Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) C. Filsfils, Ed.
Request for Comments: 8986 P. Camarillo, Ed.
Category: Standards Track Cisco Systems, Inc.
ISSN: 2070-1721 J. Leddy
Akamai Technologies
D. Voyer
Bell Canada
S. Matsushima
SoftBank
Z. Li
Huawei Technologies
February 2021
Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) Network Programming
Abstract
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The Segment Routing over IPv6 (SRv6) Network Programming framework enables a network operator or an application to specify a packet processing program by encoding a sequence of instructions in the IPv6 packet header.
Each instruction is implemented on one or several nodes in the network and identified by an SRv6 Segment Identifier in the packet.
This document defines the SRv6 Network Programming concept and specifies the base set of SRv6 behaviors that enables the creation of interoperable overlays with underlay optimization.
Status of This Memo
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This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 7841.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8986.
Copyright Notice
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Copyright © 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Table of Contents
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1. Introduction 2. Terminology 2.1. Requirements Language 3. SRv6 SID 3.1. SID Format 3.2. SID Allocation within an SR Domain 3.3. SID Reachability 4. SR Endpoint Behaviors 4.1. End: Endpoint 4.1.1. Upper-Layer Header 4.2. End.X: L3 Cross-Connect 4.3. End.T: Specific IPv6 Table Lookup 4.4. End.DX6: Decapsulation and IPv6 Cross-Connect 4.5. End.DX4: Decapsulation and IPv4 Cross-Connect 4.6. End.DT6: Decapsulation and Specific IPv6 Table Lookup 4.7. End.DT4: Decapsulation and Specific IPv4 Table Lookup 4.8. End.DT46: Decapsulation and Specific IP Table Lookup 4.9. End.DX2: Decapsulation and L2 Cross-Connect 4.10. End.DX2V: Decapsulation and VLAN L2 Table Lookup 4.11. End.DT2U: Decapsulation and Unicast MAC L2 Table Lookup 4.12. End.DT2M: Decapsulation and L2 Table Flooding 4.13. End.B6.Encaps: Endpoint Bound to an SRv6 Policy with Encapsulation 4.14. End.B6.Encaps.Red: End.B6.Encaps with Reduced SRH 4.15. End.BM: Endpoint Bound to an SR-MPLS Policy 4.16. Flavors 4.16.1. PSP: Penultimate Segment Pop of the SRH 4.16.2. USP: Ultimate Segment Pop of the SRH 4.16.3. USD: Ultimate Segment Decapsulation 5. SR Policy Headend Behaviors 5.1. H.Encaps: SR Headend with Encapsulation in an SR Policy 5.2. H.Encaps.Red: H.Encaps with Reduced Encapsulation 5.3. H.Encaps.L2: H.Encaps Applied to Received L2 Frames 5.4. H.Encaps.L2.Red: H.Encaps.Red Applied to Received L2 Frames 6. Counters 7. Flow-Based Hash Computation 8. Control Plane 8.1. IGP 8.2. BGP-LS 8.3. BGP IP/VPN/EVPN 8.4. Summary 9. Security Considerations 10. IANA Considerations 10.1. Ethernet Next Header Type 10.2. SRv6 Endpoint Behaviors Registry 10.2.1. Registration Procedures 10.2.2. Initial Registrations 11. References 11.1. Normative References 11.2. Informative References Acknowledgements Contributors Authors' Addresses
1. Introduction
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Segment Routing [RFC8402] leverages the source routing paradigm. An ingress node steers a packet through an ordered list of instructions, called "segments". Each one of these instructions represents a function to be called at a specific location in the network. A function is locally defined on the node where it is executed and may range from simply moving forward in the segment list to any complex user-defined behavior. Network Programming combines Segment Routing functions, both simple and complex, to achieve a networking objective that goes beyond mere packet routing.
This document defines the SRv6 Network Programming concept and specifies the main Segment Routing behaviors to enable the creation of interoperable overlays with underlay optimization.
[SRV6-NET-PGM-ILLUST] illustrates the concepts defined in this document.
Familiarity with the Segment Routing Header [RFC8754] is expected.
2. Terminology
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The following terms used within this document are defined in [RFC8402]: Segment Routing (SR), SR Domain, Segment ID (SID), SRv6, SRv6 SID, SR Policy, Prefix-SID, and Adj-SID.
The following terms used within this document are defined in [RFC8754]: Segment Routing Header (SRH), SR source node, transit node, SR Segment Endpoint Node, Reduced SRH, Segments Left, and Last Entry.
The following terms are used in this document as defined below:
FIB: Forwarding Information Base. A FIB lookup is a lookup in the forwarding table. SA: Source Address DA: Destination Address L3: Layer 3 L2: Layer 2 MAC: Media Access Control EVPN: Ethernet VPN ESI: Ethernet Segment Identifier Per-CE VPN label: A single label for each attachment circuit that is shared by all routes with the same "outgoing attachment circuit" (Section 4.3.2 of [RFC4364]) Per-VRF VPN label: A single label for the entire VPN Routing and Forwarding (VRF) table that is shared by all routes from that VRF (Section 4.3.2 of [RFC4364]) SL: The Segments Left field of the SRH SRv6 SID function: The function part of the SID is an opaque identification of a local behavior bound to the SID. It is formally defined in Section 3.1 of this document. SRv6 Endpoint behavior: A packet processing behavior executed at an SRv6 Segment Endpoint Node. Section 4 of this document defines SRv6 Endpoint behaviors related to traffic-engineering and overlay use cases. Other behaviors (e.g., service programming) are outside the scope of this document.An SR Policy is resolved to a SID list. A SID list is represented as <S1, S2, S3> where S1 is the first SID to visit, S2 is the second SID to visit, and S3 is the last SID to visit along the SR path.
(SA,DA) (S3, S2, S1; SL) represents an IPv6 packet with:
* Source Address (SA), Destination Address (DA), and next header (SRH).- SRH with SID list <S1, S2, S3> with Segments Left = SL.
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Note the difference between the <> and () symbols: <S1, S2, S3> represents a SID list where S1 is the first SID and S3 is the last SID to traverse. (S3, S2, S1; SL) represents the same SID list but encoded in the SRH format where the rightmost SID in the SRH is the first SID and the leftmost SID in the SRH is the last SID. When referring to an SR Policy in a high-level use case, it is simpler to use the <S1, S2, S3> notation. When referring to an illustration of the detailed packet behavior, the (S3, S2, S1; SL) notation is more convenient.
- The payload of the packet is omitted.
2.1. Requirements Language
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
3. SRv6 SID
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[RFC8402] defines an SRv6 Segment Identifier as an IPv6 address explicitly associated with the segment.
When an SRv6 SID is in the Destination Address field of an IPv6 header of a packet, it is routed through transit nodes in an IPv6 network as an IPv6 address.
Its processing is defined in Section 4.3 of [RFC8754] and reproduced here as a reminder:
| Without constraining the details of an implementation, the SR | segment endpoint node creates Forwarding Information Base (FIB) | entries for its local SIDs. | | When an SRv6-capable node receives an IPv6 packet, it performs a | longest-prefix-match lookup on the packet's destination address. | This lookup can return any of the following: | * A FIB entry that represents a locally instantiated SRv6 SID | | * A FIB entry that represents a local interface, not locally | instantiated as an SRv6 SID | | * A FIB entry that represents a nonlocal route | | * No Match
Section 4 of this document defines a new set of SRv6 SID behaviors in addition to that defined in Section 4.3.1 of [RFC8754].
3.1. SID Format
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This document defines an SRv6 SID as consisting of LOC:FUNCT:ARG, where a locator (LOC) is encoded in the L most significant bits of the SID, followed by F bits of function (FUNCT) and A bits of arguments (ARG). L, the locator length, is flexible, and an operator is free to use the locator length of their choice. F and A may be any value as long as L+F+A <= 128. When L+F+A is less than 128, then the remaining bits of the SID MUST be zero.
A locator may be represented as B:N where B is the SRv6 SID block (IPv6 prefix allocated for SRv6 SIDs by the operator) and N is the identifier of the parent node instantiating the SID.
When the LOC part of the SRv6 SIDs is routable, it leads to the node, which instantiates the SID.
The FUNCT is an opaque identification of a local behavior bound to the SID.
