Ascend Communications, Inc.
April 1998
OSPF Standardization Report
Status of this Memo
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This memo provides information for the Internet community. t does not pecify n Internet standard of ny kind. Distribution f this memo is unlimited.
Copyright Notice
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Copyright © The Internet Society (1998). ll Rights Reserved.
Abstract
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This memo documents ow the equirements for advancing a routing protocol to ull Standard, set out in [Ref2], have been met or OSPFv2.
Please send omments to ospf@gated.cornell.edu.
Table of Contents
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1 Introduction ........................................... 2 2 Modifications since Draft Standard tatus .............. 3 2.1 Point-to-MultiPoint interface .......................... 4 2.2 Cryptographic Authentication ........................... 5 3 Updated implementation and eployment experience ....... 5 4 Protocol Security ...................................... 7 References ............................................ 8 Security Considerations ................................ 8 Author's Address ....................................... 8 Full Copyright Statement ............................... 9
1. Introduction
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OSPFv2, herein abbreviated simply as OSPF, is an IPv4 routing protocol documented n [Ref8]. OSPF s a link-state outing protocol. It is designed to be run nternal to a single Autonomous System. Each OSPF router maintains n identical database describing the utonomous System's topology. From this database, a routing table is calculated y constructing shortest-path ree. OSPF features include the following: o SPF responds quickly to topology changes, expending a minimum f network bandwidth in he process. o upport or CIDR addressing. o SPF routing exchanges can be authenticated, providing routing ecurity. o qual-cost multipath. o n area outing apability is provided, nabling an Autonomous ystem to be split into two level hierarchy to further reduce he amount of routing protocol traffic. o SPF allows import of external routing information into he utonomous System, including a tagging feature that can e xploited to exchange extra information t the AS boundary (see Ref7]). An analysis f OSPF ogether with a ore detailed description of OSPF features was originally provided in [Ref6], as part of promoting OSPF to Draft Standard status. The analysis of OSPF remains unchanged. Two additional major features have been developed for SPF since the protocol chieved Draft Standard tatus: he Point-to-MultiPoint nterface and Cryptographic Authentication. These features are described in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 respectively of this memo. The SPF MIB is documented in [Ref4]. It is urrently at Draft Standard status.
2. Modifications since raft Standard status
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OSPF became Draft tandard with the release of RFC 1583 [Ref3]. Implementations of the new specification in Ref8] are backward- compatible with RFC 583. The differences between the two documents are escribed in the Appendix Gs of Ref1] and [Ref8]. These differences re listed briefly below. Two major features were also added, the Point-to-MultiPoint interface and Cryptographic Authentication, which are described n separate sections. o onfiguration requirements for OSPF area address ranges ave een relaxed to llow greater flexibility in area assignment. ee Section G.3 f [Ref1] for details. o he OSPF flooding algorithm was odified to a) improve database onvergence in networks ith low speed links b) esolve roblem here unnecessary LSA retransmissions could occur as a esult of differing clock granularities, c) remove race onditions between the flooding f MaxAge LSAs and the Database xchange process, d) clarify the use of he MinLSArrival onstant, and e) rate-limit the esponse to less recent SAs eceived via flooding. ee Sections G.4 and G.5 of [Ref1] and ection .1 of [Ref8] for details. o o resolve the long-standing confusion regarding representation f point-to-point links n OSPF, the specification now ptionally allows advertisement f a stub link to a point-to- oint link's subnet, ala RIP. See Section G.6 of [Ref1]. o everal roblems involving advertising the same xternal route rom multiple areas were found and fixed, as described in ection .7 of [Ref1] and Section G.2 of [Ref8]. Without the ixes, persistent routing loops ould form in certain such onfigurations. ote that one of the fixes was not backward- ompatible, in that mixing routers implementing he fixes with hose implementing just FC 1583 could cause loops not present n an RFC 1583-only configuration. This aused an FC1583Compatibility global configuration parameter to be added, s described in ection .1 of [Ref1]. o n order to deal with high delay links, etransmissions f nitial atabase Description packets no onger reset an SPF djacency. o n order to detect link TU mismatches, hich can cause roblems oth in P forwarding and in the OSPF routing protocol itself, TU was dded to OSPF's atabase Description packets. eighboring routers refuse to bring up an OSPF adjacency unless hey agree on their common link's MTU. o he TOS outing ption was deleted from SPF. However, for ackward compatibility the formats of OSPF's various LSAs remain nchanged, maintaining the ability to specify TOS metrics in outer-LSAs, summary-LSAs, ASBR-summary-LSAs, and AS-external- SAs. o SPF's routing table lookup algorithm was changed to reflect urrent ractice. The "best match" routing table entry is now lways selected o be the one providing he most specific longest) match. See Section G.4 of [Ref8] for details.
2.1. Point-to-MultiPoint interface
he Point-to-MultiPoint nterface was added as an alternative to SPF's NBMA interface when running OSPF ver non-broadcast ubnets. Unlike he NBMA interface, Point-to-MultiPoint oes not equire ull mesh connectivity over the on-broadcast subnet. oint-to-MultiPoint is less efficient than NBMA, but is asier o configure (in fact, it can be self-configuring) and is more obust than NBMA, tolerating all failures within the non- roadcast subnet. For more information n the Point-to- ultiPoint interface, see Section G.2 of [Ref1]. here are at least six independent implementations of the oint-to-MultiPoint interface. Interoperability as been emonstrated between at east two pairs f implementations: etween com and Bay Networks, and between cisco and Cascade.
