0B28044D34BCFD09E6E46 27044B26FE5CA734FCB08607146F41A8 71C3F95384B48ADABCTLSCiphertext:
00000: 17 03 03 00 59 52 63 1D 5B FD F4 82 54 BD FB 5F 00010: 9E 02 A6 A5 27 01 63 BC E1 E0 D8 18 E8 D7 41 76 00020: 53 5C 6C DD 25 2D E0 65 AE 77 98 4A 65 AD BA 03 00030: 6D 59 CF 45 B9 A0 04 7B AB CC D0 B2 80 44 D3 4B 00040: CF D0 9E 6E 46 27 04 4B 26 FE 5C A7 34 FC B0 86 00050: 07 14 6F 41 A8 71 C3 F9 53 84 B4 8A DA BC ---------------------------Server--------------------------- server_finished_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(SHTS, "finished", "", 32): 00000: 53 F1 C0 38 8F 8A 70 C0 BC A0 DD 21 A0 30 F2 38 00010: 1C 34 37 CD 0E 7E C9 3D 0A 96 5E 25 63 2D D7 9A HMFinished = (ClientHello, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions Certificate, CertificateVerify) Transcript-Hash(HMFinished): 00000: 03 EC 9B 1D 0B 37 41 42 45 72 BA C9 DF 3A A5 2C 00010: 03 EF E9 E9 58 07 69 43 AF D8 58 19 BC 60 2F 46 FinishedHash = HMAC(server_finished_key,Transcript-Hash(HMFinished)): 00000: E0 BA A3 36 14 E0 69 69 7E 4D FA B0 71 B9 72 57 00010: 73 F8 FE 1A 32 6A 66 2D 0F 52 30 9B 45 B6 E0 31 Finished message: msg_type: 14 length: 000020 body: verify_data: E0BAA33614E069697E4DFAB071B97257 73F8FE1A326A662D0F52309B45B6E031 00000: 14 00 00 20 E0 BA A3 36 14 E0 69 69 7E 4D FA B0 00010: 71 B9 72 57 73 F8 FE 1A 32 6A 66 2D 0F 52 30 9B 00020: 45 B6 E0 31Record payload protection:
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_hs, 3): 00000: 56 EE 18 13 72 72 49 C9 DC DF 35 13 78 7E DB 93 00010: DF 62 C6 1E E7 B1 26 C5 0F 26 C0 AA AF AE 00 E1 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 nonce: 00000: 69 69 FF AA A4 52 52 81 EE BB EB 4C BD 0B 64 0D additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 00 35 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000: 14 00 00 20 E0 BA A3 36 14 E0 69 69 7E 4D FA B0 00010: 71 B9 72 57 73 F8 FE 1A 32 6A 66 2D 0F 52 30 9B 00020: 45 B6 E0 31 16 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 0035 encrypted_record: 57B1706C4918F67EACCA457F7D5B537C CE5036B4004C778022B97EE802320398 119404506680ADD7D6A6CD7C8153B755 3C6E646AD6TLSCiphertext:
00000: 17 03 03 00 35 57 B1 70 6C 49 18 F6 7E AC CA 45 00010: 7F 7D 5B 53 7C CE 50 36 B4 00 4C 77 80 22 B9 7E 00020: E8 02 32 03 98 11 94 04 50 66 80 AD D7 D6 A6 CD 00030: 7C 81 53 B7 55 3C 6E 64 6A D6 ---------------------------Server--------------------------- Application Data: HELO gost.example.com\r\nRecord payload protection:
Derived #1 = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "") = HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "", 32): 00000: EA 3C 54 BB D1 4E F9 D7 50 77 6F AB E3 95 BE 2A 00010: BD DB BB B7 1C 13 C2 BD 60 9E 35 15 79 4A FA 02 MainSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #1, IKM: 0^256): 00000: 31 BB 1D 61 2C CD 53 32 68 8A 55 1A 48 CA 25 0F 00010: 24 78 3D 4A B0 B4 A7 6D 3F E5 06 7A 26 16 A4 A3 HM2 = (ClientHello, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions, Certificate, CertificateVerify, Server Finished) TH2 = Transcript-Hash(HM2): 00000: 9E BC 5F BE 32 D9 F4 0D 48 F8 EE CE BB 62 31 A5 00010: 33 C2 C0 EF 24 32 77 B9 6D 6F 7A D3 BB FD 14 94 server_application_traffic_secret (SATS): SATS = Derive-Secret(MainSecret, "s ap traffic", HM2) = HKDF-Expand-Label(MainSecret, "s ap traffic", TH2, 32): 00000: 87 73 4F 4B 4C FD 17 B9 7B 83 4D 82 2D 9D 73 79 00010: F6 F5 E0 3B 80 B5 2A EB 2A FF 51 0E DD 83 DB D2 server_write_key_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(SATS, "key", "", 32): 00000: 47 5E 4C 51 4C C6 31 8C 3A 5F 00 0F 12 65 BD 1A 00010: B5 F0 DE 1A F3 57 ED 00 79 EC 5F F0 AF BD 03 0C server_write_iv_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(SATS, "iv", "", 16): 00000: AF E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 B8 server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 0): 00000: C8 FC 93 D7 C5 86 F2 B0 A3 10 1B AA 6A 97 9E 4E 00010: 38 86 70 65 51 E8 11 87 E9 78 80 40 9C 7E 8E E9 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 nonce: 00000: 2F E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 B8 additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 00 28 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000: 48 45 4C 4F 20 67 6F 73 74 2E 65 78 61 6D 70 6C 00010: 65 2E 63 6F 6D 0D 0A 17 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 0028 encrypted_record: ABB8C372C79681DCE5C3C909DD039D59 8161FD3E6CE5D6F9CA5715BD6B5C1824 7FB26AC1AB396A4ETLSCiphertext:
00000: 17 03 03 00 28 AB B8 C3 72 C7 96 81 DC E5 C3 C9 00010: 09 DD 03 9D 59 81 61 FD 3E 6C E5 D6 F9 CA 57 15 00020: BD 6B 5C 18 24 7F B2 6A C1 AB 39 6A 4E ---------------------------Client--------------------------- client_finished_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(CHTS, "finished", "", 32): 00000: 2F 21 54 8C F5 27 78 69 AE 49 0D E7 BC 15 AC E6 00010: 39 F6 57 E3 58 2A 5A 63 4B 0A 91 56 95 D5 4C 42 HM2 = (ClientHello, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions, Certificate, CertificateVerify, Server Finished) TH2 = Transcript-Hash(HM2): 00000: 9E BC 5F BE 32 D9 F4 0D 48 F8 EE CE BB 62 31 A5 00010: 33 C2 C0 EF 24 32 77 B9 6D 6F 7A D3 BB FD 14 94 FinishedHash = HMAC(client_finished_key, TH2): 00000: 08 5F C7 FD 79 B6 D1 11 CD 8D 3F F6 B2 3A 06 5A 00010: 7A F7 A6 38 73 42 A5 F3 57 68 14 CD 00 47 19 D2 Finished message: msg_type: 14 length: 000020 body: verify_data: 085FC7FD79B6D111CD8D3FF6B23A065A 7AF7A6387342A5F3576814CD004719D2 00000: 14 00 00 20 08 5F C7 FD 79 B6 D1 11 CD 8D 3F F6 00010: B2 3A 06 5A 7A F7 A6 38 73 42 A5 F3 57 68 14 CD 00020: 00 47 19 D2Record payload protection:
EarlySecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: 0^256, IKM: 0^256): 00000: FB DE FB E5 27 FE EA 66 5A AB 92 77 A2 16 3B 83 00010: 43 08 4F D1 91 C4 60 66 26 0F AC 6F D1 43 6C 72 Derived #0 = Derive-Secret(EarlySecret, "derived", "") = HKDF-Expand-Label(EarlySecret, "derived", "", 32): 00000: DB C3 C8 26 D8 77 A3 B7 D2 D2 45 3D BF DC 6C FB 00010: FB 11 51 B3 E8 4F 0C 8F 26 01 1D 8D 5B F3 ED F7 HandshakeSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #0, IKM: ECDHE): 00000: 44 24 5E 2C 43 32 D1 F7 8B 0F 8D 16 F4 03 EB 69 00010: ED 2A 40 53 84 7C DC 39 FA 8B 3D 29 74 F7 45 E7-
HM1 = (ClientHello, ServerHello)
TH1 = Transcript-Hash(HM1): 00000: 99 3B A7 22 12 4A F3 CB FD 47 71 E7 FA E3 2A C1 00010: D0 E9 27 8C F7 84 3F CB C6 20 E1 A0 08 5A 87 A1-
client_handshake_traffic_secret (CHTS):
CHTS = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "c hs traffic", HM1) = HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "c hs traffic", TH1, 32): 00000: B3 F7 11 3D 35 26 55 4F E6 55 E5 6F AB 79 B1 A0 00010: 3D E3 35 96 E3 30 88 C7 78 37 19 A9 A4 B0 DC CD client_write_key_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(CHTS, "key", "", 32): 00000: 58 16 88 D7 6E FE 12 2B B5 5F 62 B3 8E F0 1B CC 00010: 8C 88 DB 83 E9 EA 4D 55 D3 89 8C 53 72 1F C3 84 client_write_iv_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(CHTS, "iv", "", 16): 00000: 43 9A 07 45 3D 0B EA 0C 1D 1B EB 73 8E B5 B8 DD client_record_write_key = TLSTREE(client_write_key_hs, 0): 00000: E1 C5 9B 41 69 D8 96 10 7F 78 45 68 93 A3 75 1E 00010: 15 73 54 3D AD 8C B7 40 69 E6 81 4A 51 3B BB 1C seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 nonce: 00000: 43 9A 07 45 3D 0B EA 0C 1D 1B EB 73 8E B5 B8 DD additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 00 35 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000: 14 00 00 20 08 5F C7 FD 79 B6 D1 11 CD 8D 3F F6 00010: B2 3A 06 5A 7A F7 A6 38 73 42 A5 F3 57 68 14 CD 00020: 00 47 19 D2 16 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 0035 encrypted_record: C9C65EAAB4A80E04849A122EB0CC26A9 CA6B5DD4DB7AD6813949F629FC09E052 2FF7ACDBBA93926C20008B8CCE865422 7B31D439F8TLSCiphertext:
00000: 17 03 03 00 35 C9 C6 5E AA B4 A8 0E 04 84 9A 12 00010: 2E B0 CC 26 A9 CA 6B 5D D4 DB 7A D6 81 39 49 F6 00020: 29 FC 09 E0 52 2F F7 AC DB BA 93 92 6C 20 00 8B 00030: 8C CE 86 54 22 7B 31 D4 39 F8 ---------------------------Server--------------------------- NewSessionTicket message: msg_type: 04 length: 000035 body: ticket_lifetime: 00093A80 ticket_age_add: 86868686 ticket_nonce: length: 08 vector: 0000000000000000 ticket: length: 0020 vector: 88888888888888888888888888888888 88888888888888888888888888888888 extensions: length: 0000 vector: -- 00000: 04 00 00 35 00 09 3A 80 86 86 86 86 08 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 00020: 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 00030: 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 00 00Record payload protection:
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 1): 00000: C8 FC 93 D7 C5 86 F2 B0 A3 10 1B AA 6A 97 9E 4E 00010: 38 86 70 65 51 E8 11 87 E9 78 80 40 9C 7E 8E E9 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 nonce: 00000: 2F E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 B9 additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 00 4A TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000: 04 00 00 35 00 09 3A 80 86 86 86 86 08 00 00 00 00010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 00020: 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 00030: 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 00 00 16 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 004A encrypted_record: CA6688A5DC22208DC8A8DE7E597292E3 CB5D454945B8F06C7C50F1823D7B6BB0 021178AE3ADB2DE3994539FD696945CF AA6919F3F1294CD41ED2A8EA75302869 ACB994F3920B09D67186TLSCiphertext:
00000: 17 03 03 00 4A CA 66 88 A5 DC 22 20 8D C8 A8 DE 00010: 7E 59 72 92 E3 CB 5D 45 49 45 B8 F0 6C 7C 50 F1 00020: 82 3D 7B 6B B0 02 11 78 AE 3A DB 2D E3 99 45 39 00030: FD 69 69 45 CF AA 69 19 F3 F1 29 4C D4 1E D2 A8 00040: EA 75 30 28 69 AC B9 94 F3 92 0B 09 D6 71 86 ---------------------------Server--------------------------- Application data: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Pad: 15360 bytesRecord payload protection:
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 2): 00000: C8 FC 93 D7 C5 86 F2 B0 A3 10 1B AA 6A 97 9E 4E 00010: 38 86 70 65 51 E8 11 87 E9 78 80 40 9C 7E 8E E9 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 nonce: 00000: 2F E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 BA additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 40 11 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 00004000: 00 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 4011 encrypted_record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iphertext:
00000000: 17 03 03 40 11 9B 3A D6 93 9F 05 A4 03 EE B1 A6 00000010: 36 E1 39 89 D9 1C CA 6A 45 BE 5B 7C B5 C9 80 02 00000020: 06 27 A1 B2 AD 34 AC 4B 5A AE 5B D4 45 C9 1C 28 00000030: 32 5E 4C 71 49 18 8D 55 EF 27 01 6D 80 AF 44 07 00000040: 04 82 0B CE 22 CE 50 1E A6 19 A4 FF 7C D9 F7 22 00000050: A2 83 91 CE 8B B8 6B F8 7D 5A 85 55 5B EF 59 A9 00000060: C9 A1 57 2F 38 11 4E 64 FD 04 A0 DB 2E 17 87 A5 00000070: 85 EA 51 DC AB B9 5D AF B7 3D 0B 3F E3 F0 70 2C 00000080: 5E 1A A0 15 71 17 D8 84 78 3E 5E 61 13 F6 CA 83 00000090: 52 F6 CF 49 F9 DB 3B 3D AB 38 0B FD 7B E0 4B 0A [...] 00003F80: 64 E7 02 7D 92 6E 0F 95 AB 7F 13 3B 59 21 F9 96 00003F90: A8 1E B6 7B 78 44 9D D3 2F 45 11 E0 13 20 65 24 00003FA0: AD 4A FA CF 0B 1C 16 22 28 2C B2 0A 96 5E 67 0C 00003FB0: C9 A1 7E 13 F3 43 AF 38 25 AF D5 8B 06 91 5B DC 00003FC0: 9E 49 47 7F 02 83 06 94 F5 AC 7C C9 9C 88 7F 62 00003FD0: CD AA EF 00 53 76 6F B1 2B C9 A0 82 C1 57 C3 47 00003FE0: 21 C5 40 0C 37 60 88 A6 60 EE 43 29 ED 64 5D 7C 00003FF0: 07 D4 DA 1A BD F6 F9 A1 B9 D5 1B F3 E0 9C FC C1 00004000: A5 9C D9 6F 07 FC 9A CF 00 4E A1 B2 0E 6B BD AD 00004010: 7B BF 0C 9E 2A 1B ---------------------------Server--------------------------- Application data: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Pad: 15360 bytesRecord payload protection:
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 3): 00000: C8 FC 93 D7 C5 86 F2 B0 A3 10 1B AA 6A 97 9E 4E 00010: 38 86 70 65 51 E8 11 87 E9 78 80 40 9C 7E 8E E9 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 03 nonce: 00000: 2F E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 BB additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 40 11 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 00004000: 00 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 4011 encrypted_record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iphertext:
00000000: 17 03 03 40 11 F0 6C 50 32 F8 A7 AD 58 CE D1 4D 00000010: 53 83 ED 96 9E 62 8D E4 F3 5C F9 B6 FC F5 04 7D 00000020: 9B 02 26 1F 56 F7 24 DE 96 1F 8F F9 C2 7A E7 6F 00000030: BA C0 A1 8E 96 AA 30 CA 7D 8E BA D5 B5 13 5A 09 00000040: 62 51 5C C4 F2 A1 6E BA B9 A0 88 86 ED 4E FD 9D 00000050: FA EC 15 8F 94 EF B0 F9 07 25 C9 11 4D 9D 8D 90 00000060: 4A 18 AB F1 84 E7 4B 07 15 0B 2F 2F 27 CB 80 32 00000070: 06 49 43 C9 57 11 E4 80 E4 F4 FC E8 E9 F0 20 D5 00000080: C9 04 89 E7 34 AE A1 0D 91 C7 09 7A EC 8C D6 D5 00000090: E3 EE C7 64 B0 CD 44 7F C0 77 35 F0 F8 D9 D4 90 [...] 00003F80: 3A 79 E7 B3 BC FD 2B 24 78 09 29 11 07 3A 7C C9 00003F90: 6A C6 26 C3 0D D0 A5 61 2D BB FF 26 E3 5A F0 BB 00003FA0: 5C EC 24 EE D3 91 10 05 33 FB 99 9D 48 73 ED 5D 00003FB0: 5E 46 93 C5 EE DC 3E CC 3C 6E FF 04 1B 0A 7F 42 00003FC0: 25 A1 09 2F 4A AD D9 A5 08 C7 A5 6C B1 3A 3F 33 00003FD0: E8 44 E2 8C 8A DC D4 52 50 F4 EE 29 83 4C 5C AA 00003FE0: C5 0B 5E BF 94 50 17 85 66 4E 78 AE 9B 5F DB FA 00003FF0: DF 73 0D ED 97 98 5D 65 91 35 F5 DA BA D8 83 FF 00004000: AC 60 46 A0 F6 29 88 1F 76 14 76 46 D8 E2 A8 67 00004010: 3B 14 29 56 21 F7 ---------------------------Server--------------------------- Application data: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Pad: 15360 bytesRecord payload protection:
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 8): 00000: D3 CD 87 D5 68 74 07 82 39 78 34 4C 06 B9 28 A8 00010: 58 98 B7 39 A3 1D 3D E5 FF 2B 78 8E F3 91 96 ED seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 nonce: 00000: 2F E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 B0 additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 40 11 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 00004000: 00 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 4011 encrypted_record: E3DF00F169A76FA19FE55FA304E0A552 5A28FDBD3DD4CA654B89140EFD69E263 28A65A77F5D8B2E2F73568F7A677E5DF 8D225FAA8ED5FED98F09963FF1E82161 81595E9FA6989CCABC2150CA668D70EA 8CB6F62BCC528D26B52FB27AB70F194A 30E5C9085D9323D38745093070D15650 52468045F3398DC5BF93D6A983956E1D 3077337B773DAF4B9A6BA5BC569A251D 34FE23DF7B9343A0550094 [...] 2B516EE4A4971FD26EFB9293981435E9 FCC560B618B8ED0A52589E7342C25325 11C3D7C145559B8119BC02CB22CBF1EB 915578E8468806B2D0728C591B617354 CC47D51FF2363197A559018AD3498846 AD167DD086BD12EF52179D45ABF06C28 97B0C1D8AAD49413E0CCC086586D537A 296F9CEEB7E7E1DD2537540232C6BD71 619FC93BAE3FD8B0C95EA9915B6127B9 9F87884541F7TLSCiphertext:
00000000: 17 03 03 40 11 E3 DF 00 F1 69 A7 6F A1 9F E5 5F 00000010: A3 04 E0 A5 52 5A 28 FD BD 3D D4 CA 65 4B 89 14 00000020: 0E FD 69 E2 63 28 A6 5A 77 F5 D8 B2 E2 F7 35 68 00000030: F7 A6 77 E5 DF 8D 22 5F AA 8E D5 FE D9 8F 09 96 00000040: 3F F1 E8 21 61 81 59 5E 9F A6 98 9C CA BC 21 50 00000050: CA 66 8D 70 EA 8C B6 F6 2B CC 52 8D 26 B5 2F B2 00000060: 7A B7 0F 19 4A 30 E5 C9 08 5D 93 23 D3 87 45 09 00000070: 30 70 D1 56 50 52 46 80 45 F3 39 8D C5 BF 93 D6 00000080: A9 83 95 6E 1D 30 77 33 7B 77 3D AF 4B 9A 6B A5 00000090: BC 56 9A 25 1D 34 FE 23 DF 7B 93 43 A0 55 00 94 [...] 00003F80: 2B 51 6E E4 A4 97 1F D2 6E FB 92 93 98 14 35 E9 00003F90: FC C5 60 B6 18 B8 ED 0A 52 58 9E 73 42 C2 53 25 00003FA0: 11 C3 D7 C1 45 55 9B 81 19 BC 02 CB 22 CB F1 EB 00003FB0: 91 55 78 E8 46 88 06 B2 D0 72 8C 59 1B 61 73 54 00003FC0: CC 47 D5 1F F2 36 31 97 A5 59 01 8A D3 49 88 46 00003FD0: AD 16 7D D0 86 BD 12 EF 52 17 9D 45 AB F0 6C 28 00003FE0: 97 B0 C1 D8 AA D4 94 13 E0 CC C0 86 58 6D 53 7A 00003FF0: 29 6F 9C EE B7 E7 E1 DD 25 37 54 02 32 C6 BD 71 00004000: 61 9F C9 3B AE 3F D8 B0 C9 5E A9 91 5B 61 27 B9 00004010: 9F 87 88 45 41 F7 ---------------------------Server--------------------------- Application data: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Pad: 15360 bytesRecord payload protection:
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 9): 00000: D3 CD 87 D5 68 74 07 82 39 78 34 4C 06 B9 28 A8 00010: 58 98 B7 39 A3 1D 3D E5 FF 2B 78 8E F3 91 96 ED seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 09 nonce: 00000: 2F E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 B1 additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 40 11 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 00004000: 00 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 4011 encrypted_record: 4AFCD1257E2C8D4626BC0BFBB30F2F9C A57A9D0DEC090B4248CAADDFE7AA4AEB 770F285384FEA308CADE2EEF318148C2 BED4870ABEE1955CCA41CE8344C3EDA4 7C2512CDD19FD54C7E0260BBC7BD8DD1 EE9D4EBADD3D7915D0A029D7847CA05D 078068CC8A792FED69A4E655A6E6D22D A134ECA2BDECA1E59D3AE7313E45E785 AF89A8F1890BFCC59F03F39C4FB2337C 326D94FA04F5548619D6DC [...] 79B6F56B6EBF8B8860436EFF9D8F03CC 73BDF446D30F918AF8FF8BA2D078D243 1AC04657D7871203F15969F160820D7D FCA78F65FF954CE5549F2C78AA3A0885 04527FC561B6AE06020A8772B75CE933 6CAC35B536A50DB26930BFA21E9EB56E A20E39CC2BBBA66D41C2E8720AA0143D 298D8036D7B0090A0214F58C5B1890A7 5B4783820395E39421F4357A49597EB0 64123818EACETLSCiphertext:
00000000: 17 03 03 40 11 4A FC D1 25 7E 2C 8D 46 26 BC 0B 00000010: FB B3 0F 2F 9C A5 7A 9D 0D EC 09 0B 42 48 CA AD 00000020: DF E7 AA 4A EB 77 0F 28 53 84 FE A3 08 CA DE 2E 00000030: EF 31 81 48 C2 BE D4 87 0A BE E1 95 5C CA 41 CE 00000040: 83 44 C3 ED A4 7C 25 12 CD D1 9F D5 4C 7E 02 60 00000050: BB C7 BD 8D D1 EE 9D 4E BA DD 3D 79 15 D0 A0 29 00000060: D7 84 7C A0 5D 07 80 68 CC 8A 79 2F ED 69 A4 E6 00000070: 55 A6 E6 D2 2D A1 34 EC A2 BD EC A1 E5 9D 3A E7 00000080: 31 3E 45 E7 85 AF 89 A8 F1 89 0B FC C5 9F 03 F3 00000090: 9C 4F B2 33 7C 32 6D 94 FA 04 F5 54 86 19 D6 DC [...] 00003F80: 79 B6 F5 6B 6E BF 8B 88 60 43 6E FF 9D 8F 03 CC 00003F90: 73 BD F4 46 D3 0F 91 8A F8 FF 8B A2 D0 78 D2 43 00003FA0: 1A C0 46 57 D7 87 12 03 F1 59 69 F1 60 82 0D 7D 00003FB0: FC A7 8F 65 FF 95 4C E5 54 9F 2C 78 AA 3A 08 85 00003FC0: 04 52 7F C5 61 B6 AE 06 02 0A 87 72 B7 5C E9 33 00003FD0: 6C AC 35 B5 36 A5 0D B2 69 30 BF A2 1E 9E B5 6E 00003FE0: A2 0E 39 CC 2B BB A6 6D 41 C2 E8 72 0A A0 14 3D 00003FF0: 29 8D 80 36 D7 B0 09 0A 02 14 F5 8C 5B 18 90 A7 00004000: 5B 47 83 82 03 95 E3 94 21 F4 35 7A 49 59 7E B0 00004010: 64 12 38 18 EA CE ---------------------------Client----------------------------- Application data: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Pad: 15360 bytesRecord payload protection:
Derived #1 = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "") = HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "", 32): 00000: EA 3C 54 BB D1 4E F9 D7 50 77 6F AB E3 95 BE 2A 00010: BD DB BB B7 1C 13 C2 BD 60 9E 35 15 79 4A FA 02 MainSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #1, IKM: 0^256): 00000: 31 BB 1D 61 2C CD 53 32 68 8A 55 1A 48 CA 25 0F 00010: 24 78 3D 4A B0 B4 A7 6D 3F E5 06 7A 26 16 A4 A3 HM2 = (ClientHello, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions, Certificate, CertificateVerify, Server Finished) TH2 = Transcript-Hash(HM2): 00000: 9E BC 5F BE 32 D9 F4 0D 48 F8 EE CE BB 62 31 A5 00010: 33 C2 C0 EF 24 32 77 B9 6D 6F 7A D3 BB FD 14 94 client_application_traffic_secret (CATS): CATS = Derive-Secret(MainSecret, "c ap traffic", HM2) = HKDF-Expand-Label(MainSecret, "c ap traffic", TH2, 32): 00000: 8A CF 74 6B EC 31 17 6C BD 14 2C 75 80 6C 27 0A 00010: 0A EF 6F C3 8E 0D 8F DC B5 A8 85 25 36 3A DE 81 client_write_key_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(CATS, "key", "", 32): 00000: 7B E6 4E 2C 12 78 7B 5B 8C 87 56 C4 3D 92 FA EF 00010: 64 F1 5A 3A 3C 10 81 AD 34 BC A5 06 F0 32 24 15 client_write_iv_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(CATS, "iv", "", 16): 00000: 31 09 57 EF 71 31 44 33 F5 76 CC 9B 00 AD 93 54 client_record_write_key = TLSTREE(client_write_key_ap, 0): 00000: D4 9A 57 15 49 E7 48 94 9F A2 4B 88 34 23 2C A8 00010: 75 D3 7A 26 C4 BB 5C 62 A2 61 DA B3 72 65 05 26 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 nonce: 00000: 31 09 57 EF 71 31 44 33 F5 76 CC 9B 00 AD 93 54 additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 40 11 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 00004000: 00 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 4011 encrypted_record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iphertext:
00000000: 17 03 03 40 11 EA 6C B6 52 C7 CB E6 B5 05 60 D0 00000010: 36 4D C9 4D 90 25 60 DF E5 5D 8B 83 C8 AA 91 9F 00000020: 5A 1E 54 92 E7 4C A5 15 6F 18 BE C8 EA B6 97 1C 00000030: AA 2D 2C 1F F1 46 EA 5F EF 5D 62 68 26 01 86 8F 00000040: FC D2 68 8F 34 83 89 9C 31 F6 BA 87 53 86 82 E7 00000050: F8 95 F6 53 C0 9B FE 95 AB F3 EE DF 7E BB 26 1C 00000060: CC 59 3D FC B0 04 F0 51 19 56 71 48 BB 35 F3 C7 00000070: B4 F0 97 13 A6 24 7A 04 7E F2 9B 05 F7 72 0E 37 00000080: 5A 6E 32 64 F4 79 22 EA EB E3 AA 6D 1E 80 83 28 00000090: 06 D5 F2 0E 7C 56 66 2A 71 28 B1 91 82 95 97 DB [...] 00003F80: 6A 51 84 90 7D 9F F8 D3 FC 09 94 A3 C8 50 DD BC 00003F90: 2D 04 20 EB 66 EA 17 7F CD D7 8F 16 24 6E 20 76 00003FA0: 03 9C 52 56 04 F7 9A 00 7F 47 2A C7 A2 0A 45 74 00003FB0: 1B 9D 96 E3 8E 56 58 99 D4 0A 72 4B 8A 37 FF 68 00003FC0: 70 2B F9 A6 45 D0 49 62 BB C9 C6 6A 35 FF D2 19 00003FD0: A0 8A 38 5F E4 CD D0 A1 F3 F0 80 BE CD F0 1E 45 00003FE0: 68 C3 38 FA D2 C8 50 DF EA A9 8A 7F 1B 95 EC A1 00003FF0: 72 BA 7F 75 26 E3 BF F2 EF F2 39 5C E4 56 18 67 00004000: DC 9D E8 FD 10 F3 8B CA 1E 44 B0 20 7A F4 CC E8 00004010: 81 55 83 63 30 BC ---------------------------Client----------------------------- Application data: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Pad: 15360 bytesRecord payload protection:
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 1): 00000: D4 9A 57 15 49 E7 48 94 9F A2 4B 88 34 23 2C A8 00010: 75 D3 7A 26 C4 BB 5C 62 A2 61 DA B3 72 65 05 26 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 nonce: 00000: 31 09 57 EF 71 31 44 33 F5 76 CC 9B 00 AD 93 55 additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 40 11 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 00004000: 00 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 4011 encrypted_record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iphertext:
00000000: 17 03 03 40 11 0D 48 6A 03 D0 3A 02 02 96 EA 0A 00000010: D1 D6 84 A9 F4 AE 35 82 41 29 14 1D 34 34 CE E0 00000020: 64 FD 5E 96 6F 88 D6 E8 90 39 13 41 76 58 E4 6C 00000030: 49 B1 8B B0 CC B2 9B 66 3D 3F 38 0A 2C F9 E5 23 00000040: 4B CD 27 F3 A4 E1 2E BF 3A 3C 69 DB 76 61 B0 8F 00000050: C1 68 5F AD DE 50 F6 80 28 A6 E8 5E E1 27 29 D6 00000060: F9 CA D7 62 FF A6 BA B5 FC 94 AC 65 BA A3 68 85 00000070: DA F8 5C 9B 27 C6 8F 9E 97 AB 85 EC FA 76 0C DD 00000080: 22 F9 A8 C0 BA 60 97 D7 96 05 87 CA 70 88 34 51 00000090: 6D 95 88 59 2D D1 B8 E0 52 10 BA A6 40 FE 65 40 [...] 00003F80: 55 A9 C5 A6 55 7D 35 B8 F1 A9 80 4B FA 0F 27 89 00003F90: 3E DC 6A A0 35 0E 96 30 AF F6 C9 B0 6C 3C E0 1D 00003FA0: 5B E5 1E 87 EB FF AC 58 23 0D 07 4B E1 21 F0 77 00003FB0: 9D 08 F8 17 7A FF FB B3 6D CE FD D0 D0 69 68 73 00003FC0: A7 72 B9 A1 DA 73 C6 81 B0 F8 35 9E C1 C7 4B 6E 00003FD0: 04 52 09 5C 62 2C 4C 79 7F 45 0C AA 4F 26 97 5A 00003FE0: 31 1F 41 F3 1C 6A 61 77 47 29 8C C0 52 A6 37 6F 00003FF0: A4 61 91 65 8F EE 5B D8 D7 A9 98 E7 F1 2E 88 38 00004000: 73 65 BA AD 4B A4 90 11 47 33 FC 15 A5 81 48 E6 00004010: 18 64 84 82 1A 94 ---------------------------Client----------------------------- Application data: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Pad: 15360 bytesRecord payload protection:
client_record_write_key = TLSTREE(client_write_key_ap, 8): 00000: B8 2D 78 25 D1 5F AE 18 A7 01 32 28 B3 1C B0 C5 00010: 97 52 C6 40 9C 5F 78 99 EC C6 95 0F 74 63 C0 90 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 nonce: 00000: 31 09 57 EF 71 31 44 33 F5 76 CC 9B 00 AD 93 5C additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 40 11 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 00004000: 00 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 4011 encrypted_record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iphertext:
00000000: 17 03 03 40 11 F8 B5 73 2A 30 0C 8E F0 5F B7 12 00000010: A2 97 2F 4D B8 4B E7 83 A9 59 09 03 98 E9 89 51 00000020: 6B 6A 54 F3 33 33 10 49 28 31 86 BD 1C 42 EF D9 00000030: 80 03 A4 76 A2 40 8E AC E0 D7 04 7F B5 36 97 93 00000040: 86 C2 6B 55 23 F9 33 A4 F5 BD 70 48 B0 94 EC 5F 00000050: 56 27 ED FA 98 99 DE 1A F8 D9 A4 93 E4 81 BA 5D 00000060: A0 85 7B E1 5A 3F 21 CA 01 E2 20 92 15 9B AA 77 00000070: 05 69 CF BE 54 F6 53 BE FB 4A 8B 32 29 5D EF E9 00000080: 92 25 8F 45 81 25 7E 93 6A F5 49 E8 2D 54 EA 6C 00000090: 09 EF 0D 98 7B F3 A3 E8 45 3C 15 48 CE F1 C3 49 [...] 00003F80: 0E F4 E8 88 99 AA 34 81 AE DA E0 E2 57 44 9F 80 00003F90: A2 0C BD F0 70 EC 02 21 1B 6B 9C BA 92 48 B1 92 00003FA0: CF 75 C8 8A 08 5D BF F7 7A BC FB 1D 82 DA A4 21 00003FB0: 1B 48 7A 48 23 03 50 CB A4 F3 38 DD 0B FD 36 D8 00003FC0: AA C5 EE 70 94 56 B7 E3 17 C7 8E 71 98 FB 72 64 00003FD0: 5B 45 EE FD 3F 93 BF 1C 02 1F 9E 74 A2 ED 2B CC 00003FE0: 1C F5 D3 67 B5 53 C7 E7 E9 D8 0D D2 44 7C 7D 13 00003FF0: D0 34 5F EF 29 76 69 6D FE 57 9E 5F 71 74 0C 71 00004000: 31 24 CF BA D6 6C 7B B5 BC 21 AA AE 2F 1E 08 60 00004010: 5C 24 8A DA F8 BA ---------------------------Client----------------------------- Application data: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Pad: 15360 bytesRecord payload protection:
client_record_write_key = TLSTREE(client_write_key_ap, 9): 00000: B8 2D 78 25 D1 5F AE 18 A7 01 32 28 B3 1C B0 C5 00010: 97 52 C6 40 9C 5F 78 99 EC C6 95 0F 74 63 C0 90 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 09 nonce: 00000: 31 09 57 EF 71 31 44 33 F5 76 CC 9B 00 AD 93 5D additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 40 11 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000400: 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000410: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 00004000: 00 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 4011 encrypted_record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iphertext:
00000000: 17 03 03 40 11 C1 71 9B 62 D4 F5 E2 95 AB 8A 4A 00000010: 2C BD 6B BE F3 0F 07 29 7D 96 00 4E BA BE 31 50 00000020: 90 24 75 10 A6 BE E6 39 56 76 95 6B 42 49 B1 6B 00000030: 52 CE 9F E1 71 B1 F4 69 3F 48 B3 44 6D 48 A9 9B 00000040: 62 24 53 7F BB 9B C8 BF 54 AE A6 88 D2 1E 39 F1 00000050: 78 40 DB 9F 33 63 2E A1 96 92 2B 7E 15 D6 AE 08 00000060: 0F 9F 3B 33 F2 FA BE 63 BB 66 E2 1C 59 07 85 EF 00000070: AE BE 75 BB 1E 17 C9 E5 F5 8A 1B 1D 11 01 DE 95 00000080: F9 BF 34 6C 62 1C 63 CA BE B6 D7 24 5D B7 5F 18 00000090: DA 49 5F 12 9A 65 2C E6 B7 E0 FE 47 FB 21 0D 6A [...] 00003F80: 2A F9 D5 15 B2 6C 3D 8F 37 F9 BF 5F 3A 76 6D 8B 00003F90: 03 18 9A 78 60 50 69 17 9F B9 CF 9B 1A 44 9D C0 00003FA0: 4F 0F E3 7E 67 FD F9 A0 34 1B 1F 0D 64 AA 28 71 00003FB0: D4 DF EF 10 EC 7D FE 74 75 CF E3 64 BB 4D 94 53 00003FC0: A9 F1 76 82 98 87 14 8F 3E 8C 0E EE 85 8F 9C 17 00003FD0: C0 B7 53 C1 45 D1 3B D2 A9 6B 23 82 2F 73 DC 6C 00003FE0: FD 62 3D E3 CB 70 F8 D5 07 E4 36 C2 0E 39 39 40 00003FF0: F3 A3 6C 91 3C 0B CD FE 67 2C 90 3C 55 22 AA 41 00004000: 0B 31 8D D1 26 8D 03 5C 59 D3 E1 1F F2 73 B1 D7 00004010: 71 5E 2F BF 3A CA ---------------------------Server--------------------------- Alert message: level: 01 description: 00 00000: 01 00Record payload protection:
client_record_write_key = TLSTREE(client_write_key_ap, 10):
00000: D3 CD 87 D5 68 74 07 82 39 78 34 4C 06 B9 28 A8 00010: 58 98 B7 39 A3 1D 3D E5 FF 2B 78 8E F3 91 96 ED seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0A nonce: 00000: 2F E9 1F 71 18 35 40 26 31 7E 1A B4 D8 22 17 B2 additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 00 13 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000: 01 00 15 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 0013 encrypted_record: 7CBC00AD5D29E301739394D31942C6A1 6658E9TLSCiphertext:
00000: 17 03 03 00 13 7C BC 00 AD 5D 29 E3 01 73 93 94 00010: D3 19 42 C6 A1 66 58 E9 ---------------------------Client--------------------------- Alert message: level: 01 description: 00 00000: 01 00Record payload protection:
client_record_write_key = TLSTREE(client_write_key_ap, 10): 00000: B8 2D 78 25 D1 5F AE 18 A7 01 32 28 B3 1C B0 C5 00010: 97 52 C6 40 9C 5F 78 99 EC C6 95 0F 74 63 C0 90 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0A nonce: 00000: 31 09 57 EF 71 31 44 33 F5 76 CC 9B 00 AD 93 5E additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 00 13 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000: 01 00 15 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 0013 encrypted_record: CB19F306C3641754BE4FC95390DF06F9 CD44AATLSCiphertext:
00000: 17 03 03 00 13 CB 19 F3 06 C3 64 17 54 BE 4F C9 00010: 53 90 DF 06 F9 CD 44 AA -
A.2. Example 2
A.2.1. Test Case
-
Test examples are given for the following instance of the TLS13_GOST profile:
- Full TLS Handshake is used.
- PSK with ECDHE key exchange mode is used. The elliptic curve GC256B is used for ECDHE shared secret calculation.
- Authentication is used on the server and client sides. The external PSK is used for the mutual authentication.
- TLS_GOSTR341112_256_WITH_MAGMA_MGM_L cipher suite is negotiated.
- Four Application Data records are sent during the operation of the Record protocol. The sequence numbers are selected to demonstrate the operation of the TLSTREE function.
- Alert protocol is used for closure of the connection.