The term "function" refers to the bit string in the SRv6 SID. The term "behavior" identifies the behavior bound to the SID. Some behaviors are defined in Section 4 of this document.
An SRv6 Endpoint behavior may require additional information for its processing (e.g., related to the flow or service). This information may be encoded in the ARG bits of the SID.
In such a case, the semantics and format of the ARG bits are defined as part of the SRv6 Endpoint behavior specification.
The ARG value of a routed SID SHOULD remain constant among packets in a given flow. Varying ARG values among packets in a flow may result in different ECMP hashing and cause reordering.
3.2. SID Allocation within an SR Domain
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Locators are assigned consistent with IPv6 infrastructure allocation. For example, a network operator may:
* Assign block B::/48 to the SR domain * Assign a unique B:N::/64 block to each SRv6-enabled node in the domainAs an example, one mobile service provider has commercially deployed SRv6 across more than 1000 commercial routers and 1800 whitebox routers. All these devices are enabled for SRv6 and advertise SRv6 SIDs. The provider historically deployed IPv6 and assigned infrastructure addresses from the Unique Local Address (ULA) space [RFC4193]. They specifically allocated three /48 prefixes (Country X, Country Y, Country Z) to support their SRv6 infrastructure. From those /48 prefixes, each router was assigned a /64 prefix from which all SIDs of that router are allocated.
In another example, a large mobile and fixed-line service provider has commercially deployed SRv6 in their country-wide network. This provider is assigned a /20 prefix by a Regional Internet Registry (RIR). They sub-allocated a few /48 prefixes to their infrastructure to deploy SRv6. Each router is assigned a /64 prefix from which all SIDs of that router are allocated.
IPv6 address consumption in both these examples is minimal, representing less than one billionth and one millionth of the available address space, respectively.
A service provider receiving the current minimum allocation of a /32 prefix from an RIR may assign a /48 prefix to their infrastructure deploying SRv6 and subsequently allocate /64 prefixes for SIDs at each SRv6 node. The /48 assignment is one sixty-five thousandth (1/2^16) of the usable IPv6 address space available for assignment by the provider.
When an operator instantiates a SID at a node, they specify a SID value B:N:FUNCT and the behavior bound to the SID using one of the SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoints of the registry defined in this document (see Table 6).
The node advertises the SID, B:N:FUNCT, in the control plane (see Section 8) together with the SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoint identifying the behavior of the SID.
An SR source node cannot infer the behavior by examination of the FUNCT value of a SID.
Therefore, the SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoint is advertised along with the SID in the control plane.
An SR source node uses the SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoint to map the received SID (B:N:FUNCT) to a behavior.
An SR source node selects a desired behavior at an advertising node by selecting the SID (B:N:FUNCT) advertised with the desired behavior.
As an example:
* A network operator may assign an SRv6 SID block 2001:db8:bbbb::/48 from their in-house operation block for their SRv6 infrastructure. * A network operator may assign an SRv6 Locator 2001:db8:bbbb:3::/64 to one particular router, for example Router 3, in their SR Domain. * At Router 3, within the locator 2001:db8:bbbb:3::/64, the network operator or the router performs dynamic assignment for:-
- Function 0x0100 associated with the behavior End.X (Endpoint with L3 cross-connect) between router 3 and its connected neighbor router (e.g., Router 4). This function is encoded as a 16-bit value and has no arguments (F=16, A=0).
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This SID is advertised in the control plane as 2001:db8:bbbb:3:100:: with an SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoint value of 5.
- Function 0x0101 associated with the behavior End.X (Endpoint with L3 cross-connect) between router 3 and its connected neighbor router (e.g., Router 2). This function is encoded as a 16-bit value and has no arguments (F=16, A=0).
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This SID is advertised in the control plane as 2001:db8:bbbb:3:101:: with an SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoint value of 5.
These examples do not preclude any other IPv6 addressing allocation scheme.
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3.3. SID Reachability
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Most often, the node N would advertise IPv6 prefix(es) matching the LOC parts covering its SIDs or shorter-mask prefix. The distribution of these advertisements and calculation of their reachability are specific to the routing protocol and are outside of the scope of this document.
An SRv6 SID is said to be routed if its SID belongs to an IPv6 prefix advertised via a routing protocol. An SRv6 SID that does not fulfill this condition is non-routed.
Let's provide a classic illustration:
Node N is configured explicitly with two SIDs: 2001:db8:b:1:100:: and 2001:db8:b:2:101::. The network learns about a path to 2001:db8:b:1::/64 via the IGP; hence, a packet destined to 2001:db8:b:1:100:: would be routed up to N. The network does not learn about a path to 2001:db8:b:2::/64 via the IGP; hence, a packet destined to 2001:db8:b:2:101:: would not be routed up to N. A packet could be steered through a non-routed SID 2001:db8:b:2:101:: by using a SID list <...,2001:db8:b:1:100::,2001:db8:b:2:101::,...> where the non-routed SID is preceded by a routed SID to the same node. A packet could also be steered to a node instantiating a non- routed SID by preceding it in the SID list with an Adj-SID to that node. Routed and non-routed SRv6 SIDs are the SRv6 instantiation of global and local segments, respectively [RFC8402].
4. SR Endpoint Behaviors
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The following is a set of well-known behaviors that can be associated with a SID.
+-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End | Endpoint | | | | | | The SRv6 instantiation of a Prefix-SID | | | [RFC8402] | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End.X | Endpoint with L3 cross-connect | | | | | | The SRv6 instantiation of an Adj-SID | | | [RFC8402] | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End.T | Endpoint with specific IPv6 table lookup | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End.DX6 | Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv6 cross- | | | connect | | | | | | e.g., IPv6-L3VPN (equivalent to per-CE VPN | | | label) | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End.DX4 | Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv4 cross- | | | connect | | | | | | e.g., IPv4-L3VPN (equivalent to per-CE VPN | | | label) | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End.DT6 | Endpoint with decapsulation and specific | | | IPv6 table lookup | | | | | | e.g., IPv6-L3VPN (equivalent to per-VRF VPN | | | label) | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End.DT4 | Endpoint with decapsulation and specific | | | IPv4 table lookup | | | | | | e.g., IPv4-L3VPN (equivalent to per-VRF VPN | | | label) | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End.DT46 | Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IP | | | table lookup | | | | | | e.g., IP-L3VPN (equivalent to per-VRF VPN | | | label) | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End.DX2 | Endpoint with decapsulation and L2 cross- | | | connect | | | | | | e.g., L2VPN use case | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End.DX2V | Endpoint with decapsulation and VLAN L2 | | | table lookup | | | | | | e.g., EVPN Flexible Cross-connect use case | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End.DT2U | Endpoint with decapsulation and unicast MAC | | | L2 table lookup | | | | | | e.g., EVPN Bridging Unicast use case | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End.DT2M | Endpoint with decapsulation and L2 table | | | flooding | | | | | | e.g., EVPN Bridging Broadcast, Unknown | | | Unicast, and Multicast (BUM) use case with | | | Ethernet Segment Identifier (ESI) filtering | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End.B6.Encaps | Endpoint bound to an SRv6 Policy with | | | encapsulation | | | | | | SRv6 instantiation of a Binding SID | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End.B6.Encaps.Red | End.B6.Encaps with reduced SRH | | | | | | SRv6 instantiation of a Binding SID | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+ | End.BM | Endpoint bound to an SR-MPLS Policy | | | | | | SRv6 instantiation of an SR-MPLS Binding | | | SID | +-------------------+---------------------------------------------+
Table 1: Endpoint Behaviors
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The list is not exhaustive. In practice, any behavior can be attached to a local SID; for example, a node N can bind a SID to a local Virtual Machine (VM) or container that can apply any complex processing on the packet, provided there is an SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoint allocated for the processing.
When an SRv6-capable node (N) receives an IPv6 packet whose destination address matches a FIB entry that represents a locally instantiated SRv6 SID (S), the IPv6 header chain is processed as defined in Section 4 of [RFC8200]. For SRv6 SIDs associated with an Endpoint behavior defined in this document, the SRH and Upper-Layer header are processed as defined in the following subsections.
The pseudocode describing these behaviors details local processing at a node. An implementation of the pseudocode is compliant as long as the externally observable wire protocol is as described by the pseudocode.