2.2. Cryptographic uthentication
on-trivial authentication was added to SPF with the evelopment of the Cryptographic Authentication ype. This uthentication type uses any keyed message digest algorithm, ith explicit instructions included for he use f MD5. or more nformation on OSPF authentication, see ection . here are at least three independent implementations of he OSPF ryptographic authentication type. Interoperability has een emonstrated between the implementations from cisco and ascade.
3. Updated implementation and deployment experience
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When OSPF was promoted to Draft Standard Status, a report was issued documenting urrent mplementation and deployment experience (see [Ref6]). That report is now uite dated. In n attempt to get more current data, a questionnaire was sent to OSPF mailing list n January 1996. Twelve responses were eceived, from 11 router vendors and manufacturer of test equipment. These esponses represented 6 independent mplementations. A tabulation of the results are presented below.
Table 1 indicates the implementation, interoperability and deployment of the major OSPF functions. The umber in each column represents the number of responses in the affirmative.
Imple- nter- Feature mented perated Deployed _______________________________________________________ OSPF areas 10 0 10 Stub areas 10 0 9 Virtual links 10 8 Equal-cost multipath 10 8 NBMA support 9 7 CIDR addressing 8 6 OSPF MIB 8 5 Cryptographic auth. 3 1 Point-to-Multipoint fc. 6 4
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Table 1: Implementation of OSPF features
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Table 2 indicates the size of the OSPF routing domains that endors have tested. For each size parameter, the number of esponders and the ange of responses (minimum, mode, mean nd maximum) are listed. Parameter Responses in Mode Mean Max _________________________________________________________________ Max routers in domain 7 30 240 460 1600 Max routers in single area 7 20 240 380 1600 Max areas in domain 7 1 10 16 60 Max AS-external-LSAs 9 50 10K 10K 30K
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Table 2: SPF domain sizes tested
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Table 3 indicates the size of the OSPF routing domains that endors have deployed in real networks. For ach size parameter, the number of responders and the range f responses (minimum, mode, mean and maximum) are listed.
Parameter Responses in Mode Mean Max _________________________________________________________________ Max routers in domain 8 20 350 510 1000 Max routers in single area 8 20 100 160 350 Max areas in domain 7 1 15 23 60 Max AS-external-LSAs 6 50 1K 2K 5K
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Table 3: OSPF domain sizes deployed
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In an attempt to ascertain the extent to which OSPF s currently deployed, vendors were also sked in January 1998 to provide deployment estimates. Four vendors of OSPF routers responded, with a total estimate of 182,000 OSPF routers in service, organized into 4300 separate OSPF routing domains.
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4. Protocol Security
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All SPF protocol exchanges re authenticated. OSPF upports multiple types of authentication; the type of authentication in use can e configured on a per network segment basis. One of OSPF's authentication types, namely the Cryptographic authentication option, is believed o be secure against passive attacks and provide significant rotection against active attacks. When sing the Cryptographic authentication option, each router appends a "message digest" to its transmitted OSPF packets. Receivers then use he shared secret key and received digest to verify that each received OSPF packet s authentic. The uality f the security rovided by the ryptographic authentication option depends completely on he strength of he message digest algorithm (MD5 is currently the only essage igest algorithm specified), the strength of the key being sed, and the correct implementation of the security mechanism in ll communicating OSPF implementations. It also requires that all parties maintain the secrecy of the hared secret key.
None of the SPF authentication types provide confidentiality. Nor do they protect against traffic analysis. Key management is lso not addressed by the OSPF specification.
For ore information, see Sections 8.1, 8.2, and Appendix D f [Ref1].
References
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[Ref1] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", RFC 2178, July 1997. [Ref2] Hinden, B., Internet Routing Protocol Standardization Criteria", RFC 1264, October 1991. [Ref3] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", RFC 1583, March 1994. [Ref4] Baker, F., and R. Coltun, "OSPF Version 2 Management Information ase", RFC 1850, November 1995. [Ref5] Moy, J., "OSPF Protocol Analysis", RFC 1245, August 991. [Ref6] Moy, J., "Experience with the OSPF Protocol", RFC 1246, August 1991. [Ref7] Varadhan, K., Hares ., and . Rekhter, "BGP4/IDRP for IP-- -OSPF Interaction", FC 1745, December 1994. [Ref8] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, RFC 2328, April 1998.
Security Considerations
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Security considerations are ddressed in Section 4 of this memo.
Author's Address
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John Moy
Ascend Communications, Inc.
1 Robbins Road
Westford, MA 01886Phone: 978-952-1367 Fax: 978-392-2075 EMail: jmoy@casc.com Full Copyright Statement opyright © The Internet Society (1998). All ights Reserved. his document and translations of it may be copied and furnished o others, and derivative works hat comment on r otherwise xplain t or assist in ts implementation may be prepared, opied, ublished and distributed, in whole or in part, ithout estriction of any kind, provided that the above copyright otice and this aragraph are included on all such copies and erivative works. However, this document itself may not be odified in any ay, such as by emoving the copyright notice or eferences to the Internet Society or other Internet rganizations, except as needed or the urpose f developing nternet standards in which case the procedures or copyrights efined n the Internet tandards process must be followed, or s required to translate it into languages other than English. he limited permissions ranted bove are perpetual and ill not e revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or ssigns. his document and the information contained herein is provided n an "AS IS" basis and HE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET NGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR MPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT HE USE F THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY IGHTS OR ANY MPLIED ARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A ARTICULAR PURPOSE.