A.2.2. Test Examples
-
ePSK:
00000: 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 00000: 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 ---------------------------Client--------------------------- ClientHello1 message: msg_type: 01 length: 00007B body: legacy_version: 0303 random: 01010101010101010101010101010101 01010101010101010101010101010101 legacy_session_id: length: 00 vector: -- cipher_suites: length: 0002 vector: CipherSuite: C104 compression_methods: length: 01 vector: CompressionMethod: 00 extensions: length: 0050 vector: Extension: /* supported_groups */ extension_type: 000A extension_data: length: 0006 vector: named_group_list: length: 0004 vector: /* GC256B */ 0023 /* GC512C */ 0028 Extension: /* supported_versions */ extension_type: 002B extension_data: length: 0003 vector: versions: length: 02 vector: 0304 Extension: /* psk_key_exchange_modes */ extension_type: 002D extension_data: length: 0002 vector: ke_modes: length: 01 vector: /* psk_dhe_ke */ 01 Extension: /* key_share */ extension_type: 0033 extension_data: length: 0002 client_shares: length: 0000 vector: -- Extension: /* pre_shared_key */ extension_type: 0029 extension_data: length: 002F vector: identities: length: 000A vector: identity: length: 0004 vector: 6550534B obfuscated_ticket_age: 00000000 binders: length: 0021 vector: binder: length: 20 vector: 6F3A0B91F2945EF7056DB74302BC34B6 DF77A88E09C587508AB6287C6C0514ADTruncate(ClientHello1):
0000: 01 00 00 7B 03 03 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 0010: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 0020: 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 02 C1 04 01 00 00 50 00 0030: 0A 00 06 00 04 00 23 00 28 00 2B 00 03 02 03 04 0040: 00 2D 00 02 01 01 00 33 00 02 00 00 00 29 00 2F 0050: 00 0A 00 04 65 50 53 4B 00 00 00 00Hash(Truncate(ClientHello1)):
0000: CC 9C A9 FC 18 DF 7A 2F 5F 63 27 D7 7B EA DC F1 0010: A7 3D 80 97 7F EB EA B4 F0 D3 83 39 30 00 2B 8DEarlySecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: 0^Hlen, IKM: ePSK):
00000: 42 30 7A 99 68 18 34 0D D0 56 2F 7F EB E6 2A B5 00010: 70 F3 BC 88 9C A9 29 3A 89 0D F2 09 B9 1B BB F3 binder_key = Derive-Secret(EarlySecret, "ext binder", "") = HKDF-Expand-Label(EarlySecret, "ext binder", "", 32): 00000: A4 37 62 C3 5E 75 54 1A 15 58 A0 8D 15 50 D3 29 00010: 4C C3 F9 0C 73 99 EC C0 50 B9 15 37 A2 4C D5 E4finished_binder_key =
HKDF-Expand-Label(binder_key, "finished", "", 32):
00000: F5 6F 59 C2 E2 F8 E7 7C 69 80 1F B1 7D B4 C1 8B 00010: ED 96 EB 32 FC D7 AB 95 AD D6 B1 CF F1 73 E6 65binder = HMAC(finished_binder_key, Hash(Truncate(ClientHello1))):
00000: 6F 3A 0B 91 F2 94 5E F7 05 6D B7 43 02 BC 34 B6 00010: DF 77 A8 8E 09 C5 87 50 8A B6 28 7C 6C 05 14 AD 0000: 01 00 00 7B 03 03 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 0010: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 0020: 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 02 C1 04 01 00 00 50 00 0030: 0A 00 06 00 04 00 23 00 28 00 2B 00 03 02 03 04 0040: 0A 07 0B 07 0C 07 0D 07 0E 07 0F 00 2B 00 03 02 0050: 00 2D 00 02 01 01 00 33 00 02 00 00 00 29 00 2F 0060: 00 0A 00 04 65 50 53 4B 00 00 00 00 00 21 20 6F 0070: 3A 0B 91 F2 94 5E F7 05 6D B7 43 02 BC 34 B6 DF 0080: 77 A8 8E 09 C5 87 50 8A B6 28 7C 6C 05 14 AD Record layer message: type: 16 legacy_record_version: 0301 length: 007F fragment: 0100007B030301010101010101010101 01010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101000002C1040100005000 0A0006000400230028002B0003020304 0A070B070C070D070E070F002B000302 002D000201010033000200000029002F 000A00046550534B000000000021206F 3A0B91F2945EF7056DB74302BC34B6DF 77A88E09C587508AB6287C6C0514AD 00000: 16 03 01 00 7F 01 00 00 7B 03 03 01 01 01 01 01 00010: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 00020: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 02 C1 04 00030: 01 00 00 50 00 0A 00 06 00 04 00 23 00 28 00 2B 00040: 00 03 02 03 04 0A 07 0B 07 0C 07 0D 07 0E 07 0F 00050: 00 2B 00 03 02 00 2D 00 02 01 01 00 33 00 02 00 00060: 00 00 29 00 2F 00 0A 00 04 65 50 53 4B 00 00 00 00070: 00 00 21 20 6F 3A 0B 91 F2 94 5E F7 05 6D B7 43 00080: 02 BC 34 B6 DF 77 A8 8E 09 C5 87 50 8A B6 28 7C 00090: 6C 05 14 AD ---------------------------Server--------------------------- HelloRetryRequest message: msg_type: 02 length: 000034 body: legacy_version: 0303 random: CF21AD74E59A6111BE1D8C021E65B891 C2A211167ABB8C5E079E09E2C8A8339C legacy_session_id: length: 00 vector: -- cipher_suite: CipherSuite: C104 compression_method: CompressionMethod: 00 extensions: length: 000C vector: Extension: /* supported_versions */ extension_type: 002B extension_data: length: 0002 vector: selected_version: 0304 Extension: /* key_share */ extension_type: 0033 extension_data: length: 0002 selected_group: 0023 00000: 02 00 00 34 03 03 CF 21 AD 74 E5 9A 61 11 BE 1D 00010: 8C 02 1E 65 B8 91 C2 A2 11 16 7A BB 8C 5E 07 9E 00020: 09 E2 C8 A8 33 9C 00 C1 04 00 00 0C 00 2B 00 02 00030: 03 04 00 33 00 02 00 23 Record layer message: type: 16 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 0038 fragment: 020000340303CF21AD74E59A6111BE1D 8C021E65B891C2A211167ABB8C5E079E 09E2C8A8339C00C10400000C002B0002 0304003300020023 00000: 16 03 03 00 38 02 00 00 34 03 03 CF 21 AD 74 E5 00010: 9A 61 11 BE 1D 8C 02 1E 65 B8 91 C2 A2 11 16 7A 00020: BB 8C 5E 07 9E 09 E2 C8 A8 33 9C 00 C1 04 00 00 00030: 0C 00 2B 00 02 03 04 00 33 00 02 00 23 ---------------------------Client--------------------------- ClientHello2 message: msg_type: 01 length: 0000BF body: legacy_version: 0303 random: 01010101010101010101010101010101 01010101010101010101010101010101 legacy_session_id: length: 00 vector: -- cipher_suites: length: 0002 vector: CipherSuite: C104 compression_methods: length: 01 vector: CompressionMethod: 00 extensions: length: 0094 vector: Extension: /* supported_groups */ extension_type: 000A extension_data: length: 0006 vector: named_group_list: length: 0004 vector: /* GC256B */ 0023 /* GC512C */ 0028 Extension: /* supported_versions */ extension_type: 002B extension_data: length: 0003 vector: versions: length: 02 vector: 0304 Extension: /* psk_key_exchange_modes */ extension_type: 002D extension_data: length: 0002 vector: ke_modes: length: 01 vector: /* psk_dhe_ke */ 01 Extension: /* key_share */ extension_type: 0033 extension_data: length: 0046 client_shares: length: 0044 vector: group: 0023 key_exchange: length: 0040 vector: D35AA795C452450949591D60E7D5C076 056D6646F3B80708CDC2E7034DE85F68 D1122DC32A3B986D40FF910622A06C12 26D9EC3A7D3A52E0A37C282C47602A43 Extension: /* pre_shared_key */ extension_type: 0029 extension_data: length: 002F vector: identities: length: 000A vector: identity: length: 0004 vector: 6550534B obfuscated_ticket_age: 00000000 binders: length: 0021 vector: binder: length: 20 vector: 0BF74AA3933B7D1A66961B6E2CFB6A28 04D696BB607710E3F56DDA91F56B57CBTruncate(ClientHello2):
0000: 01 00 00 BF 03 03 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 0010: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 0020: 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 02 C1 04 01 00 00 94 00 0030: 0A 00 06 00 04 00 23 00 28 00 2B 00 03 02 03 04 0040: 00 2D 00 02 01 01 00 33 00 46 00 44 00 23 00 40 0050: D3 5A A7 95 C4 52 45 09 49 59 1D 60 E7 D5 C0 76 0060: 05 6D 66 46 F3 B8 07 08 CD C2 E7 03 4D E8 5F 68 0070: D1 12 2D C3 2A 3B 98 6D 40 FF 91 06 22 A0 6C 12 0080: 26 D9 EC 3A 7D 3A 52 E0 A3 7C 28 2C 47 60 2A 43 0090: 00 29 00 2F 00 0A 00 04 65 50 53 4B 00 00 00 00finished_binder_key:
00000: F5 6F 59 C2 E2 F8 E7 7C 69 80 1F B1 7D B4 C1 8B 00010: ED 96 EB 32 FC D7 AB 95 AD D6 B1 CF F1 73 E6 65BinderMsg = (FE 00 00 20 | Hash(ClientHello1), HelloRetryRequest,
Truncate(ClientHello2))
Hash(BinderMsg) =