Section 4.16 defines flavors of some of these behaviors.
Section 10.2 of this document defines the IANA registry used to maintain all these behaviors as well as future ones defined in other documents.
4.1. End: Endpoint
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The Endpoint behavior ("End" for short) is the most basic behavior. It is the instantiation of a Prefix-SID [RFC8402].
When N receives a packet whose IPv6 DA is S and S is a local End SID, N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed { S02. If (Segments Left == 0) { S03. Stop processing the SRH, and proceed to process the next header in the packet, whose type is identified by the Next Header field in the routing header. S04. } S05. If (IPv6 Hop Limit <= 1) { S06. Send an ICMP Time Exceeded message to the Source Address with Code 0 (Hop limit exceeded in transit), interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet. S07. } S08. max_LE = (Hdr Ext Len / 2) - 1 S09. If ((Last Entry > max_LE) or (Segments Left > Last Entry+1)) { S10. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered) and Pointer set to the Segments Left field, interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet. S11. } S12. Decrement IPv6 Hop Limit by 1 S13. Decrement Segments Left by 1 S14. Update IPv6 DA with Segment List[Segments Left] S15. Submit the packet to the egress IPv6 FIB lookup for transmission to the new destination S16. } | Note: | | The End behavior operates on the same FIB table (i.e., | identified by VRF or L3 relay ID) associated to the packet. | Hence, the FIB lookup on line S15 is done in the same FIB table | as the ingress interface.
4.1.1. Upper-Layer Header
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When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB entry locally instantiated as an End SID, N does the following:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type is allowed by local configuration) { S02. Proceed to process the Upper-Layer header S03. } Else { S04. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address with Code 4 (SR Upper-layer Header Error) and Pointer set to the offset of the Upper-Layer header, interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet. S05 }Allowing the processing of specific Upper-Layer header types is useful for Operations, Administration, and Maintenance (OAM). As an example, an operator might permit pinging of SIDs. To do this, they may enable local configuration to allow Upper-Layer header type 58 (ICMPv6).
It is RECOMMENDED that an implementation of local configuration only allows Upper-Layer header processing of types that do not result in the packet being forwarded (e.g., ICMPv6).
4.2. End.X: L3 Cross-Connect
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The "Endpoint with L3 cross-connect" behavior ("End.X" for short) is a variant of the End behavior.
It is the SRv6 instantiation of an Adj-SID [RFC8402], and its main use is for traffic-engineering policies.
Any SID instance of this behavior is associated with a set, J, of one or more L3 adjacencies.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.X SID, the line S15 from the End processing is replaced by the following:
S15. Submit the packet to the IPv6 module for transmission to the new destination via a member of J | Note: | | S15. If the set J contains several L3 adjacencies, then one | element of the set is selected based on a hash of the packet's | header (see Section 7).If a node N has 30 outgoing interfaces to 30 neighbors, usually the operator would explicitly instantiate 30 End.X SIDs at N: one per L3 adjacency to a neighbor. Potentially, more End.X could be explicitly defined (groups of L3 adjacencies to the same neighbor or to different neighbors).
Note that if N has an outgoing interface bundle I to a neighbor Q made of 10 member links, N might allocate up to 11 End.X local SIDs: one for the bundle itself and then up to one for each L2 member link. The flows steered using the End.X SID corresponding to the bundle itself get load-balanced across the member links via hashing while the flows steered using the End.X SID corresponding to a member link get steered over that specific member link alone.
When the End.X behavior is associated with a BGP Next-Hop, it is the SRv6 instantiation of the BGP peering segments [RFC8402].
When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB entry locally instantiated as an End.X SID, process the packet as per Section 4.1.1.
4.3. End.T: Specific IPv6 Table Lookup
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The "Endpoint with specific IPv6 table lookup" behavior ("End.T" for short) is a variant of the End behavior.
The End.T behavior is used for multi-table operation in the core. For this reason, an instance of the End.T behavior is associated with an IPv6 FIB table T.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.T SID, the line S15 from the End processing is replaced by the following:
S15.1. Set the packet's associated FIB table to T S15.2. Submit the packet to the egress IPv6 FIB lookup for transmission to the new destinationWhen processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB entry locally instantiated as an End.T SID, process the packet as per Section 4.1.1.
4.4. End.DX6: Decapsulation and IPv6 Cross-Connect
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The "Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv6 cross-connect" behavior ("End.DX6" for short) is a variant of the End.X behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DX6 behavior is the L3VPNv6 use case where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress Provider Edge (PE) is not required. This is equivalent to the per-CE VPN label in MPLS [RFC4364].
The End.DX6 SID MUST be the last segment in an SR Policy, and it is associated with one or more L3 IPv6 adjacencies J.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DX6 SID, N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed { S02. If (Segments Left != 0) { S03. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered) and Pointer set to the Segments Left field, interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet. S04. } S05. Proceed to process the next header in the packet S06. }When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB entry locally instantiated as an End.DX6 SID, N does the following:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 41(IPv6) ) { S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers S03. Forward the exposed IPv6 packet to the L3 adjacency J S04. } Else { S05. Process as per Section 4.1.1 S06. } | Note: | | S01. "41" refers to "IPv6 encapsulation" as defined in the IANA | "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers" registry. | | S03. If the End.DX6 SID is bound to an array of L3 | adjacencies, then one entry of the array is selected based on | the hash of the packet's header (see Section 7).
4.5. End.DX4: Decapsulation and IPv4 Cross-Connect
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The "Endpoint with decapsulation and IPv4 cross-connect" behavior ("End.DX4" for short) is a variant of the End.X behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DX4 behavior is the L3VPNv4 use case where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE is not required. This is equivalent to the per-CE VPN label in MPLS [RFC4364].
The End.DX4 SID MUST be the last segment in an SR Policy, and it is associated with one or more L3 IPv4 adjacencies J.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DX4 SID, N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed { S02. If (Segments Left != 0) { S03. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered) and Pointer set to the Segments Left field, interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet. S04. } S05. Proceed to process the next header in the packet S06. }When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB entry locally instantiated as an End.DX4 SID, N does the following:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 4(IPv4) ) { S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers S03. Forward the exposed IPv4 packet to the L3 adjacency J S04. } Else { S05. Process as per Section 4.1.1 S06. } | Note: | | S01. "4" refers to "IPv4 encapsulation" as defined in the IANA | "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers" registry. | | S03. If the End.DX4 SID is bound to an array of L3 | adjacencies, then one entry of the array is selected based on | the hash of the packet's header (see Section 7).
4.6. End.DT6: Decapsulation and Specific IPv6 Table Lookup
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The "Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IPv6 table lookup" behavior ("End.DT6" for short) is a variant of the End.T behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DT6 behavior is the L3VPNv6 use case where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE is required. This is equivalent to the per-VRF VPN label in MPLS [RFC4364].
Note that an End.DT6 may be defined for the main IPv6 table, in which case an End.DT6 supports the equivalent of an IPv6-in-IPv6 decapsulation (without VPN/tenant implication).
The End.DT6 SID MUST be the last segment in an SR Policy, and a SID instance is associated with an IPv6 FIB table T.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DT6 SID, N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed { S02. If (Segments Left != 0) { S03. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered) and Pointer set to the Segments Left field, interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet. S04. } S05. Proceed to process the next header in the packet S06. }When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB entry locally instantiated as an End.DT6 SID, N does the following:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 41(IPv6) ) { S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers S03. Set the packet's associated FIB table to T S04. Submit the packet to the egress IPv6 FIB lookup for transmission to the new destination S05. } Else { S06. Process as per Section 4.1.1 S07. }
4.7. End.DT4: Decapsulation and Specific IPv4 Table Lookup
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The "Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IPv4 table lookup" behavior ("End.DT4" for short) is a variant of the End.T behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DT4 behavior is the L3VPNv4 use case where a FIB lookup in a specific tenant table at the egress PE is required. This is equivalent to the per-VRF VPN label in MPLS [RFC4364].
Note that an End.DT4 may be defined for the main IPv4 table, in which case an End.DT4 supports the equivalent of an IPv4-in-IPv6 decapsulation (without VPN/tenant implication).
The End.DT4 SID MUST be the last segment in an SR Policy, and a SID instance is associated with an IPv4 FIB table T.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DT4 SID, N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed { S02. If (Segments Left != 0) { S03. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered) and Pointer set to the Segments Left field, interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet. S04. } S05. Proceed to process the next header in the packet S06. }When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB entry locally instantiated as an End.DT4 SID, N does the following:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 4(IPv4) ) { S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers S03. Set the packet's associated FIB table to T S04. Submit the packet to the egress IPv4 FIB lookup for transmission to the new destination S05. } Else { S06. Process as per Section 4.1.1 S07. }
4.8. End.DT46: Decapsulation and Specific IP Table Lookup
-
The "Endpoint with decapsulation and specific IP table lookup" behavior ("End.DT46" for short) is a variant of the End.DT4 and End.DT6 behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DT46 behavior is the L3VPN use case where a FIB lookup in a specific IP tenant table at the egress PE is required. This is equivalent to the single per-VRF VPN label (for IPv4 and IPv6) in MPLS [RFC4364].
Note that an End.DT46 may be defined for the main IP table, in which case an End.DT46 supports the equivalent of an IP-in-IPv6 decapsulation (without VPN/tenant implication).
The End.DT46 SID MUST be the last segment in an SR Policy, and a SID instance is associated with an IPv4 FIB table T4 and an IPv6 FIB table T6.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DT46 SID, N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed { S02. If (Segments Left != 0) { S03. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered) and Pointer set to the Segments Left field, interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet. S04. } S05. Proceed to process the next header in the packet S06. }When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB entry locally instantiated as an End.DT46 SID, N does the following:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 4(IPv4) ) { S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers S03. Set the packet's associated FIB table to T4 S04. Submit the packet to the egress IPv4 FIB lookup for transmission to the new destination S05. } Else if (Upper-Layer header type == 41(IPv6) ) { S06. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers S07. Set the packet's associated FIB table to T6 S08. Submit the packet to the egress IPv6 FIB lookup for transmission to the new destination S09. } Else { S10. Process as per Section 4.1.1 S11. }
4.9. End.DX2: Decapsulation and L2 Cross-Connect
-
The "Endpoint with decapsulation and L2 cross-connect" behavior ("End.DX2" for short) is a variant of the Endpoint behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DX2 behavior is the L2VPN [RFC4664] / EVPN Virtual Private Wire Service (VPWS) [RFC7432] [RFC8214] use case.
The End.DX2 SID MUST be the last segment in an SR Policy, and it is associated with one outgoing interface I.
When N receives a packet destined to S and S is a local End.DX2 SID, N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed { S02. If (Segments Left != 0) { S03. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered) and Pointer set to the Segments Left field, interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet. S04. } S05. Proceed to process the next header in the packet S06. }When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB entry locally instantiated as an End.DX2 SID, N does the following:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 143(Ethernet) ) { S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers S03. Forward the Ethernet frame to the OIF I S04. } Else { S05. Process as per Section 4.1.1 S06. } | Note: | | S01. IANA has allocated value "143" for "Ethernet" | [IEEE.802.3_2018] in the "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers" | registry (see Section 10.1). | | S03. An End.DX2 behavior could be customized to expect a | specific IEEE header (e.g., VLAN tag) and rewrite the egress | IEEE header before forwarding on the outgoing interface.Note that an End.DX2 SID may also be associated with a bundle of outgoing interfaces.
4.10. End.DX2V: Decapsulation and VLAN L2 Table Lookup
-
The "Endpoint with decapsulation and VLAN L2 table lookup" behavior ("End.DX2V" for short) is a variant of the End.DX2 behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DX2V behavior is the EVPN Flexible Cross-connect use case. The End.DX2V behavior is used to perform a lookup of the Ethernet frame VLANs in a particular L2 table. Any SID instance of this behavior is associated with an L2 table T.
When N receives a packet whose IPv6 DA is S and S is a local End.DX2 SID, the processing is identical to the End.DX2 behavior except for the Upper-Layer header processing, which is modified as follows:
S03. Look up the exposed VLANs in L2 table T, and forward
-
-
via the matched table entry.
-
| Note: | | S03. An End.DX2V behavior could be customized to expect a | specific VLAN format and rewrite the egress VLAN header before | forwarding on the outgoing interface.
4.11. End.DT2U: Decapsulation and Unicast MAC L2 Table Lookup
-
The "Endpoint with decapsulation and unicast MAC L2 table lookup" behavior ("End.DT2U" for short) is a variant of the End behavior.
One of the applications of the End.DT2U behavior is the EVPN Bridging Unicast [RFC7432]. Any SID instance of the End.DT2U behavior is associated with an L2 table T.
When N receives a packet whose IPv6 DA is S and S is a local End.DT2U SID, the processing is identical to the End.DX2 behavior except for the Upper-Layer header processing, which is as follows:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 143(Ethernet) ) { S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers S03. Learn the exposed MAC Source Address in L2 table T S04. Look up the exposed MAC Destination Address in L2 table T S05. If (matched entry in T) { S06. Forward via the matched table T entry S07. } Else { S08. Forward via all L2 OIFs in table T S09. } S10. } Else { S11. Process as per Section 4.1.1 S12. } | Note: | | S01. IANA has allocated value "143" for "Ethernet" in the | "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers" registry (see | Section 10.1). | | S03. In EVPN [RFC7432], the learning of the exposed MAC Source | Address is done via the control plane. In L2VPN Virtual | Private LAN Service (VPLS) [RFC4761] [RFC4762], reachability is | obtained by standard learning bridge functions in the data | plane.
4.12. End.DT2M: Decapsulation and L2 Table Flooding
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The "Endpoint with decapsulation and L2 table flooding" behavior ("End.DT2M" for short) is a variant of the End.DT2U behavior.
Two of the applications of the End.DT2M behavior are the EVPN Bridging of Broadcast, Unknown Unicast, and Multicast (BUM) traffic with Ethernet Segment Identifier (ESI) filtering [RFC7432] and the EVPN Ethernet-Tree (E-Tree) [RFC8317] use cases.
Any SID instance of this behavior is associated with an L2 table T. The behavior also takes an argument: "Arg.FE2". This argument provides a local mapping to ESI for split-horizon filtering of the received traffic to exclude a specific OIF (or set of OIFs) from L2 table T flooding. The allocation of the argument values is local to the SR Segment Endpoint Node instantiating this behavior, and the signaling of the argument to other nodes for the EVPN functionality occurs via the control plane.
When N receives a packet whose IPv6 DA is S and S is a local End.DT2M SID, the processing is identical to the End.DX2 behavior except for the Upper-Layer header processing, which is as follows:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 143(Ethernet) ) { S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers S03. Learn the exposed MAC Source Address in L2 table T S04. Forward via all L2 OIFs excluding those associated with the identifier Arg.FE2 S05. } Else { S06. Process as per Section 4.1.1 S07. } | Note: | | S01. IANA has allocated value "143" for "Ethernet" in the | "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers" registry (see | Section 10.1). | | S03. In EVPN [RFC7432], the learning of the exposed MAC Source | Address is done via the control plane. In L2VPN VPLS [RFC4761] | [RFC4762], reachability is obtained by standard learning bridge | functions in the data plane.
4.13. End.B6.Encaps: Endpoint Bound to an SRv6 Policy with
Encapsulation
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This is a variation of the End behavior.
One of its applications is to express scalable traffic-engineering policies across multiple domains. It is one of the SRv6 instantiations of a Binding SID [RFC8402].
Any SID instance of this behavior is associated with an SR Policy B and a source address A.