73 7C 63 74 1B 3A EA DF C8 73 DF 6E EA 81 19 32 BF CE 93 4F AA 85 84 F1 44 F8 77 13 E0 D0 CA 32 binder = HMAC(finished_binder_key, Hash(BinderMsg)) = 0B F7 4A A3 93 3B 7D 1A 66 96 1B 6E 2C FB 6A 28 04 D6 96 BB 60 77 10 E3 F5 6D DA 91 F5 6B 57 CB 0000: 01 00 00 BF 03 03 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 0010: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 0020: 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 02 C1 04 01 00 00 94 00 0030: 0A 00 06 00 04 00 23 00 28 00 2B 00 03 02 03 04 0040: 00 2D 00 02 01 01 00 33 00 46 00 44 00 23 00 40 0050: D3 5A A7 95 C4 52 45 09 49 59 1D 60 E7 D5 C0 76 0060: 05 6D 66 46 F3 B8 07 08 CD C2 E7 03 4D E8 5F 68 0070: D1 12 2D C3 2A 3B 98 6D 40 FF 91 06 22 A0 6C 12 0080: 26 D9 EC 3A 7D 3A 52 E0 A3 7C 28 2C 47 60 2A 43 0090: 00 29 00 2F 00 0A 00 04 65 50 53 4B 00 00 00 00 00A0: 00 21 20 0B F7 4A A3 93 3B 7D 1A 66 96 1B 6E 2C 00B0: FB 6A 28 04 D6 96 BB 60 77 10 E3 F5 6D DA 91 F5 00C0: 6B 57 CB Record layer message: type: 16 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 00C3 fragment: 010000BF030301010101010101010101 01010101010101010101010101010101 010101010101000002C1040100009400 0A0006000400230028002B0003020304 002D0002010100330046004400230040 D35AA795C452450949591D60E7D5C076 056D6646F3B80708CDC2E7034DE85F68 D1122DC32A3B986D40FF910622A06C12 26D9EC3A7D3A52E0A37C282C47602A43 0029002F000A00046550534B00000000 0021200BF74AA3933B7D1A66961B6E2C FB6A2804D696BB607710E3F56DDA91F5 6B57CB 00000: 16 03 03 00 C3 01 00 00 BF 03 03 01 01 01 01 01 00010: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 00020: 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 00 00 02 C1 04 00030: 01 00 00 94 00 0A 00 06 00 04 00 23 00 28 00 2B 00040: 00 03 02 03 04 00 2D 00 02 01 01 00 33 00 46 00 00050: 44 00 23 00 40 D3 5A A7 95 C4 52 45 09 49 59 1D 00060: 60 E7 D5 C0 76 05 6D 66 46 F3 B8 07 08 CD C2 E7 00070: 03 4D E8 5F 68 D1 12 2D C3 2A 3B 98 6D 40 FF 91 00080: 06 22 A0 6C 12 26 D9 EC 3A 7D 3A 52 E0 A3 7C 28 00090: 2C 47 60 2A 43 00 29 00 2F 00 0A 00 04 65 50 53 000A0: 4B 00 00 00 00 00 21 20 0B F7 4A A3 93 3B 7D 1A 000B0: 66 96 1B 6E 2C FB 6A 28 04 D6 96 BB 60 77 10 E3 000C0: F5 6D DA 91 F5 6B 57 CB ---------------------------Server--------------------------- ServerHello message: msg_type: 02 length: 00007C body: legacy_version: 0303 random: 82828282828282828282828282828282 82828282828282828282828282828282 legacy_session_id: length: 00 vector: -- cipher_suite: CipherSuite: C104 compression_method: CompressionMethod: 00 extensions: length: 0054 vector: Extension: /* supported_versions */ extension_type: 002B extension_data: length: 0002 vector: selected_version: 0304 Extension: /* key_share */ extension_type: 0033 extension_data: length: 0044 vector: group: 0023 key_exchange: length: 0040 vector: 3D2FB067E106CC9980FB8842811164BA 708BBB5038D5EDFBEE1D5E5DFBE6F74F 1931217C67C2BDF46253DB9CE3487241 F2DBD84E2DABDF65455851B0B19AEFEC Extension: /* pre_shared_key */ extension_type: 0029 extension_data: length: 0002 selected_identity: 0000 00000: 02 00 00 7C 03 03 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 00010: 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 00020: 82 82 82 82 82 82 00 C1 04 00 00 54 00 2B 00 02 00030: 03 04 00 33 00 44 00 23 00 40 3D 2F B0 67 E1 06 00040: CC 99 80 FB 88 42 81 11 64 BA 70 8B BB 50 38 D5 00050: ED FB EE 1D 5E 5D FB E6 F7 4F 19 31 21 7C 67 C2 00060: BD F4 62 53 DB 9C E3 48 72 41 F2 DB D8 4E 2D AB 00070: DF 65 45 58 51 B0 B1 9A EF EC 00 29 00 02 00 00 Record layer message: type: 16 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 0080 fragment: 020000410303933EA21E49C31BC3A345 6165889684CAA5576CE7924A24F58113 808DBD9EF85610C3802A561550EC78D6 ED51AC2439D7E7C101000009FF010001 0000170000 00000: 16 03 03 00 80 02 00 00 7C 03 03 82 82 82 82 82 00010: 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 00020: 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 82 00 C1 04 00 00 00030: 54 00 2B 00 02 03 04 00 33 00 44 00 23 00 40 3D 00040: 2F B0 67 E1 06 CC 99 80 FB 88 42 81 11 64 BA 70 00050: 8B BB 50 38 D5 ED FB EE 1D 5E 5D FB E6 F7 4F 19 00060: 31 21 7C 67 C2 BD F4 62 53 DB 9C E3 48 72 41 F2 00070: DB D8 4E 2D AB DF 65 45 58 51 B0 B1 9A EF EC 00 00080: 29 00 02 00 00 ---------------------------Client--------------------------- d_C^res: 00000: 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 00010: 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 02 Q_S^res: 00000: 3D 2F B0 67 E1 06 CC 99 80 FB 88 42 81 11 64 BA 00010: 70 8B BB 50 38 D5 ED FB EE 1D 5E 5D FB E6 F7 4F 00020: 19 31 21 7C 67 C2 BD F4 62 53 DB 9C E3 48 72 41 00030: F2 DB D8 4E 2D AB DF 65 45 58 51 B0 B1 9A EF EC ECDHE: 00000: 98 5A 86 59 D5 5A 8D 48 E0 E6 77 13 96 58 0B 2C 00010: DC DA 37 E9 2A EE 18 14 D1 0E 1B F2 A4 4F 0D 24 ---------------------------Server--------------------------- d_S^res: 00000: 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 00010: 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 Q_C^res: 00000: D3 5A A7 95 C4 52 45 09 49 59 1D 60 E7 D5 C0 76 00010: 05 6D 66 46 F3 B8 07 08 CD C2 E7 03 4D E8 5F 68 00020: D1 12 2D C3 2A 3B 98 6D 40 FF 91 06 22 A0 6C 12 00030: 26 D9 EC 3A 7D 3A 52 E0 A3 7C 28 2C 47 60 2A 43 ECDHE: 00000: 98 5A 86 59 D5 5A 8D 48 E0 E6 77 13 96 58 0B 2C 00010: DC DA 37 E9 2A EE 18 14 D1 0E 1B F2 A4 4F 0D 24 ---------------------------Server--------------------------- EncryptedExtensions message: msg_type: 08 length: 000002 body: extensions: length: 0000 vector: -- 00000: 08 00 00 02 00 00Record payload protection:
EarlySecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: 0^256, IKM: ePSK): 00000: 42 30 7A 99 68 18 34 0D D0 56 2F 7F EB E6 2A B5 00010: 70 F3 BC 88 9C A9 29 3A 89 0D F2 09 B9 1B BB F3 Derived #0 = Derive-Secret(EarlySecret, "derived", "") = HKDF-Expand-Label(EarlySecret, "derived", "", 32): 00000: 6B 4E 9C 49 C5 C6 F1 7F 60 B2 B8 4B 55 0A 16 38 00010: 14 09 5B 80 88 8E C0 B0 CA 52 E4 09 0C B3 F8 BE HandshakeSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #0, IKM: ECDHE): 00000: A9 CB E6 58 50 2F 3F D1 18 66 51 5F D6 15 E9 88 00010: 0D 1E 61 B5 28 34 BB FD 5F 19 C2 4C 53 C8 79 7F-
HM1 = (FE 00 00 20 | Hash(ClientHello1), HelloRetryRequest,
ClientHello2, ServerHello) TH1 = Transcript-Hash(HM1): 00000: 88 8D 5D 1E 15 98 65 05 97 3E F2 0F 9A FA F5 71 00010: 20 A3 66 C2 D2 19 91 D1 5E 25 07 0C 3D 07 D5 E9 server_handshake_traffic_secret (SHTS): SHTS = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "s hs traffic", HM1) = HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "s hs traffic", TH1, 32): 00000: 4E F8 68 E5 5B 27 F8 88 8A 6F 82 DA A7 0B 01 1B 00010: DA B1 77 95 10 F0 88 78 A0 22 2B 3E 2C 76 E6 83 server_write_key_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(SHTS, "key", "", 32): 00000: DB 61 9B 58 F4 41 1E 33 4F 07 EA C7 7C EF EF CA 00010: 78 41 F5 40 88 B8 D0 D5 CE 6A 62 C9 82 85 C6 81 server_write_iv_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(SHTS, "iv", "", 16): 00000: FC 9E 2A C6 63 04 C2 5B server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_hs, 0): 00000: 3C 7D F3 5E AC F4 FE 71 EA 6A DC E0 DC 44 5D D3 00010: A9 29 EF CD 08 3F 18 2F BD 51 42 BA 68 6D 38 84 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 nonce: 00000: 7C 9E 2A C6 63 04 C2 5B additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 00 0F TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000: 08 00 00 02 00 00 16 TLSCiphertext: 00000: 17 03 03 00 0F 49 67 A7 E1 AE 7B FB 37 5A 0F 4B 00010: 25 45 91 17 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 000F encrypted_record: 4967A7E1AE7BFB375A0F4B 25459117 00000: 17 03 03 00 0F 49 67 A7 E1 AE 7B FB 37 5A 0F 4B 00010: 25 45 91 17 ---------------------------Server--------------------------- server_finished_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(SHTS, "finished", "", 32): 00000: AF 41 F7 7A CB 18 B4 C5 9D E0 F7 8D 46 D5 AE 95 00010: 7A A4 92 A7 D8 D8 2A 36 F4 B2 09 B8 20 7C 79 03HMFinished = (FE 00 00 20 | Hash(ClientHello1), HelloRetryRequest,
ClientHello2, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions) Transcript-Hash(HMFinished): 00000: E0 5D D6 C9 DE BA 09 3D 72 AD 6F 4A 7D 0E 11 95 00010: FC E7 AE 31 93 F2 FF 5B 2D 0B F6 14 8E CB E7 B9 FinishedHash = HMAC(server_finished_key,Transcript-Hash(HMFinished)): 00000: 96 14 5B 61 68 E0 1C 4C F2 99 50 96 EE 12 C8 6B 00010: 1F 53 1F 96 0A 48 9D E9 C3 44 2A 24 33 E9 AE EE Finished message: msg_type: 14 length: 000020 body: verify_data: 96145B6168E01C4CF2995096EE12C86B 1F531F960A489DE9C3442A2433E9AEEE 00000: 14 00 00 20 96 14 5B 61 68 E0 1C 4C F2 99 50 96 00010: EE 12 C8 6B 1F 53 1F 96 0A 48 9D E9 C3 44 2A 24 00020: 33 E9 AE EERecord payload protection:
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_hs, 1): 00000: 3C 7D F3 5E AC F4 FE 71 EA 6A DC E0 DC 44 5D D3 00010: A9 29 EF CD 08 3F 18 2F BD 51 42 BA 68 6D 38 84 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 nonce: 00000: 7C 9E 2A C6 63 04 C2 5A additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 00 2D TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000: 14 00 00 20 96 14 5B 61 68 E0 1C 4C F2 99 50 96 00010: EE 12 C8 6B 1F 53 1F 96 0A 48 9D E9 C3 44 2A 24 00020: 33 E9 AE EE 16 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 002D encrypted_record: 3BFB2AEADBC349FD89AFB8E481F8426B CC6B7F5D975FE05E5B28755C00BF353F CA6A48E9F0145993C40CE06F37TLSCiphertext:
00000: 17 03 03 00 2D 3B FB 2A EA DB C3 49 FD 89 AF B8 00010: E4 81 F8 42 6B CC 6B 7F 5D 97 5F E0 5E 5B 28 75 00020: 5C 00 BF 35 3F CA 6A 48 E9 F0 14 59 93 C4 0C E0 00030: 6F 37 ---------------------------Client---------------------------EarlySecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: 0^256, IKM: ePSK):
00000: 42 30 7A 99 68 18 34 0D D0 56 2F 7F EB E6 2A B5 00010: 70 F3 BC 88 9C A9 29 3A 89 0D F2 09 B9 1B BB F3 Derived #0 = Derive-Secret(EarlySecret, "derived", "") = HKDF-Expand-Label(EarlySecret, "derived", "", 32): 00000: 6B 4E 9C 49 C5 C6 F1 7F 60 B2 B8 4B 55 0A 16 38 00010: 14 09 5B 80 88 8E C0 B0 CA 52 E4 09 0C B3 F8 BE HandshakeSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #0, IKM: ECDHE): 00000: A9 CB E6 58 50 2F 3F D1 18 66 51 5F D6 15 E9 88 00010: 0D 1E 61 B5 28 34 BB FD 5F 19 C2 4C 53 C8 79 7FHM1 = (FE 00 00 20 | Hash(ClientHello1), HelloRetryRequest,
ClientHello2, ServerHello) TH1 = Transcript-Hash(HM1): 00000: 88 8D 5D 1E 15 98 65 05 97 3E F2 0F 9A FA F5 71 00010: 20 A3 66 C2 D2 19 91 D1 5E 25 07 0C 3D 07 D5 E9 client_handshake_traffic_secret (CHTS): CHTS = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "c hs traffic", HM1) = HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "c hs traffic", TH1, 32): 00000: DF 00 4B 79 A1 D3 51 55 97 1B 0E 84 C8 91 99 7F 00010: FE E6 D0 1B 27 04 23 CC 74 64 4B 25 47 3E 78 60 client_finished_key = HKDF-Expand-Label(CHTS, "finished", "", 32): 00000: 1F A6 7D 28 9F F2 A6 85 C7 BE 13 FD F5 60 A6 D5 00010: A9 F5 EA 85 63 AD 6C C7 B4 85 30 76 59 A5 55 81HM2 = (FE 00 00 20 | Hash(ClientHello1), HelloRetryRequest,
ClientHello2, ServerHello,
EncryptedExtensions, Server Finished) TH2 =Transcript-Hash(HM2): 00000: 53 06 24 EE 07 6F FF E1 04 DC 15 EB B4 2D 78 8F 00010: 1E 4F EB 3E 8C 2D CF A5 CB 85 D7 2F 81 D0 6D 15 FinishedHash = HMAC(client_finished_key, TH2): 00000: BB 83 09 94 BE 38 A9 8F FC A3 BF D2 35 CD 80 7E 00010: 81 82 1E 67 37 AB 98 31 43 DC A9 7B 9E E0 23 25 Finished message: msg_type: 14 length: 000020 body: verify_data: BB830994BE38A98FFCA3BFD235CD807E 81821E6737AB983143DCA97B9EE02325 00000: 14 00 00 20 BB 83 09 94 BE 38 A9 8F FC A3 BF D2 00010: 35 CD 80 7E 81 82 1E 67 37 AB 98 31 43 DC A9 7B 00020: 9E E0 23 25Record payload protection:
client_write_key_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(CHTS, "key", "", 32): 00000: DF 66 60 1E DD D6 4E 96 1D FC 7D D0 21 2E F2 25 00010: C0 05 33 E6 DA A4 AD 24 18 5E BE B2 24 B5 46 B8 client_write_iv_hs = HKDF-Expand-Label(CHTS, "iv", "", 16): 00000: E8 94 3C 9F A2 88 56 A1 client_record_write_key = TLSTREE(client_write_key_hs, 0): 00000: BD 00 9F FC 04 A0 52 9E 60 78 EB A5 A0 7A DE 74 00010: 93 7F F3 A1 AB 75 F7 AE 05 19 04 78 51 9B 6D F3 seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 nonce: 00000: 68 94 3C 9F A2 88 56 A1 additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 00 2D TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000: 14 00 00 20 BB 83 09 94 BE 38 A9 8F FC A3 BF D2 00010: 35 CD 80 7E 81 82 1E 67 37 AB 98 31 43 DC A9 7B 00020: 9E E0 23 25 16 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 002D encrypted_record: 14254CA6B9EBCC4A951A3D1F1040B0B1 45446DF131946CEECBDB6A8EC534F194 223281B56532A703C492160E2CTLSCiphertext:
00000: 17 03 03 00 2D 14 25 4C A6 B9 EB CC 4A 95 1A 3D 00010: 1F 10 40 B0 B1 45 44 6D F1 31 94 6C EE CB DB 6A 00020: 8E C5 34 F1 94 22 32 81 B5 65 32 A7 03 C4 92 16 00030: 0E 2C ---------------------------Server---------------------------Application data:
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00Record payload protection:
Derived #1 = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "") = HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "", 32): 00000: BC 4D 6F E3 D9 43 78 21 1D 3D 64 1C 75 92 EB AA 00010: 7A A2 96 47 9C 57 BD D1 E1 4C 7B 04 9F 6D F1 CD MainSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #1, IKM: 0^256): 00000: DB FF 82 86 2E 54 A1 41 3E 6C 2E D8 2C 6D A5 AF 00010: FD BF DE 12 30 2E 49 75 5B 61 F2 06 32 E1 0A 42-
HM2 = (FE 00 00 20 | Hash(ClientHello1), HelloRetryRequest,
ClientHello2, ServerHello,
EncryptedExtensions, Server Finished) TH2 = Transcript-Hash(HM2): 00000: 53 06 24 EE 07 6F FF E1 04 DC 15 EB B4 2D 78 8F 00010: 1E 4F EB 3E 8C 2D CF A5 CB 85 D7 2F 81 D0 6D 15 SATS = Derive-Secret(MainSecret, "s ap traffic", HM2) = HKDF-Expand-Label(MainSecret, "s ap traffic", TH2, 32): 00000: 52 91 26 2B EC B5 22 69 34 3A E8 27 9B 43 54 B1 00010: 89 22 D5 15 04 60 8B A7 21 C4 72 46 7E EE E8 78 server_write_key_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(SATS, "key", "", 32): 00000: 15 D9 2C 51 47 B2 13 10 ED ED F5 5B 3D 7A B7 76 00000: 81 7D 6F E2 FC F2 30 D7 E3 F2 92 75 F6 E2 41 EC server_write_iv_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(SATS, "iv", "", 8): 00000: 71 2E 2F 11 CD 50 6E B9 server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 0): 00000: 7B B8 81 55 35 98 DE F5 34 FC AF 9B 77 A3 35 5B 00010: C3 BC A3 87 4D 67 40 F6 CB F5 C1 B6 D3 5C 65 ED seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 nonce: 00000: 71 2E 2F 11 CD 50 6E B9 additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 04 09 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000400: 17 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 0409 encrypted_record: 7CAA82039F67326C2D735EE809B57750 945F5CE2B0C47B8EF1ECADA3D3F1AD9E 3FBA5926FDB2B61197D08B8B1399167B 6C249C90C0A3101452FD72078FBFB057 31E06215019395DDCF44AA763DCB1ACA 8B3F47D033FBA12E7C0FBB4DFBDABD8B 97E996E8E36231BE8015412B90CCCFBB E2BC967E597FC2E7B251A9BBEBAA245B 63139387203DB90BD1BF5300A5B577BF 46793DB1AA30FEDFD1E6A5 [...] E1D55816BFD6BFFBF6E6FB23D86117D2 47441BC211D078199C1F8340BE808BA6 E5BE092B9E081E95D4A57672A07970A6 1FEF2F4B12A0F401FA30B813FE7CD1BF 881485157381B8489EC36296C6EE7538 0FB1DAA1B1473358FD87AA41D5DBA089 F528BD5F3B41B34002D945D7E0C49EFA 54A4EFB0DA4049F5F248B3F7D46FEC05 A25BBE0A5120106BC21C1EA25EFF3125 E079CA0F7FFA56FD89C1A80DA0A3TLSCiphertext:
00000000: 17 03 03 04 09 7C AA 82 03 9F 67 32 6C 2D 73 5E 00000010: E8 09 B5 77 50 94 5F 5C E2 B0 C4 7B 8E F1 EC AD 00000020: A3 D3 F1 AD 9E 3F BA 59 26 FD B2 B6 11 97 D0 8B 00000030: 8B 13 99 16 7B 6C 24 9C 90 C0 A3 10 14 52 FD 72 00000040: 07 8F BF B0 57 31 E0 62 15 01 93 95 DD CF 44 AA 00000050: 76 3D CB 1A CA 8B 3F 47 D0 33 FB A1 2E 7C 0F BB 00000060: 4D FB DA BD 8B 97 E9 96 E8 E3 62 31 BE 80 15 41 00000070: 2B 90 CC CF BB E2 BC 96 7E 59 7F C2 E7 B2 51 A9 00000080: BB EB AA 24 5B 63 13 93 87 20 3D B9 0B D1 BF 53 00000090: 00 A5 B5 77 BF 46 79 3D B1 AA 30 FE DF D1 E6 A5 [...] 00000370: E1 D5 58 16 BF D6 BF FB F6 E6 FB 23 D8 61 17 D2 00000380: 47 44 1B C2 11 D0 78 19 9C 1F 83 40 BE 80 8B A6 00000390: E5 BE 09 2B 9E 08 1E 95 D4 A5 76 72 A0 79 70 A6 000003A0: 1F EF 2F 4B 12 A0 F4 01 FA 30 B8 13 FE 7C D1 BF 000003B0: 88 14 85 15 73 81 B8 48 9E C3 62 96 C6 EE 75 38 000003C0: 0F B1 DA A1 B1 47 33 58 FD 87 AA 41 D5 DB A0 89 000003D0: F5 28 BD 5F 3B 41 B3 40 02 D9 45 D7 E0 C4 9E FA 000003E0: 54 A4 EF B0 DA 40 49 F5F2 48 B3 F7 D4 6F EC 05 000003F0: A2 5B BE 0A 51 20 10 6B C2 1C 1E A2 5E FF 31 25 00000400: E0 79 CA 0F 7F FA 56 FD 89 C1 A8 0D A0 A3 ---------------------------Server---------------------------Application data:
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00Record payload protection:
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 1): 00000: 7B B8 81 55 35 98 DE F5 34 FC AF 9B 77 A3 35 5B 00010: C3 BC A3 87 4D 67 40 F6 CB F5 C1 B6 D3 5C 65 ED seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 nonce: 00000: 71 2E 2F 11 CD 50 6E B8 additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 04 09 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000400: 17 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 0409 encrypted_record: DC593FC6FAFC5191242B632E144504A2 61AEF332970FF8316FA4DE507BFB471E A83C713FF950791078FD9A3178D02682 66E12BC970FFB1EE4A56600DF32ABF9F A318FF45C91CDEF42E1C1D450059729B 1BB6925F773A1E8F304E7AB143F0FC16 EF16BC4E0DF60D76DE43390F9CD257DE D256209B1675378FE6822CBB19A53620 BD5B240282CF4977F1C572AB3B1DD6CF 497F2757286B7E49CF80C7 [...] EE2E29D3F79640D9CA3C35181B9CE939 CA16A862AC460424B6AEF6B89D533406 7724CCF2466A804F09FAB3EBE737F99C 6498EFF2379CAD6596C3C352F4426876 95ACBC4FB44B5D069FB66605E47945FE 2F11509FF7B5961BE8AB43EC2060D822 A994D97C59C8058C951708029AE0BEDA 8045ECA025FE02E6D2EFAF13202012E9 E34358DE79E561CCEC8F549E70073EE6 938F4A1AAE97465970D65260604CTLSCiphertext:
00000000: 17 03 03 04 09 DC 59 3F C6 FA FC 51 91 24 2B 63 00000010: 2E 14 45 04 A2 61 AE F3 32 97 0F F8 31 6F A4 DE 00000020: 50 7B FB 47 1E A8 3C 71 3F F9 50 79 10 78 FD 9A 00000030: 31 78 D0 26 82 66 E1 2B C9 70 FF B1 EE 4A 56 60 00000040: 0D F3 2A BF 9F A3 18 FF 45 C9 1C DE F4 2E 1C 1D 00000050: 45 00 59 72 9B 1B B6 92 5F 77 3A 1E 8F 30 4E 7A 00000060: B1 43 F0 FC 16 EF 16 BC 4E 0D F6 0D 76 DE 43 39 00000070: 0F 9C D2 57 DE D2 56 20 9B 16 75 37 8F E6 82 2C 00000080: BB 19 A5 36 20 BD 5B 24 02 82 CF 49 77 F1 C5 72 00000090: AB 3B 1D D6 CF 49 7F 27 57 28 6B 7E 49 CF 80 C7 [...] 00000370: EE 2E 29 D3 F7 96 40 D9 CA 3C 35 18 1B 9C E9 39 00000380: CA 16 A8 62 AC 46 04 24 B6 AE F6 B8 9D 53 34 06 00000390: 77 24 CC F2 46 6A 80 4F 09 FA B3 EB E7 37 F9 9C 000003A0: 64 98 EF F2 37 9C AD 65 96 C3 C3 52 F4 42 68 76 000003B0: 95 AC BC 4F B4 4B 5D 06 9F B6 66 05 E4 79 45 FE 000003C0: 2F 11 50 9F F7 B5 96 1B E8 AB 43 EC 20 60 D8 22 000003D0: A9 94 D9 7C 59 C8 05 8C 95 17 08 02 9A E0 BE DA 000003E0: 80 45 EC A0 25 FE 02 E6 D2 EF AF 13 20 20 12 E9 000003F0: E3 43 58 DE 79 E5 61 CC EC 8F 54 9E 70 07 3E E6 00000400: 93 8F 4A 1A AE 97 46 59 70 D6 52 60 60 4C ---------------------------Server---------------------------Application data:
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00Record payload protection:
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 128): 00000: 93 D5 D6 E1 03 6F DF B3 EF BF 31 E6 DA 5E EC E6 00010: 85 17 1C 97 7F F9 CD 6C 3A 3F 67 C0 22 4A B6 EB seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 nonce: 00000: 71 2E 2F 11 CD 50 6E 39 additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 04 09 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000400: 17 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 0409 encrypted_record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iphertext:
00000000: 17 03 03 04 09 56 A7 E2 F3 25 41 DB 0E E1 56 3F 00000010: 8C A7 9E B1 29 31 92 E2 12 2B A8 A8 9A 6C F0 5B 00000020: 15 1D 20 5A EC EB 60 32 1D 0F 63 7A 98 88 08 14 00000030: BE F6 39 FC 08 A1 E8 22 2D 95 A5 4E 55 93 F8 BB 00000040: 9C F5 20 D3 FA 7D 38 D9 60 E0 06 65 BB 73 6A 7A 00000050: FF 49 D7 A7 BA D0 92 DD B1 71 46 55 ED F1 A9 A2 00000060: 4F 47 27 DA 7E 87 31 35 F2 A0 53 4F AF 78 25 EA 00000070: 99 40 1F E1 F0 1E 8C 42 46 D2 B5 5C EB E7 68 FA 00000080: 20 5B 3F 78 90 98 27 B9 12 C6 AA 9F DD E3 CF CA 00000090: 47 F2 D9 E2 E2 0F BE E9 60 6D 0E 01 05 A7 C9 7A [...] 00000370: A7 2D 5F 8E 43 AB C1 39 84 59 3F 16 DC EC BE 7B 00000380: 26 AF 73 FD C8 2D 7B E1 F9 13 B8 46 D2 61 25 31 00000390: BA 0F 05 FF 0C 52 DE FC 86 74 AF 3A 1A E2 73 93 000003A0: FC 09 2D 45 DC D0 F7 1E 2B 54 B6 0E C6 18 C2 A4 000003B0: 5B E7 2E C1 9B 5F B2 63 C2 DC 78 0F F3 09 3F D5 000003C0: D2 F7 51 85 E4 37 BE 8B B3 E5 C2 6F 9E 0E 71 B3 000003D0: C5 D6 CC A2 E0 D2 F4 4B B1 AC DA 17 B1 89 F2 1E 000003E0: C9 7C 74 85 02 A2 15 5E 3A DC 3C CC 1B A1 4E EB 000003F0: 7C DA A0 18 25 3F CB 57 D5 3A 12 F5 48 C5 45 6C 00000400: DD A0 03 85 EE 1C 08 26 AB 58 E9 64 00 7C ---------------------------Server---------------------------Application data:
00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00Record payload protection:
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 129): 00000: 93 D5 D6 E1 03 6F DF B3 EF BF 31 E6 DA 5E EC E6 00010: 85 17 1C 97 7F F9 CD 6C 3A 3F 67 C0 22 4A B6 EB seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 81 nonce: 00000: 71 2E 2F 11 CD 50 6E 38 additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 04 09 TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [...] 000003F0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00000400: 17 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 0409 encrypted_record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iphertext:
00000000: 17 03 03 04 09 EE 73 C4 CA E6 9F D3 0B C4 B3 A6 00000010: 6C A5 71 CD 9F 3C 7A A2 C2 BA 9F 42 8A 82 24 97 00000020: 20 F7 17 73 8F 8C 35 AC 77 45 B7 01 F3 B0 CE E9 00000030: 93 EB 2C FD AB 44 68 B2 22 97 A8 28 6C 25 72 DE 00000040: 36 6A C3 8B 70 47 1B 26 A1 EC 4F 19 D6 8E 7E DA 00000050: 0A 23 1C 3B D1 98 01 3F A0 5B AC 92 E7 74 A3 70 00000060: EB 10 C0 CB D9 15 BA CD 01 17 A8 85 80 4B 9A 47 00000070: 5B 44 A6 F3 E8 7D 7B CA 40 F3 F5 2E F4 AB 62 4B 00000080: 6E DD 30 94 F9 86 26 9E 40 9F 8B B7 6C EB 4B E2 00000090: 6D 4B 1A F5 4C 0A 14 D4 1C 29 1E B8 E1 81 F7 9A [...] 00000370: 10 C4 01 A9 42 3D 02 80 4B 51 DD BF E5 92 52 94 00000380: AD EE 00 67 19 3F ED 8F 66 CB EE D9 47 58 73 B8 00000390: 8A 73 04 96 48 7E 8E 7F 45 FC 05 EE E9 C6 28 AF 000003A0: E9 23 66 96 F4 1A 15 05 AA 73 92 BF 71 C7 EE D3 000003B0: 78 03 50 13 AD E1 EF 07 DE 5A 02 30 66 9E 13 3E 000003C0: 0D 18 B6 C9 77 A7 FE 94 F4 D2 2A B2 9C BA A6 B5 000003D0: CD DB F4 B3 55 98 C0 00 7F 3B A6 9D 3F A2 73 0D 000003E0: F5 1D 86 7E 1E 47 CF DE 22 CA EA CD 4C 5A FD 97 000003F0: 08 8A EB 92 D1 2C E3 C6 85 C4 E5 17 73 0B 83 39 00000400: 4F C8 51 42 64 E2 F1 5E 51 CE 43 9D ED 1D ---------------------------Server--------------------------- Alert message: level: 01 description: 00 00000: 01 00Record payload protection:
server_record_write_key = TLSTREE(server_write_key_ap, 130):
00000: 93 D5 D6 E1 03 6F DF B3 EF BF 31 E6 DA 5E EC E6 00010: 85 17 1C 97 7F F9 CD 6C 3A 3F 67 C0 22 4A B6 EB seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 82 nonce: 00000: 71 2E 2F 11 CD 50 6E 3B additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 00 0B TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000: 01 00 15 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 000B encrypted_record: 447A3FAE8F86C135189B10TLSCiphertext:
00000: 17 03 03 00 0B 44 7A 3F AE 8F 86 C1 35 18 9B 10 ---------------------------Client--------------------------- Alert message: level: 01 description: 00 00000: 01 00
Record payload protection:
Derived #1 = Derive-Secret(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "") = HKDF-Expand-Label(HandshakeSecret, "derived", "", 32): 00000: BC 4D 6F E3 D9 43 78 21 1D 3D 64 1C 75 92 EB AA 00010: 7A A2 96 47 9C 57 BD D1 E1 4C 7B 04 9F 6D F1 CD MainSecret = HKDF-Extract(Salt: Derived #1, IKM: 0^256): 00000: DB FF 82 86 2E 54 A1 41 3E 6C 2E D8 2C 6D A5 AF 00010: FD BF DE 12 30 2E 49 75 5B 61 F2 06 32 E1 0A 42-
HM2 = (FE 00 00 20 | Hash(ClientHello1), HelloRetryRequest,
ClientHello2, ServerHello, EncryptedExtensions, Server Finished) TH2 = Transcript-Hash(HM2): 00000: 53 06 24 EE 07 6F FF E1 04 DC 15 EB B4 2D 78 8F 00010: 1E 4F EB 3E 8C 2D CF A5 CB 85 D7 2F 81 D0 6D 15 client_application_traffic_secret (CATS): CATS = Derive-Secret(MainSecret, "c ap traffic", HM2) = HKDF-Expand-Label(MainSecret, "c ap traffic", TH2, 32): 20 D9 85 D5 B8 4D 9D 8D 4E 5E CF CD BC DD 67 41 55 F1 82 F7 28 7B 18 4D A5 53 42 5C 6C 64 57 83 client_write_key_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(CATS, "key", "", 32): 00000: EB D2 71 DE 19 FE E1 8B B1 99 8F 69 AF 5B 6A E1 00010: 89 58 E8 D3 70 2F 12 FB B5 B0 3F 6F D6 91 FE FA client_write_iv_ap = HKDF-Expand-Label(CATS, "iv", "", 8): 00000: 18 FB 03 8D BF 72 41 E6 client_record_write_key = TLSTREE(client_write_key_ap, 0): 00000: 86 2A 74 18 0B 4A E4 C2 D1 5F 4A 62 ED 8A 4A 75 00010: B0 8D 72 B0 46 AF DE CB 3A 8E F0 C2 67 F4 56 BD seqnum: 00000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 nonce: 00000: 18 FB 03 8D BF 72 41 E6 additional_data: 00000: 17 03 03 00 0B TLSInnerPlaintext: 00000: 01 00 15 Record layer message: type: 17 legacy_record_version: 0303 length: 000B encrypted_record: 464AEEAD391D97987169F3TLSCiphertext:
00000: 17 03 03 00 0B 46 4A EE AD 39 1D 97 98 71 69 F3
Contributors
-
Lilia Akhmetzyanova CryptoPro Email: lah@cryptopro.ru Alexandr Sokolov CryptoPro Email: sokolov@cryptopro.ru Vasily Nikolaev CryptoPro Email: nikolaev@cryptopro.ru
Authors' Addresses
-
Stanislav Smyshlyaev (editor) CryptoPro 18, Suschevsky val Moscow 127018 Russian Federation Phone: +7 (495) 995-48-20 Email: svs@cryptopro.ru
Evgeny Alekseev
CryptoPro
18, Suschevsky val
Moscow
127018
Russian Federation
Email: alekseev@cryptopro.ruEkaterina Griboedova
CryptoPro
18, Suschevsky val
Moscow
127018
Russian Federation
Email: griboedovaekaterina@gmail.comAlexandra Babueva
CryptoPro
18, Suschevsky val
Moscow
127018
Russian Federation
Email: babueva@cryptopro.ruLidiia Nikiforova
CryptoPro
18, Suschevsky val
Moscow
127018
Russian Federation
Email: nikiforova@cryptopro.ru