When N receives a packet whose IPv6 DA is S and S is a local End.B6.Encaps SID, N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed { S02. If (Segments Left == 0) { S03. Stop processing the SRH, and proceed to process the next header in the packet, whose type is identified by the Next Header field in the routing header. S04. } S05. If (IPv6 Hop Limit <= 1) { S06. Send an ICMP Time Exceeded message to the Source Address with Code 0 (Hop limit exceeded in transit), interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet. S07. } S08. max_LE = (Hdr Ext Len / 2) - 1 S09. If ((Last Entry > max_LE) or (Segments Left > Last Entry+1)) { S10. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered) and Pointer set to the Segments Left field, interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet. S11. } S12. Decrement IPv6 Hop Limit by 1 S13. Decrement Segments Left by 1 S14. Update IPv6 DA with Segment List[Segments Left] S15. Push a new IPv6 header with its own SRH containing B S16. Set the outer IPv6 SA to A S17. Set the outer IPv6 DA to the first SID of B S18. Set the outer Payload Length, Traffic Class, Flow Label, Hop Limit, and Next Header fields S19. Submit the packet to the egress IPv6 FIB lookup for transmission to the new destination S20. } | Note: | | S15. The SRH MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy B only | contains one SID and there is no need to use any flag, tag, or | TLV. | | S18. The Payload Length, Traffic Class, Hop Limit, and Next | Header fields are set as per [RFC2473]. The Flow Label is | computed as per [RFC6437].When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB entry locally instantiated as an End.B6.Encaps SID, process the packet as per Section 4.1.1.
4.14. End.B6.Encaps.Red: End.B6.Encaps with Reduced SRH
-
This is an optimization of the End.B6.Encaps behavior.
End.B6.Encaps.Red reduces the size of the SRH by one SID by excluding the first SID in the SRH of the new IPv6 header. Thus, the first segment is only placed in the IPv6 Destination Address of the new IPv6 header, and the packet is forwarded according to it.
The SRH Last Entry field is set as defined in Section 4.1.1 of [RFC8754].
The SRH MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy only contains one SID and there is no need to use any flag, tag, or TLV.
4.15. End.BM: Endpoint Bound to an SR-MPLS Policy
-
The "Endpoint bound to an SR-MPLS Policy" behavior ("End.BM" for short) is a variant of the End behavior.
The End.BM behavior is required to express scalable traffic- engineering policies across multiple domains where some domains support the MPLS instantiation of Segment Routing. This is an SRv6 instantiation of an SR-MPLS Binding SID [RFC8402].
Any SID instance of this behavior is associated with an SR-MPLS Policy B.
When N receives a packet whose IPv6 DA is S and S is a local End.BM SID, N does the following:
S01. When an SRH is processed { S02. If (Segments Left == 0) { S03. Stop processing the SRH, and proceed to process the next header in the packet, whose type is identified by the Next Header field in the routing header. S04. } S05. If (IPv6 Hop Limit <= 1) { S06. Send an ICMP Time Exceeded message to the Source Address with Code 0 (Hop limit exceeded in transit), interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet. S07. } S08. max_LE = (Hdr Ext Len / 2) - 1 S09. If ((Last Entry > max_LE) or (Segments Left > Last Entry+1)) { S10. Send an ICMP Parameter Problem to the Source Address with Code 0 (Erroneous header field encountered) and Pointer set to the Segments Left field, interrupt packet processing, and discard the packet. S11. } S12. Decrement IPv6 Hop Limit by 1 S13. Decrement Segments Left by 1 S14. Update IPv6 DA with Segment List[Segments Left] S15. Push the MPLS label stack for B S16. Submit the packet to the MPLS engine for transmission S17. }When processing the Upper-Layer header of a packet matching a FIB entry locally instantiated as an End.BM SID, process the packet as per Section 4.1.1.
4.16. Flavors
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The Penultimate Segment Pop (PSP) of the SRH, Ultimate Segment Pop (USP) of the SRH, and Ultimate Segment Decapsulation (USD) flavors are variants of the End, End.X, and End.T behaviors. The End, End.X, and End.T behaviors can support these flavors either individually or in combinations.
4.16.1. PSP: Penultimate Segment Pop of the SRH
4.16.1.1. Guidelines
-
SR Segment Endpoint Nodes advertise the SIDs instantiated on them via control-plane protocols as described in Section 8. Different behavior IDs are allocated for flavored and unflavored SIDs (see Table 6).
An SR Segment Endpoint Node that offers both PSP- and non-PSP- flavored behavior advertises them as two different SIDs.
The SR Segment Endpoint Node only advertises the PSP flavor if the operator enables this capability at the node.
The PSP operation is deterministically controlled by the SR source node.
A PSP-flavored SID is used by the SR source node when it needs to instruct the penultimate SR Segment Endpoint Node listed in the SRH to remove the SRH from the IPv6 header.
4.16.1.2. Definition
-
SR Segment Endpoint Nodes receive the IPv6 packet with the Destination Address field of the IPv6 header equal to its SID address.
A penultimate SR Segment Endpoint Node is one that, as part of the SID processing, copies the last SID from the SRH into the IPv6 Destination Address and decrements the Segments Left value from one to zero.
The PSP operation only takes place at a penultimate SR Segment Endpoint Node and does not happen at any transit node. When a SID of PSP flavor is processed at a non-penultimate SR Segment Endpoint Node, the PSP behavior is not performed as described in the pseudocode below since Segments Left would not be zero.
The SRH processing of the End, End.X, and End.T behaviors are modified: after the instruction "S14. Update IPv6 DA with Segment List[Segments Left]" is executed, the following instructions must be executed as well:
S14.1. If (Segments Left == 0) { S14.2. Update the Next Header field in the preceding header to the Next Header value from the SRH S14.3. Decrease the IPv6 header Payload Length by 8*(Hdr Ext Len+1) S14.4. Remove the SRH from the IPv6 extension header chain S14.5. }The usage of PSP does not increase the MTU of the IPv6 packet and hence does not have any impact on the Path MTU (PMTU) discovery mechanism.
As a reminder, Section 5 of [RFC8754] defines the SR Deployment Model within the SR Domain [RFC8402]. Within this framework, the Authentication Header (AH) is not used to secure the SRH as described in Section 7.5 of [RFC8754]. Hence, the discussion of applicability of PSP along with AH usage is beyond the scope of this document.
In the context of this specification, the End, End.X, and End.T behaviors with PSP do not contravene Section 4 of [RFC8200] because the destination address of the incoming packet is the address of the node executing the behavior.
4.16.1.3. Use Case
-
One use case for the PSP functionality is streamlining the operation of an egress border router.
+----------------------------------------------------+ | | +-+-+ +--+ +--+ +--+ +-+-+ |iPE+-------->+R2+-------->+R3+-------->+R4+-------->+ePE| | R1| +--+ +--+ +--+ |R5 | +-+-+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-+-+ | |IPv6 | |IPv6 | |IPv6 | |IPv6 | | | |DA=R3| |DA=R3| |DA=R5| |DA=R5| | | +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ +-----+ | | | SRH | | SRH | | IP | | IP | | | |SL=1 | |SL=1 | +-----+ +-----+ | | | R5 | | R5 | | | +-----+ +-----+ | | | IP | | IP | | | +-----+ +-----+ | | | +----------------------------------------------------+
Figure 1: PSP Use Case Topology
-
In the above illustration, for a packet sent from the ingress provider edge (iPE) to the egress provider edge (ePE), node R3 is an intermediate traffic-engineering waypoint and is the penultimate segment endpoint router; this node copies the last segment from the SRH into the IPv6 Destination Address and decrements Segments Left to 0. The Software-Defined Networking (SDN) controller knows that no other node after R3 needs to inspect the SRH, and it instructs R3 to remove the exhausted SRH from the packet by using a PSP-flavored SID.
The benefits for the egress PE are straightforward:
- As part of the decapsulation process, the egress PE is required to parse and remove fewer bytes from the packet.
* If a lookup on an upper-layer IP header is required (e.g., per-VRF VPN), the header is more likely to be within the memory accessible to the lookup engine in the forwarding ASIC (Application-Specific Integrated Circuit).
4.16.2. USP: Ultimate Segment Pop of the SRH
-
The SRH processing of the End, End.X, and End.T behaviors are modified; the instructions S02-S04 are substituted by the following ones:
S02. If (Segments Left == 0) { S03.1. Update the Next Header field in the preceding header to the Next Header value of the SRH S03.2. Decrease the IPv6 header Payload Length by 8*(Hdr Ext Len+1) S03.3. Remove the SRH from the IPv6 extension header chain S03.4. Proceed to process the next header in the packet S04. }One of the applications of the USP flavor is when a packet with an SRH is destined to an application on hosts with smartNICs ("Smart Network Interface Cards") implementing SRv6. The USP flavor is used to remove the consumed SRH from the extension header chain before sending the packet to the host.
4.16.3. USD: Ultimate Segment Decapsulation
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The Upper-Layer header processing of the End, End.X, and End.T behaviors are modified as follows:
End:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 41(IPv6) ) { S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers S03. Submit the packet to the egress IPv6 FIB lookup for transmission to the new destination S04. } Else if (Upper-Layer header type == 4(IPv4) ) { S05. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers S06. Submit the packet to the egress IPv4 FIB lookup for transmission to the new destination S07. Else { S08. Process as per Section 4.1.1 S09. }End.T:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 41(IPv6) ) { S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers S03. Set the packet's associated FIB table to T S04. Submit the packet to the egress IPv6 FIB lookup for transmission to the new destination S05. } Else if (Upper-Layer header type == 4(IPv4) ) { S06. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers S07. Set the packet's associated FIB table to T S08. Submit the packet to the egress IPv4 FIB lookup for transmission to the new destination S09. Else { S10. Process as per Section 4.1.1 S11. }End.X:
S01. If (Upper-Layer header type == 41(IPv6) || Upper-Layer header type == 4(IPv4) ) { S02. Remove the outer IPv6 header with all its extension headers S03. Forward the exposed IP packet to the L3 adjacency J S04. } Else { S05. Process as per Section 4.1.1 S06. }One of the applications of the USD flavor is the case of a Topology Independent Loop-Free Alternate (TI-LFA) in P routers with encapsulation. The USD flavor allows the last SR Segment Endpoint Node in the repair path list to decapsulate the IPv6 header added at the TI-LFA Point of Local Repair and forward the inner packet.
5. SR Policy Headend Behaviors
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This section describes a set of SRv6 Policy Headend [RFC8402] behaviors.
+-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | H.Encaps | SR Headend with Encapsulation in an SR Policy | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | H.Encaps.Red | H.Encaps with Reduced Encapsulation | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | H.Encaps.L2 | H.Encaps Applied to Received L2 Frames | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+ | H.Encaps.L2.Red | H.Encaps.Red Applied to Received L2 Frames | +-----------------+-----------------------------------------------+
Table 2: SR Policy Headend Behaviors
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This list is not exhaustive, and future documents may define additional behaviors.
5.1. H.Encaps: SR Headend with Encapsulation in an SR Policy
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Node N receives two packets P1=(A, B2) and P2=(A,B2)(B3, B2, B1; SL=1). B2 is neither a local address nor SID of N.
Node N is configured with an IPv6 address T (e.g., assigned to its loopback).
N steers the transit packets P1 and P2 into an SRv6 Policy with a Source Address T and a segment list <S1, S2, S3>.
The H.Encaps encapsulation behavior is defined as follows:
S01. Push an IPv6 header with its own SRH S02. Set outer IPv6 SA = T and outer IPv6 DA to the first SID in the segment list S03. Set outer Payload Length, Traffic Class, Hop Limit, and Flow Label fields S04. Set the outer Next Header value S05. Decrement inner IPv6 Hop Limit or IPv4 TTL S06. Submit the packet to the IPv6 module for transmission to S1 | Note: | | S03: As described in [RFC2473] and [RFC6437].After the H.Encaps behavior, P1' and P2' respectively look like:
* (T, S1) (S3, S2, S1; SL=2) (A, B2) * (T, S1) (S3, S2, S1; SL=2) (A, B2) (B3, B2, B1; SL=1)
The received packet is encapsulated unmodified (with the exception of the IPv4 TTL or IPv6 Hop Limit that is decremented as described in [RFC2473]).
The H.Encaps behavior is valid for any kind of L3 traffic. This behavior is commonly used for L3VPN with IPv4 and IPv6 deployments. It may be also used for TI-LFA [SR-TI-LFA] at the Point of Local Repair.
The push of the SRH MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy only contains one segment and there is no need to use any flag, tag, or TLV.
5.2. H.Encaps.Red: H.Encaps with Reduced Encapsulation
-
The H.Encaps.Red behavior is an optimization of the H.Encaps behavior.
H.Encaps.Red reduces the length of the SRH by excluding the first SID in the SRH of the pushed IPv6 header. The first SID is only placed in the Destination Address field of the pushed IPv6 header.
After the H.Encaps.Red behavior, P1' and P2' respectively look like:
* (T, S1) (S3, S2; SL=2) (A, B2) * (T, S1) (S3, S2; SL=2) (A, B2) (B3, B2, B1; SL=1)
The push of the SRH MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy only contains one segment and there is no need to use any flag, tag, or TLV.
5.3. H.Encaps.L2: H.Encaps Applied to Received L2 Frames
-
The H.Encaps.L2 behavior encapsulates a received Ethernet [IEEE.802.3_2018] frame and its attached VLAN header, if present, in an IPv6 packet with an SRH. The Ethernet frame becomes the payload of the new IPv6 packet.
The Next Header field of the SRH MUST be set to 143.
The push of the SRH MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy only contains one segment and there is no need to use any flag, tag, or TLV.
The encapsulating node MUST remove the preamble (if any) and frame check sequence (FCS) from the Ethernet frame upon encapsulation, and the decapsulating node MUST regenerate, as required, the preamble and FCS before forwarding the Ethernet frame.
5.4. H.Encaps.L2.Red: H.Encaps.Red Applied to Received L2 Frames
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The H.Encaps.L2.Red behavior is an optimization of the H.Encaps.L2 behavior.
H.Encaps.L2.Red reduces the length of the SRH by excluding the first SID in the SRH of the pushed IPv6 header. The first SID is only placed in the Destination Address field of the pushed IPv6 header.
The push of the SRH MAY be omitted when the SRv6 Policy only contains one segment and there is no need to use any flag, tag, or TLV.
6. Counters
-
A node supporting this document SHOULD implement a pair of traffic counters (one for packets and one for bytes) per local SID entry, for traffic that matched that SID and was processed successfully (i.e., packets that generate ICMP Error Messages or are dropped are not counted). The retrieval of these counters from MIB, NETCONF/YANG, or any other data structure is outside the scope of this document.
7. Flow-Based Hash Computation
-
When a flow-based selection within a set needs to be performed, the IPv6 Source Address, the IPv6 Destination Address, and the IPv6 Flow Label of the outer IPv6 header MUST be included in the flow-based hash.
This may occur in any of the following scenarios:
- A FIB lookup is performed and multiple ECMP paths exist to the updated destination address.
- End.X, End.DX4, or End.DX6 is bound to an array of adjacencies.
- The packet is steered in an SR Policy whose selected path has multiple SID lists.
Additionally, any transit router in an SRv6 domain includes the outer flow label in its ECMP flow-based hash [RFC6437].
8. Control Plane
-
In an SDN environment, one expects the controller to explicitly provision the SIDs and/or discover them as part of a service discovery function. Applications residing on top of the controller could then discover the required SIDs and combine them to form a distributed network program.
The concept of "SRv6 Network Programming" refers to the capability of an application to encode any complex program as a set of individual functions distributed through the network. Some functions relate to underlay SLA, others to overlay/tenant, and others to complex applications residing in VMs and containers.
While not necessary for an SDN control plane, the remainder of this section provides a high-level illustrative overview of how control- plane protocols may be involved with SRv6. Their specification is outside the scope of this document.
8.1. IGP
-
The End, End.T, and End.X SIDs express topological behaviors and hence are expected to be signaled in the IGP together with the flavors PSP, USP, and USD. The IGP should also advertise the Maximum SID Depth (MSD) capability of the node for each type of SRv6 operation -- in particular, the SR source (e.g., H.Encaps), intermediate endpoint (e.g., End and End.X), and final endpoint (e.g., End.DX4 and End.DT6) behaviors. These capabilities are factored in by an SR source node (or a controller) during the SR Policy computation.
The presence of SIDs in the IGP does not imply any routing semantics to the addresses represented by these SIDs. The routing reachability to an IPv6 address is solely governed by the non-SID-related IGP prefix reachability information that includes locators. Routing is neither governed nor influenced in any way by a SID advertisement in the IGP.
These SIDs provide important topological behaviors for the IGP to build Fast Reroute (FRR) solutions based on TI-LFA [SR-TI-LFA] and for TE processes relying on an IGP topology database to build SR Policies.
8.2. BGP-LS
-
BGP-LS provides the functionality for topology discovery that includes the SRv6 capabilities of the nodes, their locators, and locally instantiated SIDs. This enables controllers or applications to build an inter-domain topology that can be used for computation of SR Policies using the SRv6 SIDs.
8.3. BGP IP/VPN/EVPN
-
The End.DX4, End.DX6, End.DT4, End.DT6, End.DT46, End.DX2, End.DX2V, End.DT2U, and End.DT2M SIDs can be signaled in BGP.
In some scenarios, an egress PE advertising a VPN route might wish to abstract the specific behavior bound to the SID from the ingress PE and other routers in the network. In such case, the SID may be advertised using the Opaque SRv6 Endpoint Behavior codepoint defined in Table 6. The details of such control-plane signaling mechanisms are out of the scope of this document.
8.4. Summary
-
The following table summarizes which SID behaviors may be signaled in which control-plane protocol.
+=======================+=====+========+=================+ | | IGP | BGP-LS | BGP IP/VPN/EVPN | +=======================+=====+========+=================+ | End (PSP, USP, USD) | X | X | | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | End.X (PSP, USP, USD) | X | X | | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | End.T (PSP, USP, USD) | X | X | | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | End.DX6 | X | X | X | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | End.DX4 | X | X | X | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | End.DT6 | X | X | X | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | End.DT4 | X | X | X | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | End.DT46 | X | X | X | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | End.DX2 | | X | X | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | End.DX2V | | X | X | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | End.DT2U | | X | X | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | End.DT2M | | X | X | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | End.B6.Encaps | | X | | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | End.B6.Encaps.Red | | X | | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | End.B6.BM | | X | | +-----------------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
Table 3: SRv6 Locally Instantiated SIDs Signaling
-
The following table summarizes which SR Policy Headend capabilities may be signaled in which control-plane protocol.
+=================+=====+========+=================+ | | IGP | BGP-LS | BGP IP/VPN/EVPN | +=================+=====+========+=================+ | H.Encaps | X | X | | +-----------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | H.Encaps.Red | X | X | | +-----------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | H.Encaps.L2 | | X | | +-----------------+-----+--------+-----------------+ | H.Encaps.L2.Red | | X | | +-----------------+-----+--------+-----------------+
Table 4: SRv6 Policy Headend Behaviors Signaling
-
The previous table describes generic capabilities. It does not describe specific instantiated SR Policies.
For example, a BGP-LS advertisement of H.Encaps behavior would describe the capability of node N to perform H.Encaps behavior. Specifically, it would describe how many SIDs could be pushed by N without significant performance degradation.
As a reminder, an SR Policy is always assigned a Binding SID [RFC8402]. Binding SIDs are also advertised in BGP-LS as shown in Table 3. Hence, Table 4 only focuses on the generic capabilities related to H.Encaps.
9. Security Considerations
-
The security considerations for Segment Routing are discussed in [RFC8402]. Section 5 of [RFC8754] describes the SR Deployment Model and the requirements for securing the SR Domain. The security considerations of [RFC8754] also cover topics such as attack vectors and their mitigation mechanisms that also apply the behaviors introduced in this document. Together, they describe the required security mechanisms that allow establishment of an SR domain of trust. Having such a well-defined trust boundary is necessary in order to operate SRv6-based services for internal traffic while preventing any external traffic from accessing or exploiting the SRv6-based services. Care and rigor in IPv6 address allocation for use for SRv6 SID allocations and network infrastructure addresses, as distinct from IPv6 addresses allocated for end users and systems (as illustrated in Section 5.1 of [RFC8754]), can provide the clear distinction between internal and external address space that is required to maintain the integrity and security of the SRv6 Domain. Additionally, [RFC8754] defines a Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) TLV permitting SR Segment Endpoint Nodes in the SR domain to verify that the SRH applied to a packet was selected by an authorized party and to ensure that the segment list is not modified after generation, regardless of the number of segments in the segment list. When enabled by local configuration, HMAC processing occurs at the beginning of SRH processing as defined in Section 2.1.2.1 of [RFC8754].
This document introduces SRv6 Endpoint and SR Policy Headend behaviors for implementation on SRv6-capable nodes in the network. The definition of the SR Policy Headend should be consistent with the specific behavior used and any local configuration (as specified in Section 4.1.1). As such, this document does not introduce any new security considerations.
The SID behaviors specified in this document have the same HMAC TLV handling and mutability properties with regard to the Flags, Tag, and Segment List field as the SID behavior specified in [RFC8754].
10. IANA Considerations
10.1. Ethernet Next Header Type
-
IANA has allocated "Ethernet" (value 143) in the "Assigned Internet Protocol Numbers" registry (see <https://www.iana.org/assignments/ protocol-numbers/>). Value 143 in the Next Header field of an IPv6 header or any extension header indicates that the payload is an Ethernet frame [IEEE.802.3_2018].
10.2. SRv6 Endpoint Behaviors Registry
-
IANA has created a new top-level registry called "Segment Routing" (see <https://www.iana.org/assignments/segment-routing/>). This registry serves as a top-level registry for all Segment Routing subregistries.
Additionally, IANA has created a new subregistry called "SRv6 Endpoint Behaviors" under the top-level "Segment Routing" registry. This subregistry maintains 16-bit identifiers for the SRv6 Endpoint behaviors. This registry is established to provide consistency for control-plane protocols that need to refer to these behaviors. These values are not encoded in the function bits within a SID.
10.2.1. Registration Procedures
-
The range of the registry is 0-65535 (0x0000-0xFFFF). The table below contains the allocation ranges and registration policies [RFC8126] for each:
+=============+===============+=========================+===========+ | Range | Range (Hex) | Registration | Note | | | | Procedures | | +=============+===============+=========================+===========+ | 0 | 0x0000 | Reserved | Not to be | | | | | allocated | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 1-32767 | 0x0001-0x7FFF | First Come | | | | | First Served | | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 32768-34815 | 0x8000-0x87FF | Private Use | | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 34816-65534 | 0x8800-0xFFFE | Reserved | | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 65535 | 0xFFFF | Reserved | Opaque | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
Table 5: Registration Procedures
10.2.2. Initial Registrations
-
The initial registrations for the subregistry are as follows:
+=============+===============+=========================+===========+ | Value | Hex | Endpoint Behavior | Reference | +=============+===============+=========================+===========+ | 0 | 0x0000 | Reserved | | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 1 | 0x0001 | End | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 2 | 0x0002 | End with PSP | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 3 | 0x0003 | End with USP | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 4 | 0x0004 | End with PSP & USP | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 5 | 0x0005 | End.X | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 6 | 0x0006 | End.X with PSP | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 7 | 0x0007 | End.X with USP | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 8 | 0x0008 | End.X with PSP & USP | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 9 | 0x0009 | End.T | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 10 | 0x000A | End.T with PSP | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 11 | 0x000B | End.T with USP | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 12 | 0x000C | End.T with PSP & USP | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 13 | 0x000D | Unassigned | | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 14 | 0x000E | End.B6.Encaps | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 15 | 0x000F | End.BM | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 16 | 0x0010 | End.DX6 | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 17 | 0x0011 | End.DX4 | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 18 | 0x0012 | End.DT6 | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 19 | 0x0013 | End.DT4 | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 20 | 0x0014 | End.DT46 | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 21 | 0x0015 | End.DX2 | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 22 | 0x0016 | End.DX2V | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 23 | 0x0017 | End.DT2U | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 24 | 0x0018 | End.DT2M | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 25 | 0x0019 | Reserved | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 26 | 0x001A | Unassigned | | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 27 | 0x001B | End.B6.Encaps.Red | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 28 | 0x001C | End with USD | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 29 | 0x001D | End with PSP & USD | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 30 | 0x001E | End with USP & USD | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 31 | 0x001F | End with PSP, USP & | RFC 8986 | | | | USD | | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 32 | 0x0020 | End.X with USD | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 33 | 0x0021 | End.X with PSP & USD | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 34 | 0x0022 | End.X with USP & USD | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 35 | 0x0023 | End.X with PSP, USP | RFC 8986 | | | | & USD | | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 36 | 0x0024 | End.T with USD | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 37 | 0x0025 | End.T with PSP & USD | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 38 | 0x0026 | End.T with USP & USD | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 39 | 0x0027 | End.T with PSP, USP | RFC 8986 | | | | & USD | | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 40-32766 | 0x0028-0x7FFE | Unassigned | | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 32767 | 0x7FFF | The SID defined in | RFC 8986, | | | | RFC 8754 | RFC 8754 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 32768-34815 | 0x8000-0x87FF | Reserved for Private | RFC 8986 | | | | Use | | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 34816-65534 | 0x8800-0xFFFE | Reserved | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+ | 65535 | 0xFFFF | Opaque | RFC 8986 | +-------------+---------------+-------------------------+-----------+
Table 6: Initial Registrations
11. References
11.1. Normative References
-
[IEEE.802.3_2018]
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Ethernet", IEEE 802.3-2018, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2018.8457469, 31 August 2018, <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8457469>. [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>. [RFC2473] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Generic Packet Tunneling in IPv6 Specification", RFC 2473, DOI 10.17487/RFC2473, December 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2473>. [RFC6437] Amante, S., Carpenter, B., Jiang, S., and J. Rajahalme, "IPv6 Flow Label Specification", RFC 6437, DOI 10.17487/RFC6437, November 2011, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6437>. [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>. [RFC8200] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", STD 86, RFC 8200, DOI 10.17487/RFC8200, July 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8200>. [RFC8402] Filsfils, C., Ed., Previdi, S., Ed., Ginsberg, L., Decraene, B., Litkowski, S., and R. Shakir, "Segment Routing Architecture", RFC 8402, DOI 10.17487/RFC8402, July 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8402>. [RFC8754] Filsfils, C., Ed., Dukes, D., Ed., Previdi, S., Leddy, J., Matsushima, S., and D. Voyer, "IPv6 Segment Routing Header (SRH)", RFC 8754, DOI 10.17487/RFC8754, March 2020, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8754>.
11.2. Informative References
-
[RFC4193] Hinden, R. and B. Haberman, "Unique Local IPv6 Unicast Addresses", RFC 4193, DOI 10.17487/RFC4193, October 2005, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4193>. [RFC4364] Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)", RFC 4364, DOI 10.17487/RFC4364, February 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4364>. [RFC4664] Andersson, L., Ed. and E. Rosen, Ed., "Framework for Layer 2 Virtual Private Networks (L2VPNs)", RFC 4664, DOI 10.17487/RFC4664, September 2006, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4664>. [RFC4761] Kompella, K., Ed. and Y. Rekhter, Ed., "Virtual Private LAN Service (VPLS) Using BGP for Auto-Discovery and Signaling", RFC 4761, DOI 10.17487/RFC4761, January 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4761>. [RFC4762] Lasserre, M., Ed. and V. Kompella, Ed., "Virtual Private LAN Service (VPLS) Using Label Distribution Protocol (LDP) Signaling", RFC 4762, DOI 10.17487/RFC4762, January 2007, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4762>. [RFC7432] Sajassi, A., Ed., Aggarwal, R., Bitar, N., Isaac, A., Uttaro, J., Drake, J., and W. Henderickx, "BGP MPLS-Based Ethernet VPN", RFC 7432, DOI 10.17487/RFC7432, February 2015, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7432>. [RFC8126] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC 8126, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126>. [RFC8214] Boutros, S., Sajassi, A., Salam, S., Drake, J., and J. Rabadan, "Virtual Private Wire Service Support in Ethernet VPN", RFC 8214, DOI 10.17487/RFC8214, August 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8214>. [RFC8317] Sajassi, A., Ed., Salam, S., Drake, J., Uttaro, J., Boutros, S., and J. Rabadan, "Ethernet-Tree (E-Tree) Support in Ethernet VPN (EVPN) and Provider Backbone Bridging EVPN (PBB-EVPN)", RFC 8317, DOI 10.17487/RFC8317, January 2018, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8317>.
[SR-TI-LFA]
Litkowski, S., Bashandy, A., Filsfils, C., Francois, P., Decraene, B., and D. Voyer, "Topology Independent Fast Reroute using Segment Routing", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rtgwg-segment-routing-ti-lfa- 06, 1 February 2021, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft- ietf-rtgwg-segment-routing-ti-lfa-06>.[SRV6-NET-PGM-ILLUST]
Filsfils, C., Camarillo, P., Ed., Li, Z., Matsushima, S., Decraene, B., Steinberg, D., Lebrun, D., Raszuk, R., and J. Leddy, "Illustrations for SRv6 Network Programming", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-filsfils-spring- srv6-net-pgm-illustration-03, 25 September 2020, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-filsfils-spring-srv6- net-pgm-illustration-03>.
Acknowledgements
-
The authors would like to acknowledge Stefano Previdi, Dave Barach, Mark Townsley, Peter Psenak, Thierry Couture, Kris Michielsen, Paul Wells, Robert Hanzl, Dan Ye, Gaurav Dawra, Faisal Iqbal, Jaganbabu Rajamanickam, David Toscano, Asif Islam, Jianda Liu, Yunpeng Zhang, Jiaoming Li, Narendra A.K, Mike Mc Gourty, Bhupendra Yadav, Sherif Toulan, Satish Damodaran, John Bettink, Kishore Nandyala Veera Venk, Jisu Bhattacharya, Saleem Hafeez, and Brian Carpenter.
Contributors
-
Daniel Bernier
Bell Canada
CanadaEmail: daniel.bernier@bell.ca
Dirk Steinberg
Lapishills Consulting Limited
CyprusEmail:
dirk@lapishills.com
Robert Raszuk
Bloomberg LP
United States of AmericaEmail:
robert@raszuk.net
Bruno Decraene
Orange
FranceEmail: bruno.decraene@orange.com
Bart Peirens
Proximus
BelgiumEmail: bart.peirens@proximus.com
Hani Elmalky
Google
United States of AmericaEmail:
helmalky@google.com
Prem Jonnalagadda
Barefoot Networks
United States of AmericaEmail:
prem@barefootnetworks.com
Milad Sharif
SambaNova Systems
United States of AmericaEmail: milad.sharif@sambanova.ai
David Lebrun
Google
BelgiumEmail:
dlebrun@google.com
Stefano Salsano
Universita di Roma "Tor Vergata"
ItalyEmail: stefano.salsano@uniroma2.it
Ahmed AbdelSalam
Gran Sasso Science Institute
ItalyEmail: ahmed.abdelsalam@gssi.it
Gaurav Naik
Drexel University
United States of AmericaEmail:
gn@drexel.edu
Arthi Ayyangar
Arrcus, Inc
United States of AmericaEmail:
arthi@arrcus.com
Satish Mynam
Arrcus, Inc
United States of AmericaEmail:
satishm@arrcus.com
Wim Henderickx
Nokia
BelgiumEmail: wim.henderickx@nokia.com
Shaowen Ma
Juniper
SingaporeEmail:
mashao@juniper.net
Ahmed Bashandy
Individual
United States of AmericaEmail: abashandy.ietf@gmail.com
Francois Clad
Cisco Systems, Inc.
FranceEmail:
fclad@cisco.com
Kamran Raza
Cisco Systems, Inc.
CanadaEmail:
skraza@cisco.com
Darren Dukes
Cisco Systems, Inc.
CanadaEmail:
ddukes@cisco.com
Patrice Brissete
Cisco Systems, Inc.
CanadaEmail:
pbrisset@cisco.com
Zafar Ali
Cisco Systems, Inc.
United States of AmericaEmail:
zali@cisco.com
Ketan Talaulikar
Cisco Systems, Inc.
IndiaEmail:
ketant@cisco.com
Authors' Addresses
-
Clarence Filsfils (editor) Cisco Systems, Inc. Belgium
Email:
cf@cisco.com
Pablo Camarillo Garvia (editor)
Cisco Systems, Inc.
SpainEmail:
pcamaril@cisco.com
John Leddy
Akamai Technologies
United States of AmericaEmail:
john@leddy.net
Daniel Voyer
Bell Canada
CanadaEmail: daniel.voyer@bell.ca
Satoru Matsushima
SoftBank
JapanEmail: satoru.matsushima@g.softbank.co.jp
Zhenbin Li
Huawei Technologies
ChinaEmail:
lizhenbin@huawei.com